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A central issue for every company is to price the items for sale with the ob-
jective to maximize the revenue. If pricing decisions are made without suf-
ﬁcient research and analysis, the company can loose a signiﬁcant amount
of revenue. A low price can lead to a loss if interested customers are will-
ing to spend more to purchase the item. It will, however, also attract more
customers that would otherwise not buy the item. A high price generates
more revenue per sold item, but interested customers might decide not to
purchase the item simply because it is too expensive. Setting the price level
to maximize the revenue takes considerable market knowledge and algorith-
mic analysis.
1.1 Algorithmic pricing
The pricing problem is a two-level game between the company and the cus-
tomers. First, the company sets the prices for the items with the objective
to maximize the revenue. Then, regarding these prices, customers optimize
their own objective, which means that they decide which items they want to
purchase and whether they are willing to pay the price set by the company.
This two-level game, where the company is the leader and the customers are
the followers, is an instance of a Stackelberg game (von Stackelberg 1934).
Being the leader of the Stackelberg game, the company has to act ﬁrst.
Obviously, it is a great advantage to the company if it already has access
to information about the preferences of the customers at the moment the
prices are to be determined. Obtaining a thorough knowledge about the
target market is nowadays easier and more distributed than in the past,Chapter 1. Introduction
mainly through the use of the Internet (Rendleman 2001; Rusmevichien-
tong, van Roy, and Glynn 2006). A company can buy data about almost
every industry, product, trend and interest, in any manner that ﬁts best to
the company’s speciﬁc needs. Because of this large availability and easiness
to spread information, companies know what customers buy, how much they
spend and how frequently a product is purchased. That information can be
worth a lot of money if it is used to the fullest. In algorithmic pricing, we
address the computational problem that a company encounters when deter-
mining the prices in order to maximize the revenue, using all information
about the preferences of the customers.
Algorithmic pricing problems are also motivated by their importance in
the ﬁeld of algorithmic mechanism design1. In mechanism design problems,
the customers’ preferences are private information and thus unknown to
the company. The goal of the company is to create an incentive compatible
mechanism, which means that for all customers the best strategy is to truth-
fully reveal their private information. This particular problem is discussed
by Goldberg and Hartline (2001) and Goldberg et al. (2006). More speciﬁ-
cally, they study competitive auctions, which are auctions that achieve a rev-
enue that is a constant fraction of the optimal solution on every input of the
problem. This optimal revenue can be found using algorithmic pricing. Par-
ticularly, a general approach for reducing incentive compatible mechanism
design problems to the underlying algorithmic pricing problems is suggested
by Balcan et al. (2005) and further explored in Balcan et al. (2008). Hence,
there is interest in purely algorithmic pricing problems from the perspective
of mechanism design, as in order to solve the algorithmic mechanism design
problem, it is useful to understand how items should be priced when the
preferences of the customers are known.
In this thesis we address two different algorithmic pricing problems; the
single item pricing problem and the afﬁne pricing problem. The ﬁrst part of
this thesis is dedicated to the single item pricing problem. In Chapters 2, 3
and 4, we address the complexity of this problem subject to several natural
constraints, and develop algorithms to solve or approximate these problems.
The second part is devoted to the afﬁne pricing problem. We consider the
computational complexity of this problem in Chapter 5, and describe practi-
1For further reading on algorithmic mechanism design, we refer to Nisan and Ronen
(1999), Mu’alem and Nisan (2002), Archer et al. (2003), Abrams (2006), Aggarwal and Hart-
line (2006), Balcan, Blum, and Mansour (2007), and a recent survey by Hartline and Karlin
(2007).
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cal settings in which this problem can be applied in Chapters 6 and 7. Next
to the theoretical results, we conduct several computational studies in the
last three chapters of this thesis.
The single item pricing problem and the afﬁne pricing problem are in-
troduced in the following two sections.
1.2 Single item pricing
In single item pricing, the company owns a set of items for sale and wants
to determine a price for each item. Every customer requests one or more
subsets of items, referred to as bundles. Each bundle contains at most one
copy of every item. For every bundle a customer requests, she has a valua-
tion, which is the maximum amount she is willing to pay for that particular
bundle. The total price of a bundle is equal to the sum of the prices for all
items contained in the bundle. A customer is only interested in a bundle if
its price does not exceed her valuation. The company’s goal is to maximize
the revenue, which is equal to the total sum of prices of all items sold.
Customer proﬁles, and thus the way the requests are established, can
be very different. The two most important customer proﬁles in algorith-
mic pricing problems are unit-demand and single-minded. A unit-demand
customer requests many different bundles and has a separate valuation for
each of those. Based on the prices set by the company, the customer de-
termines the bundle that she prefers most, namely the one that yields the
highest positive utility which is equal to her valuation minus the price of
that particular bundle. In contrast to a unit-demand customer, a single-
minded customer is interested in one particular bundle only. By deﬁnition,
a customer is single-minded if and only if she has a positive valuation for
one bundle, and values all other bundles equal to zero. She purchases the
bundle with positive valuation if the total price does not exceed her valua-
tion. Single-minded customers with private valuations are widely discussed
in combinatorial auction theory2. However, in algorithmic pricing problems,
single-minded customers are introduced only recently.
Items can be available to customers in unlimited or limited supply. Un-
limited supply means that there are either at least as many copies per item
as there are customers, or that the items can instantly be produced without
signiﬁcant costs, which is for example generally the case for digital items.
2See e.g. Lehmann, O’Callaghan, and Shoham (2002), Mu’alem and Nisan (2002), Archer
et al. (2003), and Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg (2006).
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Consequently, every customer that can afford to purchase a particular bun-
dle is able to do so. In contrast, if items are available in limited supply, the
allocation of bundles to customers is a much harder task. It might occur that
some customers want to purchase a bundle but are unable to do so by the
limitation of available items. The company determines the prices and allo-
cates bundles of items to customers, and can choose to do this envy-free. In
game theory, envy-freeness is a property of a fair allocation of items to cus-
tomers who may have different preferences (Walras 1954; Gul and Stacchetti
1999). An allocation is said to be envy-free if no customer prefers another
bundle to her own (Foley 1967). Envy-freeness is recently introduced in sin-
gle item pricing (Aggarwal et al. 2004; Guruswami et al. 2005) to obtain a
better algorithmic understanding of game theory. In an optimal envy-free
pricing, the company has no incentive to change the prices on the items and
the customers have no incentive to complain about the allocation, given the
pricing. In the unit-demand case, this means that every customer gets a
bundle that has the largest utility to her, or no bundle at all if all utilities
are negative. In the single-minded case, every customer who can afford to
purchase the requested bundle will do so. Although an envy-free allocation
seems fair for all players in the market, companies will deﬁnitely not always
strive towards this property as it might reduce the revenue. The following
example shows that different prices are required if items are available in
unlimited and limited supply, and if envy-freeness is required or not.
Example 1.2.1. Consider a bookstore selling books with titles A, B and C,
among others. Four customers currently in the bookstore are interested in a
subset of these books. Customer 1 wants to buy book A for at most 10 euro.
Customer 2 wants to buy books A and B and spend at most 35 euro on both.
Customer 3 is interested in books A and C but only if they cost at most 25
euro. And customer 4 wants to purchase books B and C for at most 30 euro.
This situation is schematically displayed in Figure 1.1.
Let us consider the case where there are sufﬁciently many books available
for all customers. An optimal pricing is to set a price of 10 euro for book A,
and 15 euro for each of the other books. Then, customer 1 buys book A for 10
euro, customers 2 and 3 get their requested books for 25 euro, and customer 4
pays 30 euro. All customers can afford to buy the books they like to purchase,
and the total revenue for the bookstore is 90 euro. Notice that if the items are
available in unlimited supply, any optimal solution is an envy-free solution.
Suppose that there is only one copy of each book left in the bookstore.
Then, the seller of the books can decide to set the same prices as before, but
141.2. Single item pricing
now not all customers are able to purchase the books they are interested in.
The optimal revenue of 40 euro is obtained when book A is sold to customer 1
and books B and C are sold to customer 4. Obviously, customers 2 and 3 will
not be happy with this allocation because they can afford the books they want,
but are not able to buy them. An optimal envy-free solution is to price book A
to 15 euro, book B to 20 euro and book C to 11 euro. Then, only customer 2












Figure 1.1: Example of the single item pricing problem.
1.2.1 Tollbooth and highway problem
A special case of the single item pricing problem with single-minded cus-
tomers is the tollbooth problem, introduced by Guruswami et al. (2005). The
problem is motivated by determining tolls to be charged for segments of a
highway system. The capacity on the segments is assumed unlimited. The
customers each request to travel several consecutive segments of the high-
way system. In this setting, we regard the valuation of the customers as
a monetary expression of the time saving achieved by traveling the high-
way as opposed to taking an alternative route. Then, these valuations are
naturally public knowledge as is assumed for algorithmic pricing problems.
The goal of the owner of the highway is to choose tolls for the segments to
maximize the total revenue. We can model this setting such that the high-
way segments are edges on a simple graph, which represents the complete
highway system. Customers request to travel a path in the graph. The prob-
lem to the company is to price all edges to maximize the revenue. Similarly
as before, the price of a path is equal to the sum of prices for the edges on
this path, the customers only travel the path if its price does not exceed the
valuation, and the revenue is equal to the total sum of prices for all edges
traveled by customers.
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An even further restricted problem is the highway problem. Here, we
determine tolls on the segments of a single highway. The underlying graph is
thus a path of which customers request subpaths. As this particular problem
is extensively discussed in the next three chapters, we present an example
to further clarify the problem.
Example 1.2.2. Consider a highway containing three segments, A, B and C.
There are several alternative roads next to the highway. They are displayed
on the left of Figure 1.2, together with the costs for the travelers for choos-
ing such an alternative road. Suppose there are four customers. The ﬁrst
customer only wants to travel via segment A. Based on the alternative road
network, her valuation is 7. The second customer wants to travel B and C.
There is no direct alternative connection, so the valuation is 6Å4 Æ 10. The
third customer only travels C and has valuation 4. The last customer travels
all three segments. The cheapest alternative road is to ﬁrst pass A and B and
afterwards pass C, which gives a valuation of 11Å4 Æ 15. The right ﬁgure









Figure 1.2: Example of the highway problem.
The maximum revenue of 34 can be obtained by charging 5, 6 and 4 at
tollbooths A, B and C, respectively. Notice that this same revenue can also be
received by setting the prices at the tollbooths to 7, 4, and 4.
1.3 Afﬁne pricing
To introduce the afﬁne pricing problem, we consider the following applica-
tion. A telephone operator faces the problem to set prices in order to maxi-
mize the total revenue. The operator has to determine prices for one minute
of calling, sending one text message, establishing a connection, monthly fee,
etc. Based on the phone usage of the customers, the operator is well aware of
how, how often and during what times the customers use their phones. That
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is, the company knows what contract a customer requests, and moreover,
how much she is willing to pay for it. The contract price is personal to every
customer because, next to the prices set by the operator, it includes her per-
sonal demand with respect to using her phone. Furthermore, the customer
may be charged a ﬁxed cost for accepting the contract. Using the acquired
information, the operator can determine all prices to maximize the revenue
by solving the afﬁne pricing problem. We clarify this problem in an example,
and formally deﬁne it afterwards.
Example 1.3.1. In a ﬁxed period of time, four customers are interested in a
contract. One customer requests to call 250 minutes and send 25 text mes-
sages. Another customer wants to call 100 minutes and send 50 text messages.
The third customer requests to call 100 minutes and also send 100 text mes-
sages, and the last customer only wants to call 150 minutes. Their valuations
are 70, 35, 10 and 45, respectively. The ﬁxed price for accepting the contract
is 5 for the ﬁrst three customers, and 2.50 for the fourth customer.
The best pricing strategy is to charge 0.25 for one minute of calling and
0.10 per text message. Then, the contract price is 250¢0.25Å25¢0.10Å5Æ70
for the ﬁrst customer, 100¢0.25Å50¢0.10Å5 Æ 35 for the second customer,
50¢0.25Å100¢0.10Å5 Æ 27.50 for the third customer and 150¢0.25Å2.50 Æ
40 for the fourth customer. The third customer is not able to purchase her
requested contract, and consequently, she also does not pay the ﬁxed price.
Therefore, the total revenue is 145.
More general, in the afﬁne pricing problem the company wants to price
a set of distinct item types. These item types can be physical or digital prod-
ucts, but also services, shipping, or the start-up of a process. Every single-
minded customer requests one contract from the company based on her per-
sonal demand on the different item types available. This contract may con-
tain multiple copies of an item type. A customer accepts the contract if the
price of the contract does not exceed her valuation, which is the maximum
amount she is willing to pay for her contract. We might regard this as the
amount she has to pay for the same contract at any competing company,
which is naturally public knowledge. As a direct consequence hereof, the
customer will only accept the contract if it is the cheapest available in the
market. However, if the company is able to determine different valuations
through market research, this can obviously be used instead. The total price
of a customer’s contract is equal to a constant price per item type for every
unit she requests, and possibly a ﬁxed, customer dependent amount for ac-
cepting the contract. In other words, given the prices set by the company, the
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price a customer pays for her contract is an afﬁne function on her personal
request.
Afﬁne pricing can be implemented as a pricing tool in many different
companies. Because of the general structure, the item types can be anything
from physical product to service, traveling or shipping. When determining
the price of a contract, the item types do not have to be comparable. For
example, if a customer travels by train, the price of the ticket depends on
the distance, the class, the time and day at which she travels, whether she
owns a frequent travel card, etc. In this example, the supply can be regarded
as unlimited. However, similarly as in single item pricing, the availability
of the item types might be limited. Also, the notion of envy-freeness can still
be applied in afﬁne pricing.
1.3.1 Price regulation
Using afﬁne pricing to determine the optimal prices for the company, we also
touch on the problem in which the company has to deal with price regula-
tions. A price regulation refers to the policy of inﬂuencing price strategies by
a government agency. Price regulations occur in many industries, for exam-
ple, environmental or pharmaceutical. In some industries, the government
sets price ceilings while in other industries there may be price ﬂoors, or the
regulation can be imposed through taxation. Reasons for the government to
interfere are for example that prices are misleading, there exists price dis-
crimination in a market, companies use predatory pricing to take advantage
of customers or price ﬁxing in which several companies make arrangements
to artiﬁcially keep prices high. The government’s main purpose for using
price regulation is to protect the customers, without harming the market.
A recent example of price regulation is on roaming tariffs in the European
Union (European Commission, Information Society, Media Directorate Gen-
eral 2007). Roaming is using a mobile phone outside the geographical cov-
erage area of the home network, by means of using a visited network. The
price for roaming was on average four times higher than for domestic calls.
The repeated warnings to the operators to lower roaming charges voluntar-
ily were not taken seriously. National authorities felt powerless because
roaming is international calling. Therefore, the European Commission in-
terfered through price regulation. The goal of the regulation is to have fairer
prices charged to customers and among operators, and to improve the trans-
parency of the market.
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1.4 Related work
Although pricing is an extensively studied area in economics, algorithmic
pricing is a relatively new ﬁeld of research. Motivated by the availability
of customer data, Rusmevicientong (2003) and Rusmevichientong, van Roy,
and Glynn (2006) deﬁne a pricing problem in which customers are charac-
terized by their valuations for different items and a selection rule describing
how a customer selects an item among those she can afford once prices are
determined. The problem described is the single item pricing problem with
unit-demand customers, as each customer buys at most one item among all
items she is interested in. Aggarwal et al. (2004) ﬁrst considered approxi-
mation algorithms and the analysis of the computational complexity for this
problem. It is further discussed by Briest and Krysta (2007), Briest (2007),
Briest, Hoefer, and Krysta (2008) and Briest (2008).
The single item pricing problem as addressed in this thesis was intro-
duced by Guruswami et al. (2005). They show that the problem is APX-hard,
for both limited and unlimited supply. APX is the subclass of NP Optimiza-
tion problems that admit constant-factor approximation algorithms. APX-
hardness denies the existence of a polynomial time approximation scheme
(PTAS), which is an algorithm that, for any " È 0, is guaranteed to ﬁnd a
solution whose revenue is within a factor (1Å") of the optimum revenue,
in polynomial time depending on ". In the same paper, the authors de-
rive an O(logn)-approximation algorithm for the limited supply problem
with unit-demand customers, and an O(lognÅlogm)-approximation for the
unlimited supply problem with single-minded customers, where n is the
number of customers and m is the number of items. Hartline and Koltun
(2005) design near-linear and near-cubic time approximation schemes un-
der the assumption that the number of distinct items is constant. Briest
and Krysta (2006) show that the APX-hardness proof from Guruswami et al.
(2005) holds for even more restricted instances of the problem. Balcan and
Blum (2006) derive an O(k)-approximation for the instance where each cus-
tomer is interested in bundles containing at most k items, improving the
O(k2)-approximation of Briest and Krysta (2006). For the single item pric-
ing problem with unlimited supply and single-minded customers, Demaine
et al. (2006) prove semi-logarithmic inapproximability. More speciﬁcally,
they show that the problem is hard to approximate within a factor of O(log"n)
for some "È0, assuming that NP * BPTIME(2O(n±)) for all ±È0. In partic-
ular, because of this result it is unlikely that a constant-factor approxima-
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tion algorithm exists. There exist two fully polynomial time approximation
schemes by Briest and Krysta (2006) and Balcan and Blum (2006) for the
problem where the bundles are a laminar family, that is, for any two bun-
dles it holds that either one is a subset of the other or they do not intersect.
A fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for a maximization
problem assures that, for any " È 0, we have an algorithm that computes a
solution with revenue at least (1¡") times the optimum revenue, in time
polynomial in the input and 1/". Finally, Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg
(2007) describe the single item pricing problem in which the demands of
the unit-demand customers are drawn from an explicit probability distri-
bution, in contrast to the assumption that the demands are known to the
company. They show that if the valuations are drawn independently for dif-
ferent items, constant approximation guarantees are possible using concepts
from the theory of optimal auction design (Myerson 1981).
The tollbooth problem is introduced by Guruswami et al. (2005). This
problem is proven to be APX-hard, even if the underlying graph is a star,
all valuations are equal to one, and the customers’ paths contain at most
two edges. The complexity of the highway problem was left open at the in-
troduction by Guruswami et al. (2005). However, as all pricing problems
described here are instances of the Stackelberg game, they can be inter-
preted as a bilevel linear program as discussed by e.g. Vicente and Calamai
(1994) and Marcotte and Savard (2005). Speciﬁcally for the highway prob-
lem this means that if either the price vector or the set of winners is known,
the problem is polynomially solvable as shown in Section 4.2, even under
the requirement of integral prices. Bodlaender and Penninkx (2005) and
Briest and Krysta (2006) show independently that the seemingly innocent
highway problem is NP-hard. Guruswami et al. (2005) propose a polynomial
time dynamic programming algorithm when the valuations are bounded by
a constant, and a pseudo-polynomial time dynamic programming algorithm
when the lengths of the subpaths are bounded by a constant. Balcan and
Blum (2006) derive an O(logm)-approximation algorithm for the highway
problem, improving upon the previous O(logmÅlogn)-approximation of Gu-
ruswami et al. (2005), where m is the number of highway segments and n
is the number of customers. Elbassioni, Sitters, and Zhang (2007) present
a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) for both the lim-
ited and unlimited supply case of the problem. A QPTAS is an approxi-
mation scheme whose running time is quasi-polynomial. The existence of
a QPTAS implies that the problem is not APX-hard, assuming that NP*
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DPTIME[npolylog(n)]. Therefore, the existence of a QPTAS can be seen as a
strong indication for the existence of a PTAS.
Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard (1998) and Brotcorne et al. (2001) study the
problem of setting tolls on a speciﬁed subset of edges of a multi-commodity
transportation network. This study is different from the tollbooth problem
discussed above as the customers travel over the shortest path from their
origin to destination via tolled and non-tolled arcs instead of traveling ei-
ther only tolled edges on a pre-speciﬁed path or only non-tolled edges. A
similar problem, but focussed to setting tolls on a single highway, is dis-
cussed by Heilporn et al. (2007). For further reading on Stackelberg pricing
in networks, we refer to Dewez (2004), van der Kraaij (2004), Roch, Savard,
and Marcotte (2005), van Hoesel (2006) and Bouthou et al. (2007).
The afﬁne pricing technique in algorithmic pricing is introduced by Grig-
oriev et al. (2007). The difference between afﬁne pricing and single item
pricing is that in afﬁne pricing customers can request multiple copies of one
item type and the price of the contract is personal. Consider again the ap-
plication of the telephone operator, and assume that the operator wants to
determine a price per minute calling. For every minute, the customer will
be charged this same price. If we would solve the same problem with sin-
gle item pricing, then we have to price every single minute separately. The
demand of every customer is similar as in the afﬁne pricing problem, which
means that if a customer wants to call for x minutes at various time periods,
then she requests one copy of the item that models calling in a particular
minute, and her bundle contains x items. The problem is then to determine
a price for every single minute. Thus, the afﬁne pricing problem is in fact
a generalization of the single item pricing problem because we can regard
every single copy of all item types in the afﬁne pricing problem as separate
items in the single item pricing problem.
1.5 Outline
The single item pricing problem with single-minded customers is discussed
in the ﬁrst part of this thesis. In Chapter 2 we consider this problem with
unlimited supply. We impose a natural monotonicity constraint enforcing
that larger bundles are at least as expensive as smaller ones. We show that
this problem is strongly NP-hard and derive a polynomial time approxima-
tion scheme, thereby breaking the semi-logarithmic inapproximability re-
sult by Demaine et al. (2006). As a special case we also address the highway
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problem. We show that this problem remains weakly NP-hard under the
monotonicity condition, and we derive a simple approximation algorithm
that is logarithmic in the largest valuation.
In Chapter 3, we address the single item pricing problem with unlimited
supply and we show that the problem is trivially solvable if all customers
have the same average valuation, that is, the valuation divided by the size
of the requested bundle. But, even for the slightest deviation in average val-
uation, the problem is strongly NP-hard immediately. These results remain
true also if we pose monotonicity constraints on the valuations and aver-
age valuations. That is, customers requesting a large bundle should have a
higher valuation but lower average valuation than customers interested in
a smaller bundle. Moreover, we present an approximation algorithm with a
performance guarantee that is logarithmic in the largest deviation between
any two customers’ average valuations. In the last part of this chapter, we
study the highway problem. The approximation algorithm we create for the
pricing problem with arbitrary bundles carries over to the highway problem.
Also, this problem is trivially solvable if the average valuations are equal for
all customers. Even the slightest deviation makes that this problem becomes
NP-hard.
We describe the algorithmic complexity of the single item pricing prob-
lem in capacitated, undirected networks in Chapter 4. The edges of an un-
derlying graph are regarded as the items for sale and the customers’ bundles
are paths in the graph. If the graph is a path (highway problem) and capac-
ity is unlimited then we derive an approximation algorithm that is logarith-
mic in the largest valuation. The problem with a constant upper bound on
the limited edge capacities can be solved using a dynamic programming al-
gorithm. Based on this dynamic program, we derive a fully polynomial time
approximation scheme. The problem with limited edge capacities and with
a cycle as underlying graph is NP-hard, and can be solved by an adjusted
dynamic program in pseudo-polynomial time. Finally, with unit edge capac-
ity, the pricing problem is polynomially solvable if the underlying graph is a
path, cycle or tree. The same problem on a grid is surprisingly much harder.
The second part of this thesis focuses on afﬁne pricing. In Chapter 5
we present an algorithm to solve the afﬁne pricing problem in polynomial
time, if the number of distinct item types is constant. This result holds for
the envy-free problem with unlimited supply of item types, both for single-
minded and unit-demand customers, and we derive a near-optimal solution
if the supply is limited. Moreover, we show that the afﬁne pricing problem
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is a generalization of the single item pricing problem, which means that
for a non-constant number of item types available in unlimited supply, the
hardness results known for single item pricing also hold for afﬁne pricing.
Moreover, if the availability of item types is limited, the problem is hard to
approximate within a factor of n1¡" for any " È 0, where n is the number
of customers. After the theoretical results, we apply the afﬁne pricing algo-
rithm in a practical study, where the number of item types is constant, the
customers are single-minded and the supply is unlimited. As the running
time of the algorithm is large for huge instances, we present a local search
algorithm that gives promising results on the tested instances.
In Chapter 6 we consider the situation in which a company wishes to
implement a price vector different from the current price vector. It is not al-
ways feasible to implement new prices instantly, because of the involvement
of public authorities, the strategy towards competitors or the customers’ per-
ception of the company. This forces the company to implement the new
prices gradually. We impose the restriction that for the customers that ac-
cept their contract in the optimal pricing, the contract price never increases
more than some predetermined percentage per time period. We determine
the minimum number of time periods necessary to implement the new prices
under this assumption. Furthermore, we describe how to maximize the total
revenue over time if a maximum number of time periods is given in which
the new pricing must be implemented.
Motivated by the current price regulation on roaming tariffs, we closely
look into the problem where the pricing strategy of the company is regu-
lated by a government in Chapter 7. We model the setting as a three-level
program, and present a polynomial time algorithm to solve this problem.
Furthermore, we analyze the current policy of the European Commission,
and compare different price regulative policies. We test our theoretical re-
sults on a data set.
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Single Item PricingChapter 2
Monotonicity Constraint on
Prices
In this chapter we consider the single item pricing problem with unlim-
ited supply. We know that the problem is inapproximable within a semi-
logarithmic factor in the number of customers by Demaine et al. (2006).
Therefore, we suggest a natural monotonicity constraint, enforcing that the
price of larger bundles is at least as high as the price of smaller ones. We
show that this problem remains strongly NP-hard, and we derive a PTAS.
Finally, we also discuss the highway problem with monotonicity constraint.1
2.1 Introduction
We consider the situation where a company wants to sell a set of (digital)
items I Æ {1,...,m} to a set of single-minded customers J Æ {1,...,n}. Every
item i 2 I is available in unlimited supply. Each customer j 2 J is interested
in exactly one subset of items I j µ I, her bundle, and has a positive valua-
tion bj for this bundle, which is the maximum amount she is willing to pay.
Without loss of generality we assume that bj ¸ 1 for j 2 J. Let B be the
highest valuation, that is, B Æ maxj2J{bj}. Let pi ¸ 0 be the price of item
i 2 I. The price of a bundle I j is therefore
P
i2I j pi. A customer is a winner
if the total price of her bundle does not exceed her valuation, and a loser
otherwise. The set of winners is denoted by W µ J.
1This chapter is based on Grigoriev, van Loon, Sviridenko, Uetz, and Vredeveld (2007)
and Grigoriev, van Loon, Sviridenko, Uetz, and Vredeveld (2008).Chapter 2. Monotonicity Constraint on Prices
Deﬁnition 2.1.1. A feasible solution consists of a positive price pi for every
item i 2 I and a set of winners W µ J such that all winners can afford their
bundle, that is,
P
i2I j pi · bj for all j 2W, and the solution is envy-free, that
is,
P






Notice that any solution will be trivially envy-free, meaning that a cus-
tomer not receiving her bundle cannot afford it. This is an artifact of the
unlimited supply of items.
In a sequence of recent papers, several algorithms and complexity results
have been derived for such price optimization problems; see e.g. Aggarwal
et al. (2004), Guruswami et al. (2005), Hartline and Koltun (2005), Balcan
and Blum (2006), Briest and Krysta (2006), Elbassioni, Sitters, and Zhang
(2007). Many of the positive results achieve only logarithmic approximation
guarantees in the number of customers, the number of items or both, and
often somewhat trivial algorithms sufﬁce to achieve such bounds, e.g. uni-
form prices for all items. Demaine et al. (2006) delivered a reason for this
observation on the performance of algorithms, showing that the problem
does not allow for semi-logarithmic approximation algorithms in general. In
this chapter, we introduce a very natural monotonicity constraint on bundle
prices that allows us to derive results that break this semi-logarithmic in-
approximability barrier. More speciﬁcally, we impose the condition that the
price of any bundle of size k must not exceed the price of a bundle of size kÅ1
or larger, for any k. That is, the monotonicity constraint that we impose on






pi whenever jI0jÇjI00j, (2.1)
for any two subsets of items I0 and I00. The condition has a meaningful eco-
nomic interpretation in settings where items are different, yet comparable
in the sense that their prices cannot differ too much. It only requires that
larger bundles are at least as expensive as smaller ones. Notice that we do
not require a monotonicity condition on bundles of the same size, as this
would immediately yield that all items must receive the same price. Yet, the
condition is quite strong, as it requires that most item prices are of the same
order of magnitude.
We show in Section 2.2 that the single item pricing problem is strongly
NP-hard even with the monotonicity constraint on bundle prices as deﬁned
in (2.1). Moreover, we derive a polynomial time approximation scheme for
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that problem, with a time complexity of O(nm8/"(logB)8/"). The PTAS cru-
cially exploits the fact that the monotonicity condition (2.1) yields most item
prices to be of the same order of magnitude. In Section 2.3 we address the
highway problem, where items can be seen as edges on a simple path and
customers request a subpath. The monotonicity constraint is only imposed
on subpaths. We show that this problem remains weakly NP-hard under the
monotonicity constraint, and we derive an O(lnB)-approximation algorithm.
2.2 Arbitrary bundles
We settle the computational complexity of the single item pricing problem in
which customers requests arbitrary bundles and the prices satisfy the mono-
tonicity constraint, deﬁned in (2.1). First, we prove that this particular prob-
lem is strongly NP-hard. Then, we derive a polynomial time approximation
scheme.
2.2.1 Complexity
We show that the pricing problem with monotonicity constraint is strongly
NP-hard by using a reduction from INDEPENDENTSET, which is known to
be NP-hard (Garey and Johnson 1979) and deﬁned as follows. Given a graph
G Æ (V,E) and integer s · jVj, does there exist a set of vertices V0 µ V such
that no two vertices in V0 are joined by an edge in E, with cardinality jV0j¸
s?
We deﬁne an instance I of the pricing problem in the following way. Let
M be an integer such that M ¸ 2jEj2 Å4jEjÅ2. For every vertex v 2 V we
create a vertex-item, and for every edge e 2 E we introduce an edge-item, that
is, I ÆV [E. For every item i 2 I, there are MÅ2 customers that request the
bundle consisting of only this item. One of these customers has valuation
M, and all other customers have valuation M Å1. Moreover, for every edge
e Æ{u,v}2 E, there are four more customers. One customer requests bundle
{u,e}, one requests bundle {v,e}, and two customers request bundle {u,v}.
These four customers each have valuation 2MÅ1.
Figure 2.1 displays how an edge e Æ {u,v} 2 E of graph G is represented
in instance I. The bundle of one customer is represented by a dashed line,
and this customer has valuation M for that particular bundle. Every solid
line represents a bundle of MÅ1 customers who have valuation MÅ1. Each
dotted line represents a bundle of one customer who has valuation 2MÅ1.
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u v
e
Figure 2.1: Instance I for edge e Æ{u,v}2 E from the reduction of INDEPENDENT-
SET.
We prove strong NP-hardness of the single item pricing problem with
monotonicity constraint in Theorem 2.2.5. In this proof, we need the prop-
erty that in an optimal solution to the above created instance I of the pric-
ing problem with monotonicity constraint all prices are either M or M Å1.
Therefore, we ﬁrst collect some preliminary observations.
Lemma 2.2.1. In the optimal solution to the pricing problem on I, all prices
are within the interval [M,MÅ1].
Proof. Assume the claim is not true, and let p be an optimal solution that
violates it. If all items have prices pi · M Å1 and there exists at least one
item with price pi Ç M, then it can easily be veriﬁed that the price vector p0,
deﬁned by p0
i Æ max{pi,M}, yields the same set of winners and the revenue
has increased compared to p. Hence, p cannot be optimal.
Therefore, assume that at least one item, h, has a price ph È M Å1 and
consider the price vector p0 deﬁned by p0
i Æ pi for i 6Æ h and p0
h Æ MÅ1. Since
item h belongs to at most 3jEj bundles containing two items, the decrease in
revenue of these bundles due to the price change is at most 3jEjM. This is
because, without loss of generality, the price of an item is at most 2MÅ1 in an
optimal solution, that is, at most equal to the largest valuation. On the other
hand, MÅ1 customers can now afford bundle {h}. Therefore, the increase in
revenue due to these customers is (MÅ1)2. Thus, the total revenue increases
by at least M2Å(2¡3jEj)MÅ1 which is positive since M È2jEj2. Hence, the
price vector p cannot be optimal.
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Lemma 2.2.2. In an optimal solution to the pricing problem on I, all cus-
tomers requesting a bundle that contains two items are winners.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a bundle containing two items, say I j Æ
{i1,i2}, that is priced higher than 2MÅ1 and let the prices of the two items
be pi1 Æ M Å d1 and pi2 Æ M Å d2. Combining this with the result of the
previous lemma, we know that 0Ç d1,d2 ·1. As each item is in at most 3jEj
bundles of size two, decreasing the price of item i1 to M increases the total
revenue by at least
¡((MÅ1)Å(3jEj¡1))d1ÅMÅ2MÅd2 ¸2M¡3jEj,
which is positive since M È3jEj/2.
Lemma 2.2.3. In an optimal solution to the pricing problem on I, all prices
are integral.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2.1, we know that each item has a price pi Æ M Å di,
for 0 · di · 1. Suppose that there exists an item i with 0 Ç di Ç 1 and that
this item corresponds to an edge e Æ {u,v}. If both du Æ dv Æ 0, then we can
change the price of the edge-item e to p0
e Æ M Å1 without affecting the set
of winners and increasing the total revenue. Therefore, assume that du È 0
and, without loss of generality, du ¸ dv. By Lemma 2.2.2, we know that




v Æ M, and p0
i Æ pi for all other items i. The increase in revenue due
to this price change for the bundles containing two items corresponding to
the edge e Æ{u,v} is 1¡(duÅde)Å1¡(dvÅde)¡2(duÅdv), whereas the total
decrease in revenue for all other bundles containing two items is bounded by
3(jEj¡1)(duÅdv). The increase in revenue caused by the bundles {e} and {u}
is (1¡de)(MÅ1)ÅM¡du(MÅ1), whereas the increase in revenue for bundle
{v} is M ¡(M Å1)dv ¸ 0 if dv È 0 and 0 otherwise. Hence, the total increase




as M È3jEj¡1. Hence, any solution in which an edge-item e has a fractional
price cannot be optimal.
On the other hand, suppose that all edge-items e 2 E have price pe 2
{M,M Å1} and there exists a vertex-item u with M Ç pu Ç M Å1. Then by
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Lemma 2.2.2 we know that there exists an item u such that all its neighbors
v with {u,v}2 E have price pv · MÅ1/2. Moreover, we may assume that there
exists a neighbor v such that pv È M as otherwise we may set pu Æ M Å1
without affecting the set of winners, but increasing the total revenue. Let
d Æ max{dv : {u,v} 2 E}, then 0 Ç d · 1/2. Consider the prices p0 deﬁned by
p0
u Æ M Å1, p0
v Æ M for v such that {u,v} 2 E and p0
i Æ pi for all other items
i. Then the revenue for each bundle containing two items is decreased by
at most 2d and as there are in total 4jEj of these bundles the total decrease
in revenue due to this price change is bounded by 4jEj(2d) · 4jEj. As there
was at least one neighbor of u that had a price pv È M, the change in prices
leads to an increase of revenue of at least
(1¡du)(MÅ1)ÅM¡d(MÅ1)¸(1¡du¡d)(MÅ1)ÅM ¸ M,
as du Åd · 1 by Lemma 2.2.2. Hence the total increase in revenue due to
this price change is at least M ¡4jEj È 0 as M È 4jEj. Hence, no solution
with at least one fractional price can be optimal.
Lemma 2.2.4. An optimal solution to instance I satisﬁes the monotonicity
constraint.
Proof. We know that pi is either M or MÅ1 for all i 2 I by Lemma 2.2.1 and








where the second inequality holds because M ¸ 2jEj2Å4jEjÅ2 È jVjÅjEj Æ
jIjÈjI0j.
We use the above four lemmas to prove that the single item pricing prob-
lem with arbitrary bundles satisfying the monotonicity constraint is strongly
NP-hard.
Theorem 2.2.5. The single item pricing problem with monotonicity con-
straint is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Consider instance I. We claim that there exists an independent set
of size s in G if and only if there is a solution to the single item pricing
problem with revenue at least f(s)Æ(M2Å2M)jVjÅ(M2Å10MÅ3)jEjÅs.
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Given an independent set V0 µ V with jV0j ¸ s. Let E0 Æ {e Æ {u,v} 2 E :
u,v Ý V0}. Let pv Æ MÅ1 if v 2 V0 and M otherwise. Let pe Æ MÅ1 if e 2 E0
and M otherwise. By Lemma 2.2.4 we know that this pricing satisﬁes the
monotonicity constraint. The revenue of this solution is
¦ Æ (MÅ1)(MjVjÅjV0jÅMjEjÅjE0j)ÅMjV \V0jÅMjE\E0j
Å8MjEjÅ2jE0jÅ3jE\E0j
Æ (M2Å2M)jVjÅ(M2Å10MÅ3)jEjÅjV0j,
which is greater than or equal to f(s).
For the converse, assume there is an optimal solution to the pricing prob-
lem that satisﬁes the monotonicity constraint with revenue at least f(s). We
know by Lemma 2.2.1 and Lemma 2.2.3, that the price for any item is ei-
ther M or M Å1. Let V0 Æ {v 2 V : pv Æ M Å1}, then V0 is an independent
set in G, as by Lemma 2.2.2 we know that for any e Æ {u,v} 2 E with u 2 V0,
pv · M. Deﬁne E0 Æ{e Æ{u,v}2 E : pe Æ MÅ1}. Then for any e Æ{u,v}2 E0,
we have that pu Æ pv · M by Lemma 2.2.2. The revenue for the four bun-
dles containing two items corresponding to an edge e 2 E\E0 is bounded by




As the total revenue is at least f(s), we conclude that jV0j¸ s.
2.2.2 Approximation scheme
In this section we show that the pricing problem with monotonicity con-
straint admits a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS). A PTAS is
an algorithm which takes an instance of an optimization problem and, for
any "È0, produces a solution that is within a factor (1Å") of being optimal,
in polynomial time depending on ".
Assume, without loss of generality, that p1 · p2 · ¢¢¢ · pm. Then by
the monotonicity constraint, we know 2p2 ¸ p1Å p2 ¸ pm. Similarly, 3p3 ¸
p1Å p2Å p3 ¸ pm¡1Å pm ¸2pm¡1, etc.
Lemma 2.2.6. Suppose p1 · p2 · ¢¢¢ · pm. Any pricing of the items satisfy-
ing the monotonicity constraint also satisﬁes
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The idea for the PTAS is now the following. First, we restrict the prices
to powers of (1Å±) for some ± È 0. Then, Lemma 2.2.6 says that except
for a constant number of the cheapest and most expensive items, all items
have prices in roughly the same range. Therefore we can price all except a
constant number of items uniformly with the same price, without loosing too
much in terms of the total revenue. We therefore enumerate over all possible
uniform prices for the bulk of the items, and over all possible combinations
of prices for the remaining (constant number of) items.
Theorem 2.2.7. The pricing problem with monotonicity constraint admits a
PTAS. The time complexity is O(nm8/"(logB)8/"), where " È 0 is the precision
of the PTAS.
Proof. Given an instance of the pricing problem and an " È 0, let ± Æ "/4,
and for convenience assume that 1/± is integral. Let p1 · ¢¢¢ · pm be the
prices in an optimal solution, satisfying the monotonicity constraints. Deﬁne
the subsets of items S Æ {i 2 I : i · 1
±}, M Æ {i 2 I : 1Å 1
± · i · mÅ1¡ 1
±}
and L Æ {i 2 I : i ¸ mÅ2¡ 1
±}, as shown in Figure 2.2. Note that M Æ ; if










S ={i ∈ I : i ≤ 1
δ} M ={i ∈ I : 1+ 1
δ ≤ i ≤ m+1− 1
δ} L ={i ∈ I : i ≥ m+2− 1
δ}
Figure 2.2: Subsets of items S, M and L.
We round down the prices of all items in S and L to powers of (1Å±).
Moreover, we price all items in M uniformly at price p1Å1/±, rounded down
to a power of (1Å±). Let us call the new prices p0, and let us call p0
M the
price of items in M. First observe that the order of prices does not change.
We next argue that we do not loose too much by this rounding. Clearly, since
we round down, the set of winners can only increase. Moreover, we loose at
most a factor (1Å±) on items in S and L. Finally, consider the items in M.









pmÅ1¡1/± ,(1Å±)p1Å1/± ¸ pmÅ1¡1/±.
In other words, the price for the most expensive item in M differs from the
cheapest item in M by a factor of at most (1Å±). Hence, on items in M we
loose a factor of at most (1Å±)2.
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Now we have a structured solution, but it may violate the monotonicity
constraint. In case of a violation, we divide the highest prices by a factor
of (1Å±), so that the new price vector satisﬁes the monotonicity constraint.
Note that in this case, we loose at most a factor of (1Å±)3 compared to the
optimal pricing vector. The question remains is which prices need to be
divided by (1Å±). To this end, we deﬁne s Æ max{0,i : p0
i Ç p0
M} as the
number of small prices and ` Æ max{0,i : p0
mÅ1¡i È p0
M} as the number of
high prices. If s È `, then the new prices are deﬁned by p00
i Æ p0
i for 1 · i · s
and for sÅ1 · i · m by p00
i Æ p0
i/(1Å±). Otherwise, if s · `, then the new
prices are deﬁned by p00
i Æ p0
i for 1 · i · m¡` and for m¡`Å1 · i · m by
p00
i Æ p0
i/(1Å±). Let k Æ max{s¡1,`}. Then, if there is a violation of the
monotonicity constraint in the new pricing, sets {1,...,kÅ1} and {mÅ1¡




we only need to verify that for these two sets the monotonicity constraint
holds true. First notice that by the way of deﬁning k and the prices p00, we
have that p00
i Æ p0
i for 1 · i · kÅ1 and p00
i Æ p0
i/(1Å±), for mÅ1¡k · i · m.





























where the second inequality is due to the monotonicity of the original set of
prices p. From this it follows that the structured solution p00 satisﬁes the
monotonicity constraint.
The PTAS now consists of enumerating all possible structured solutions,
which is sufﬁcient to obtain a feasible solution that differs from the optimal





choices for S[L. Since all prices are powers of (1Å±), there are logB possible
prices. Given that all items in M have the same price, there are at most
(logB)2/± structured solutions for each choice of S [L. Computation of the
revenue for any such solution takes O(nm) time. This together with ± Æ "/4
yields the claimed time complexity, where the constant hidden in the O-
notation depends on ".
2.3 Highway problem
A particularly intriguing special case of the general pricing problem con-
sidered so far is the highway problem as introduced by Guruswami et al.
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(2005). Let I Æ {1,...,n} represent the highway segments, which we can re-
gard as consecutive edges on a simple path. Every customer j 2 J requests
a subpath of the highway, denoted by I j µ I, and we assume that each I j is
of the form I j Æ {k,kÅ1,...,`}, where 1 · k · ` · m. We may assume that
the valuation bj of customer j 2 J for subpath I j is a monetary expression
for the time saving that can be realized by using the highway instead of the
next-fastest alternative route. Similarly as in the single item pricing prob-
lem with arbitrary bundles, the company determines prices pi ¸ 0 for the
items i 2 I. The price of bundle I j is
P
i2I j pi. A customer is a winner if the
total price of her bundle is not more than her valuation, and a loser other-





where W µ J is the set of winners.
In the highway problem, it is most natural to assume that the mono-
tonicity constraint holds for any two subpaths only, but not necessarily for
arbitrary subsets of items. Because of the consecutiveness of the items, the
strong NP-hardness result and the PTAS for the single item pricing prob-
lem with monotonicity constraint and arbitrary bundles, established in the
previous section, do not carry over to the highway problem with price mono-
tonicity on subpaths. Also notice that the weak NP-hardness for the gen-
eral highway problem by Briest and Krysta (2006) does not automatically
yield weak NP-hardness for the problem with price monotonicity, as optimal
prices in that completeness proof are not monotone in the length of the sub-
paths. We next derive weak NP-hardness for the problem with monotonicity
constraint, and we present an O(lnB)-approximation algorithm.
2.3.1 Complexity
We prove NP-completeness of the highway problem with monotonicity con-
straint by a reduction from EQUALCARDINALITYSUBSETSUM deﬁned in the
following way.
Deﬁnition 2.3.1 (EQUALCARDINALITYSUBSETSUM). Given a set of positive
integers a1,a2,...,a2L and nonnegative integer A such that a1 · a2 · ...,·
a2L, a2L È
P2L¡1
`Æ1 a` and 0 Ç A Ç a2L. Does there exist a set S µ {1,...,2L}
such that
P
`2S a` Æ A and jSjÆ L?
In Theorem 2.3.2, we show that this problem is NP-complete by a re-
duction from SUBSETSUM; see Garey and Johnson (1979). This problem is
deﬁned as follows. Given a set of positive integers x1,x2,...,xK and nonneg-
ative integer X. Does there exist a set T µ{1,...,K} such that
P
k2T xk Æ X?
362.3. Highway problem
Theorem 2.3.2. EQUALCARDINALITYSUBSETSUM is NP-complete.
Proof. Consider an instance of the NP-complete problem SUBSETSUM. As-
sume without loss of generality that x1 · x2 · ... · xK. We create an in-
stance of EQUALCARDINALITYSUBSETSUM as follows: let L Æ K Å1, A Æ
X Å
PK
kÆ1xk, a` Æ 0 for all ` 2 {1,...,K Æ L¡1}, a` Æ x`¡K for all ` 2 {K Å1 Æ
L,...,2K Æ2L¡2}, a2L¡1 Æ
PK
kÆ1xk and a2L Æ2
PK
kÆ1xkÅ1. This instance sat-
isﬁes the properties of EQUALCARDINALITYSUBSETSUM in Deﬁnition 2.3.1.
We claim that there exists a solution to SUBSETSUM if and only if there ex-
ists a solution to EQUALCARDINALITYSUBSETSUM.
Given a set T µ {1,...,K} such that
P














and jSj Æ jTjÅ(L¡1¡jTj)Å1 Æ L. For the converse, given set S such that
P
`2S a` Æ A and jSj Æ L. First, note that 2L Ý S as a2L Æ 2
PK
kÆ1xk Å1 È A
























Thus T is a solution to SUBSETSUM.
Consider an instance of EQUALCARDINALITYSUBSETSUM as in Deﬁni-
tion 2.3.1. We now create an instance H of the highway problem as follows.
For every ` Æ 1,...,2L, we deﬁne a0
` Æ a` Åa2L, and we introduce a gadget.
Every gadget ` consists of four items i`,1, i`,2, i`,3, i`,4. Furthermore, there
are 4Å8L customers in every gadget `, one customer requests bundle {i`,1}
with valuation 2M¡ 1
2a0
`, one customer requests bundle {i`,2} with valuation
a0




one customer requests {i`,3} with valuation 2M¡ 1
2a0
`, and one customer re-
quests bundle {i`,4} with valuation M, where M is a sufﬁciently large integer.
For gadget 2L, there is one additional customer who is interested in bundle
{i2L,1,i2L,2,i2L,3,i2L,4} with valuation 5M. Finally, there is one big customer
requesting all items with valuation 10MLÅ 1
8a2L Å 1
8L A. Thus, the instance
of the highway pricing problem has 2L(4Å8L)Å2 customers and 8L items,
and is displayed in Figure 2.3.


























i2L,1 i2L,2 i2L,3 i2L,4
5M
Figure 2.3: Instance H of the highway problem.
To prove NP-hardness, we claim that there exists a set S µ {1,...,2L}
such that
P
`2S a` Æ A and jSj Æ L if and only if there is a feasible solution
to the highway problem, satisfying the monotonicity constraint, with a total
revenue ¦ ¸ (20Å32L)MLÅ5M Å4L
P2L
`Æ1a` Å(8L2 Å 1
8)a2L Å 1
8L A. In the



































To prove the necessary condition of the claim, we show in Lemma 2.3.3 that
each gadget will be priced at p1
` or p2
`.
Lemma 2.3.3. Suppose that there exists a solution to instance H of the high-





8L A. Then, the items in gadget `2{1,...,2L} are priced according to
either price vector p1
` or p2
`.
Proof. Let us denote the total revenue by ¦ Æ ¦bigÅ
P2L
`Æ1¦`, where ¦big is
the revenue obtained from the big customer and ¦` is the revenue obtained
from selling the items in gadget `2{1,...,2L}.
Consider a gadget 1 · ` Ç 2L. If p`,2Å p`,3 È 2MÅ 1
2a0
` then at most one
of the customers requesting bundle {i`,2} or {i`,3} is a winner. In this case,

























On the other hand, if the customer requesting bundle {i`,2} and the cus-
tomer requesting bundle {i`,3} are both winners, then each of the customers
requesting {i`,2,i`,3} cannot contribute more than 2MÅ 1
2a0
` to the revenue.
Therefore, also in this case the revenue due to the items in this gadget can
be bounded by ¦` ·5MÅ(16MÅ4a0
`)L.
With similar arguments, we can bound the revenue on gadget 2L by
¦2L ·10MÅ(16MÅ4a0
`)L, and the big customer contributes at most 10MLÅ
1
8a2LÅ 1






























8L A, the revenues on each of the gadgets and the big bundle
need to be equal to the before mentioned upper bounds. It is easy to verify
that only the price vectors p1
` and p2
` satisfy this constraint.
We show that these price vectors p1
` and p2
` always lead to a pricing
strategy that satisﬁes the monotonicity constraint.
Lemma 2.3.4. Any pricing strategy that only uses price vectors p1
` and p2
` for
each gadget in instance H of the highway problem satisﬁes the monotonicity
constraint.
Proof. We know that 0 · a1 · a2 · ... · a2L. Notice that both p1
` and p2
`
consist of four item prices, and the sum of the item prices in p1
` is 5M and
in p2
` it is 5M Å 1
8La0
`. Now consider an arbitrary bundle of size K, where
K · nÆ8L. Since only prices p1
` and p2
` are used for the gadgets, depending
on the value of K modulo 4, we can easily determine lower and upper bounds
on the price of any bundle of size K. To ﬁnd the lower (upper) bound for





`,i for every i 2{1,...,4}. Consider the following extensive case study,
in which we determine the bounds for different values of K modulo 4.
K ´ 0 mod 4: If the bundle starts at item i`,1 in some gadget ` then the
total bundle price is at least 5M K
4 and at most (5MÅ 1
8La0
2L)K
4 . If the bundle
starts at item i`,2 in some gadget ` then the total bundle price is at least













1. If the bundle













1. If the bundle
starts at item i`,4 in some gadget ` then the total bundle price is at least
5M K
4 and at most (5M Å 1
8La0
2L)K
4 . Concluding, for a bundle of size K ´ 0














K ´1 mod 4: If the bundle starts at item i`,1 in some gadget ` then the to-
tal bundle price is at least 5M K¡1
4 Å2M¡1
2a0






1. If the bundle starts at item i`,2 in some gadget ` then the total
bundle price is at least 5M K¡1
4 Åa0






If the bundle starts at item i`,3 in some gadget ` then the total bundle price
is at least 5M K¡1
4 Å2M¡ 1
2a0






the bundle starts at item i`,4 in some gadget ` then the total bundle price
is at least 5M K¡1
4 ÅM and at most (5MÅ 1
8La0
2L)K¡1
4 ÅM. Concluding, for a








1 (as M is large enough).
K ´ 2 mod 4: If the bundle starts at item i`,1 in some gadget ` then
the total bundle price is at least 5M K¡2
4 Å2M Å 1
2a0







2L. If the bundle starts at item i`,2 in some
gadget ` then the total bundle price is at least 5M K¡2
4 Å2M Å 1
2a0
1 and at






2L. If the bundle starts at item i`,3




and at most (5M Å 1
8La0
2L)K¡2
4 Å3M ¡ 1
2a0
1. If the bundle starts at item i`,4




and at most (5M Å 1
8La0
2L)K¡2
4 Å3M ¡ 1
2a0
1. Concluding, for a bundle of size
K ´ 2 mod 4, the bundle price is at least 5M K¡2
4 Å2M Å 1
2a0







K ´ 3 mod 4: If The bundle starts at item i`,1 in some gadget ` then the
total bundle price is at least 5M K¡3






2L. If The bundle starts at item i`,2 in some gadget ` then the total
bundle price is at least 5M K¡3
4 Å3M Å 1
2a0







2L. If The bundle starts at item i`,3 in some gadget ` then
the total bundle price is at least 5M K¡3
4 Å5M ¡ a0






1. If The bundle starts at item i`,4 in some gadget `
then the total bundle price is at least 5M K¡3
4 Å3MÅ 1
2a0







2L. Concluding, for a bundle of size K ´3 mod 4,
the bundle price is at least 5M K¡3
4 Å3MÅ1
2a0






We summarize the resulting lower and upper bounds in Table 2.1. We
use the lower and upper bound on the prices for a bundle of size K to deter-
mine whether the monotonicity constraint holds. To do this, the difference
between the lower bound of a bundle of size K Å1 and the upper bound on
a bundle of size K, that is, LB(K Å1)¡UB(K), should be positive for any
bundle of size K ·8L.
Bundle size LB UB









































Table 2.1: Smallest and largest bundle prices for bundles with size K.
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We veriﬁed that this difference is positive in all four cases, hence the mono-
tonicity constraint is satisﬁed.
Theorem 2.3.5. The highway problem with monotonicity constraint is NP-
hard.
Proof. For the ﬁrst part of the proof assume there is a set S µ{1,...,2L} such
that
P
`2S a` Æ A and jSj Æ L. Let the price vector of gadget ` be p1
` if ` Ý S,
and p2
` if ` 2 S. The revenue of every gadget ` is (5Å16L)MÅ4L(a`Åa2L),
independent of which price vector is used, and there is an additional revenue























































For the converse, assume there is a feasible solution to the highway pric-





8L A. By Lemma 2.3.3, we know that we use either p1
` or p2
`
for each gadget `. Notice that to obtain the maximum revenue on gadget 2L,
we use pricing p1
2L. Let set S Æ {` 2 {1,...,2L} : p` Æ p2
`}. Then, the actual





















From the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2.3.3, we know that this should
be equal to her valuation 10MLÅ1
8a2LÅ 1
8L A. That is,
P
`2S a` Æ(L¡jSj)a2LÅ
A. We claim that jSj Æ L. To prove this, suppose it is not true. First, as-
sume that jSj Ç L, then
P
`2S a` Æ (L¡jSj)a2L Å A È
P2L¡1
`Æ1 a` Å A, which is
not possible as 2L Ý S, so jSj ¸ L. Now, assume jSj È L, then
P
`2S a` Æ
(L¡jSj)a2L Å A Ç ¡a2L Å A Ç 0, as A Ç a2L. This is also not possible as all





We cannot apply the PTAS from Theorem 2.2.7 to the highway problem,
as this crucially requires the monotonicity constraint for arbitrary subsets
of items. Nevertheless, we derive an O(lnB)-approximation algorithm for
the highway pricing problem with monotonicity constraint. We denote by
a ½-approximation algorithm an algorithm that produces a solution with
value at least 1/½ times the optimal solution value. Before we present the
algorithm, we present approximation guarantees for two special cases. First,
for the case in which all bundles contain at least two items. Second, we
consider the case in which all bundles contain only one item, and there is a
bound on the ratio of the valuations between any two customers.
Lemma 2.3.6. The highway problem with monotonicity constraint in which
all bundles have size at least two is approximable within a factor of 3 by
optimal uniform pricing.
Proof. Consider an optimal solution with revenue ¦¤ and let p¤
max be the
highest item price in this solution. We claim that pricing all items at p¤
max/3,
yields a revenue of at least ¦¤/3. Clearly, an optimal uniform pricing is at
least as good as the uniform p¤
max/3 pricing.
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We claim that any winner j 2W in the optimal pricing remains a winner
for the uniform pricing at level p¤
max/3. Let jI jj Æ `. Then the valuation for
customer j is at least bj ¸ b`/2cp¤
max, as by the monotonicity constraint the
total price of any two consecutive items in an optimal solution is at least
p¤
max and customer j can afford the corresponding bundle I j. In the uni-
form p¤
max/3 pricing, the total bundle price is `p¤
max/3, which is not more
than b`/2cp¤
max, for ` ¸ 2. In an optimal pricing, bundle I j is priced at most
at `p¤
max, whereas in our uniform pricing, we get `p¤
max/3. Hence, pricing
all items to p¤
max/3 yields a revenue of at least ¦¤/3. The optimal uniform
pricing yields at least the same revenue, which proves the claim.
The above lemma shows that whenever all bundles contain at least two
items, we have a constant approximation. Now, we consider only instances
in which bundles consist of exactly one item. Moreover, we restrict ourselves
to instances in which bj/bk ·¯, for any two customers j and k. The value of
¯¸1 will be deﬁned later.
Lemma 2.3.7. The highway problem with monotonicity constraint, restricted
to instances in which each bundle contains exactly one item and bj/bj0 ·¯ for
any two customers j, j0 2 J, admits a linear time ¯-approximation algorithm.
Proof. We price each item uniformly at p Æ minj2J{bj}. Since for any two
customers j and j0 it holds that bj/bj0 · ¯ and every bundle contains one
item, we lose at most a factor of ¯ on the contribution of every customer.
Hence, pricing all items at p yields a revenue of at least ¦¤/¯.
Theorem 2.3.8. The best uniform pricing yields a solution with revenue at
least ¦¤/(3Å elnB) for the highway problem with monotonicity constraint.
The time needed to ﬁnd this solution is O(n2m).
Proof. Consider an optimum solution satisfying the monotonicity constraint.
Let ¦¤
L denote the revenue of customers whose bundles are of size at least
two. Furthermore, for any r 2 R Æ {1,...,dlog¯BeÅ1}, let ¦¤
r denote the rev-
enue of customers whose bundles are of size one with valuation ¯r¡1 · bj Ç





Let ˜ ¦L denote the revenue obtained by the best uniform pricing and ˜ ¦r
denote the revenue obtained by the best uniform pricing strategy for the
customers in Jr Æ {j 2 J : jI jj Æ 1 and ¯r¡1 · bj Ç ¯r}, for all r 2 R. By












Moreover, from Lemma 2.3.6, it follows that ˜ ¦L ¸¦¤
L/3. Hence, the solution
yields a revenue of




The revenue from the approximation algorithm is maximized for the value
of ¯ for which the derivative of the approximation ratio (3Å¯log¯B)¡1, with
respect to ¯, is equal to 0. This is true for ¯Æ e and therefore we get




To see the claim on the time complexity, note that to ﬁnd an optimal uni-
form pricing, we need to consider at most n different prices, namely bj/jI jj
for all j 2 J. For each price, we need to compute the set of winning customers
and the revenue obtained on this price, which can be done in O(nm) time.
So, the best uniform price can be computed in O(n2m) time.
2.4 Conclusion
The monotonicity constraint introduced in this chapter forces prices to be of
the same magnitude for all items, thus it can very well be applied for compa-
nies that sell comparable items. With the introduction of this monotonicity
constraint on the bundle prices, the single item pricing problem is strongly
NP-hard. Also, we show that a polynomial time approximation scheme ex-
ists for this particular problem, breaking the semi-logarithmic inapproxima-
bility result by Demaine et al. (2006).
In contrast, the prices are not forced to be of the same magnitude in the
highway problem, and as proven in this chapter, this problem remains NP-
hard. Being unable to close the gap between (weak) NP-hardness on the
one hand and only logarithmic polynomial-time approximation algorithms
on the other hand, we search for a different approach in the next chapter.
There, we use the average valuations of the customers to obtain an approxi-
mation algorithm, and introduce a monotonicity constraint on the valuations




In this chapter1 we consider the single item pricing problem with unlimited
supply. Customers request arbitrary subsets of a given set of items that are
sold by a company. This problem is in general known to be inapproximable
by a semi-logarithmic factor in the number of customers n as shown by De-
maine et al. (2006). We relate the tractability of the problem to structural
properties of customers’ valuations. Then, the inapproximability result is no
longer valid as soon as the inhomogeneity is bounded by a constant. More-
over, we show that the problem becomes strongly NP-hard as soon as the
average valuations of customers are not homogeneous, even under further
restrictions such as monotonicity of valuations.
We address the highway problem afterwards. This problem asks for
prices to be determined for segments of a single highway such as to maximize
the revenue obtainable from a given set of customers with known valuations.
The problem is (weakly) NP-hard and a recent quasi-polynomial time ap-
proximation scheme by Elbassioni, Sitters, and Zhang (2007) suggests that
a PTAS might be in reach. We show that also this problem becomes NP-hard
as soon as the average valuations of customers are not homogeneous, even
under further restrictions such as monotonicity of valuations. Moreover, we
apply the efﬁcient approximation algorithm, parameterized along the inho-
mogeneity of customers’ average valuations, that is derived for the single
item pricing problem with arbitrary bundles.
1This chapter is based on Grigoriev, van Loon, and Uetz (2008b).Chapter 3. Inhomogeneity of Average Valuations
3.1 Introduction
Let I Æ{1,...,m} represent the set of items for sale, where each item is avail-
able in unlimited supply. Let J Æ{1,...,n} denote the set of potential single-
minded customers. Every customer j 2 J requests a subset of the items,
the bundle, denoted I j µ I. The maximum amount customer j wants to
pay for subset I j, her valuation bj, is publicly known. We assume bj È 0,
for otherwise that customer can be deleted from the instance. Given a vec-
tor of prices p Æ (p1,...,pm), containing one price for each item, denote by
W Æ{j 2 J :
P
i2I j pi · bj} the set of winners.
Deﬁnition 3.1.1. The single item pricing problem with arbitrary bundles
asks for a vector of prices p Æ (p1,...,pm) 2 Rm
Å , one for each item, such that






In this chapter we determine the maximum deviation between customers’
average valuations, referred to as the inhomogeneity of average valuations.
Deﬁnition 3.1.2 (Inhomogeneity of average valuations). For any instance of
the single item pricing problem, deﬁne ¯ bj Æ bj/jI jj as the average (per item)








Notice that ® ¸ 1, and that the problem becomes trivial as soon as the
valuations are homogeneous, that is, ® Æ 1, since this corresponds to the
case where all customers’ valuations per segment are identical; see also Sec-
tion 3.2.1.
Our ﬁrst result shows that, in contrast to the trivially solvable homoge-
neous case, the problem with inhomogeneity of valuations is strongly NP-
hard. While this does not sound very surprising, the main point is that this
NP-hardness result holds even if the inhomogeneity ® is bounded from above
by any constant 1Å". In some sense, we thereby delineate the borderline be-
tween triviality and NP-hardness for the single item pricing problem.
Furthermore, the NP-hardness result remains true even if we impose
further restrictions on customers’ valuations, such as monotonicity, that is,
bj · bj0 for all I j µ I j0 ,
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Æ ¯ bj0 for all I j µ I j0 .
Our second result is a parametric approximation algorithm for the single
item pricing problem that complements the NP-hardness result. The pro-
posed algorithm has performance guarantee O(ln®) and computation time
O(n(lognÅm)), where the constant hidden in the O-notation of the perfor-
mance bound is not more than e. More speciﬁcally, it is easy to see that
an ®-approximation exists, and for large values of ® we show how to im-
prove this bound to 1Åln®Å" for any " È 0. In this context, notice that
if there exists any constant upper bound on the inhomogeneity ® then the
semi-logarithmic inapproximability result of Demaine et al. (2006) for that
problem is not longer valid. We believe that such a constant bound is not
unreasonable in practical applications, especially if the company sells com-
parable items. Also, note that ®· m for the case of monotone and decreasing
average valuations.
Finally, we brieﬂy comment on the fact that the O(ln®)-approximation
result also holds for the highway problem. Here, the items represent con-
secutive segments of a single highway, which can be regarded as edges on
a simple path. Customers are interested in subpaths of this path. Notice
that as soon as the inhomogeneity ® of customers’ valuations is bounded by
some constant, we have a constant-factor approximation algorithm. Sim-
ilarly as for the problem with arbitrary bundles, we delineate the border
between triviality if ® Æ 1 and (weak) NP-hardness if the inhomogeneity ®
is bounded from above by 1Å".
3.2 Arbitrary bundles
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the single item pricing problem
with arbitrary bundles. Furthermore, we propose a O(ln®)-approximation
algorithm.
3.2.1 Complexity
We start with the short argument that the single item pricing problem with
homogeneous average valuations is trivially solvable: consider the average
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valuation ¯ b, which is, by homogeneity, the same for each customer, and de-
ﬁne the price pi Æ ¯ b for every item i 2 I. Clearly, each customer contributes
her entire valuation to the revenue, and the obtained solution is optimal.
Surprisingly enough, even if we allow only arbitrarily small deviations
from homogeneous average valuations, the single item pricing problem be-
comes NP-hard. More speciﬁcally, in Theorem 3.2.2 we show that the prob-
lem with inhomogeneous average valuations is strongly NP-hard under the
following three conditions.
Condition 3.1. The inhomogeneity ® · 1Å", where " È 0 is an arbitrary
constant.
Condition 3.2. The valuations of the customers are monotone, that is, bj ·
bj0 for any j, j0 2 J such that I j µ I j0.
Condition 3.3. The average valuations of the customers are monotone de-
creasing, that is, ¯ bj0 · ¯ bj for any j, j0 2 J such that I j µ I j0.
To prove this, we use a reduction from the NP-hard problem INDEPEN-
DENTSET (Garey and Johnson 1979). Given a graph G Æ (V,E) and inte-
ger s · jVj, does there exist a set of vertices that are pairwise non-adjacent
with cardinality at least s? We deﬁne an instance I of the pricing prob-
lem as follows. Given an " È 0, let M ¸ max{1/",sÅ1/2}. For every vertex
v 2 V we create two vertex-items, v1 and v2, and for every edge e 2 E we
introduce two edge-items, e1 and e2. Thus, I Æ V [E. Every vertex- and
edge-item is requested by 2M2 Å2M ¡1 customers with valuation M Å1.
For every vertex v 2 V, there is one customer interested in bundle {v1,v2}
and similarly, for every edge e 2 E, there is one customer interested in bun-
dle {e1,e2}. These customers have valuation 2M Å2¡1/M. There is one
customer interested in item x with valuation M Å1, and there are two cus-
tomers interested in bundle {y} of size M with valuation M2. Also, there
are two customers requesting bundle {x, y} (of size M Å1) with valuation
M2 Å M. Then, for every edge e Æ {u,v} 2 E, there is one customer inter-
ested in bundle {u1,u2,v1,v2,e1,e2}[{x} with valuation 7M Å6¡2/M. And
ﬁnally, one customer requests all vertex-items and item x, that is, bundle
{v1,v2 : v2V}[{x}, with valuation (2MÅ2¡1/M)jVjÅMÅ(1/M)s. An exam-
ple of an instance of the single item pricing problem with arbitrary bundles
is displayed in Figure 3.1, where graph G has vertices {u,v,w} and edges
e Æ{u,v} and f Æ{v,w}.
Let us give a short intuition as to why we need these particular bundles.
The bundles on the vertex- and edge-items determine which vertices are in
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Figure 3.1: Example of instance I of the single item pricing problem with arbi-
trary bundles reduced from graph G Æ({u,v,w},{e Æ{u,v}, f Æ{v,w}}).
the independent set of G and bundle {u1,u2,v1,v2,e1,e2}[{x} assures later
that a feasible solution to the single item pricing problem corresponds to an
independent set in G. Bundle {v1,v2 : v2V}[{x} assures that a feasible solu-
tion to the pricing problem corresponds to an independent set of cardinality
s. Finally, bundles {x},{y} and {x, y} are present to fulﬁll the three conditions
required in this theorem.
Lemma 3.2.1. Instance I satisﬁes Conditions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
Proof. The single-item bundles have the largest average valuation of MÅ1,
and bundles {y} and {x, y} have the smallest average valuation of M, thus
® Æ 1Å1/M · 1Å", as M ¸ 1/". It is fairly easy to see that Condition 3.2
holds as the valuation of a customer for some bundle is strictly smaller than
the valuation of a customer requesting a superset of this particular bundle.
The veriﬁcation of Condition 3.3 is a little more troublesome. First note that
for bundle {i1} or {i2} the condition holds regarding bundle {i1,i2} as MÅ1È
MÅ1¡ 1
2M, for all i 2 I. Also, for bundles {i1,i2} and {u1,u2,v1,v2,e1,e2}[{x}



















where the inequality holds as M ¸ sÅ1/2 ¸ 3/2. Furthermore, for bundles













as M ¸ sÅ1/2. The average valuation of bundle {x} is MÅ1, thus as a conse-
quence of the above calculation, the condition holds for bundle {x} in either
{v1,v2 : v 2 V}[{x} or {u1,u2,v1,v2,e1,e2}[{x}. Finally, the average valua-
tion of {x} is MÅ1 which is clearly greater than the average valuation M for
{x, y}, and as this is equal to the average valuation for {y} we have veriﬁed
that Condition 3.3 holds.
In the following proof, we deﬁne ¦i as the revenue obtained from the cus-
tomers requesting a bundle from set {{i1},{i2},{i1,i2}} for all i 2 I ÆV [E. We
deﬁne ¦e as the revenue from the customers requesting {u1,u2,v1,v2,e1,e2}[
{x} for some e Æ {u,v} 2 E. We deﬁne ¦xy as the revenue received from
customers requesting a bundle from set {{x},{y},{x, y}}, and ﬁnally, ¦V rep-
resents the revenue obtained from the customers requesting {v1,v2 : v 2





Let C be a constant equal to (jVjÅjEj)(4M3 Å8M2 Å2M ¡2)ÅjEj(7M Å6¡
2/M)ÅjVj(2MÅ2¡1/M)Å4M2Å4M.
Theorem 3.2.2. The single item pricing problem with arbitrary bundles is
strongly NP-hard, even when restricted to the instances satisfying Condi-
tions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
Proof. We claim that there exists an independent set V0 µ V of size jV0j Æ s
if and only if there exists a feasible solution to instance I of the single item
pricing problem with arbitrary bundles with revenue at least CÅ(1/M)s.
Given an independent set V0 µV of size jV0jÆ s. Deﬁne E0 Æ{e Æ{u,v}2
E : u,v ÝV0}. Let pi Æ(pi1,pi2) be deﬁned by pi Æ(MÅ1,MÅ1) if i 2V \V0
or i 2 E\E0 and pi Æ(MÅ1¡ 1
2M,MÅ1¡ 1
2M) if i 2V \V0 or i 2 E\E0. Also,
let px Æ M and py Æ M2, where py denotes the sum of all M item prices in
bundle {y}. Under this pricing strategy, we see that ¦i Æ4M3Å8M2Å2M¡2
for all i 2 I Æ V [E, irrespective of which pricing is used for item i, and
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¦xy Æ MÅ2M2Å2(M2ÅM)Æ4M2Å3M. Every edge e Æ{u,v}2 E contains one
item priced at (MÅ1,MÅ1) and two at (MÅ1¡ 1
2M,MÅ1¡ 1
2M) by deﬁnition
































For the converse, we are given a solution to instance I with revenue at
least CÅ(1/M)s. First, we consider ¦xy. If the customer requesting bundle
{x, y} is not a winner, the maximum revenue is M Å1Å2M2. Otherwise, let
px be the price for item x. Then, the maximum revenue is px Å2(M2ÅM ¡
px)Å2(M2ÅM), where px 2[M,MÅ1] such that all customers are winners.
Then, ¦x,y ·4M2Å3M, which is obtained if px Æ M. For every item i 2 I, we
have
¦i Æmax{2(2M2Å2M¡1)(MÅ1),(2M2Å2M¡1Å1)(2MÅ2¡1/M)}.
This is equal to ¦i Æ4M3Å8M2Å2M¡2. Clearly, for every e 2 E, the revenue
¦e is at most the valuation 7M Å6¡2/M. Now, we know that the revenue
from the customer requesting bundle {v1,v2 : v2V}[{x} is
¦V Æ¦¡(jVjÅjEj)¦i ¡jEj¦e¡¦xy ¸(2MÅ2¡1/M)jVjÅMÅ(1/M)s.
Thus, the minimum revenue is at least equal to the valuation. As this
customer cannot contribute more than the valuation, it should be equality
throughout. This also means that all other revenues described above at-
tain their maximum, thus px Æ M and py Æ M2. Now, let V0 Æ {v 2 V : pv Æ
(MÅ1,MÅ1)} and E0 Æ{e 2 E : pe Æ(MÅ1,MÅ1)}. As ¦e Æ7MÅ6¡2/M and
px Æ M for all e Æ {u,v} 2 E, we know that either u 2 V0 and v Ý V0, e Ý E0,
or v 2 V0 and u Ý V0, e Ý E0, or e 2 E0 and u,v Ý V0. Thus, for each edge,
either one vertex is in V0 or both are not in. Hence, V0 is an independent set.
Furthermore, the customer requesting bundle {v1,v2 : v2V}[{x} pays
(2MÅ2¡1/M)jV \V0jÅ(2MÅ2)jV0jÅ px Æ(2MÅ2¡1/M)jVjÅMÅ(1/M)jV0j.
As this payment is equal to the revenue, which in turn has to be equal to the
valuation, we know that jV0jÆ s.
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3.2.2 Approximation algorithm
The idea for the approximation algorithm is as follows. We partition the set
of customers J into O(ln®) subsets S1,...,SK, such that in each subset any
two customers have average valuations different from each other by at most
a constant factor ± È 1. Denote by ¦¤
k the maximum revenue for the single




k is clearly an upper bound for the opti-
mum ¦¤ of the original problem. Therefore, the highest maximum revenue
maxkÆ1,...,K{¦¤
k} over all restricted problems is at least ¦¤/K. Next, from the
fact that the inhomogeneity of the average valuations in Sk is bounded by at
most a factor of ±, we derive that for the Sk-restricted problem there exist
a price vector generating revenue of at least ¦¤
k/±. Thus, taking the pricing
vector yielding the highest revenue over all restricted problems, we gener-
ate a total revenue of at least ¦¤/±K. Finally, we optimize the performance
guarantee over parameters K and ±, in Lemma 3.2.3 and Theorem 3.2.5,
respectively.
Consider Algorithm 3.1 in which we create sets S1,...,SK and determine
a price vector p yielding revenue ˜ ¦.
Lemma 3.2.3. For any ±È1, the number of subsets K is at most 1Åln®/ln±.
Proof. By deﬁnition of the inhomogeneity ®, we have ¯ bj ·®¯ bj0 for every pair
of customers j, j0 2 J. We show by induction that for any k Æ1,...,K the ratio
between the highest and lowest average valuation of customers in Jk, ¯ bmax
k
and ¯ bmin
k respectively, is at most ®/±k¡1. This holds trivially for k Æ 1. Now,













where the ﬁrst inequality holds because ¯ bmin
k È ±k¡1 ¯ bmin
1 by deﬁnition of Sk
and ¯ bmax
k Æ ¯ bmax
1 by deﬁnition of Jk, and the second inequality holds by the
induction hypothesis. Consequently, K ·1Ålog±®Æ1Åln®/ln±.
Lemma 3.2.4. In the Sk-restricted problem, price vector pk yields a revenue
˜ ¦k ¸¦¤
k/±.
Proof. For any k Æ 1,...,K, pricing pk determined in Algorithm 3.1 assures
that all customers in Sk are winners. By deﬁnition of set Sk, maxj2Sk ¯ bj/
minj2Sk ¯ bj ·±, therefore the revenue of the solution is at least ¦¤
k/±.
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Algorithm 3.1: Approximation algorithm
Initialize J1 Æ J, ˜ ¦Æ0, W Æ J;
Order the customer with respect to their average valuation in an
increasing fashion;
¯ bmin Æminj2J{¯ bj};
foreach k Æ1,...,K do
Sk Æ{j 2 Jk : ¯ bj ·±k ¯ bmin};
JkÅ1 Æ Jk\Sk;
¦k Æ0;
foreach i Æ1,...,m do
Sik Æ{j 2 Sk : i 2 I j};










if ¦k È ˜ ¦ then
˜ ¦Æ¦k, p Æ pk and W Æ Sk;
end
end
Combining Lemma 3.2.3 and Lemma 3.2.4 and optimization of ± yields
the following result.
Theorem 3.2.5. Price vector p yields a total revenue of at least ¦¤/(eln®Åe)
for the single item pricing problem, and it can be computed in O((nÅm)logn)
time.




















55Chapter 3. Inhomogeneity of Average Valuations


































. Now, as eln®Åe ¸±(1Å ln®
ln±) for all ®È1,
the total revenue is at least ¦¤/(eln®Åe).
We arrive at the computation time as follows. First, we order the cus-
tomers according to their average valuation increasingly, which can be done
in O(nlogn) time. Then, for all k Æ 1,...,K, we use binary search to create
set Sk in O(logn) time, and for all items i Æ 1,...,m we determine the set
of customers that request the item in O(n) time, and the item price and the
revenue in constant time. So, the total runtime is O(nlognÅK(lognÅnm)),
which is in O(n(lognÅm)), as K depends on ®.
There are several directions for improvement of the obtained approxi-
mate solution to the single item pricing problem. First, instead of the con-
structed price vectors pk,k Æ 1,...,K, we can use price vectors maximizing
the revenue in the Sk-restricted problems, with given set of winners W Æ Sk.
Notice that, for any set of winners W µ J, the price vector maximizing the
revenue obtained from W can be found in polynomial time by solving a sim-
ple linear program; see Lemma 4.2.2. Unfortunately, this approach does not
necessarily lead to any provable improvement of the performance guarantee.
Second, we can improve the performance guarantee when using a more
careful analysis of the revenue generated by price vector p when applied to
the entire set J instead of Sk only. By construction of the partition of J, for
any two subsets Sk and Sk0, k · k0, the average valuation of any customer
in Sk is at most the average valuation of a customer from Sk0. Therefore, for
any k Æ1,...,K, and for all k0 ¸ k, if Sk µW then Sk0 µW as well. By deﬁni-
tion of the subsets, the maximum average valuation in set SkÅ1 is at most ±
times the maximum average valuation in set Sk. By combining this insight
with Lemma 3.2.4, we have that the revenue generated by price vector pk





















¦kÅ1, 8k Æ1,...,K ¡1, (3.1)
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Let ¦1 ÆÁ ¯ ¦. Since
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kÆ1¦¤




































Clearly, the best price vector yields a total revenue of at least ¦¤/(±(1Å ln®
ln±)¡
ln®











To see this, consider function f(±)Æln±Å1/±. As the derivative f 0(±)Æ±¡1¡
±¡2 È0 for all ±È1, function f(±) is monotone increasing, and consequently,


































and we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.6 (Improved Bound). Price vector p yields a total revenue of at
least ¦¤/(1Åln®Å") for the single item pricing problem for any "È0 , and it
can be computed in O(n(lognÅm)) time.
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3.3 Highway problem
We consider the highway problem, introduced by Guruswami et al. (2005).
Let I Æ {1,...,m} represent the highway segments, and regard them as con-
secutive edges on a simple path with unlimited capacity. Let J Æ {1,...,n}
denote the set of potential customers. Every customer j 2 J requests a sub-
path of the highway, denoted I j µ I, and we assume that each I j is of the
form I j Æ {k,kÅ1,...,`}, where 1 · k · ` · m. The valuation bj for travel-
ing subpath I j is publicly known. This is quite reasonable when assuming
that the valuation is a monetary expression for the time saving that can be
realized by using the highway instead of the next-fastest alternative route.
We assume bj È 0, for otherwise that customer can be deleted from the in-
stance. Given a vector of prices p Æ(p1,...,pm), containing one price for each
highway segment, denote by W Æ{j 2 J :
P
i2I j pi · bj} the set of winners.
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. The highway problem asks for a vector of prices p 2 Rm
Å ,
one for each segment of the highway, such that the total revenue ¦ extracted





Intrigued by the gap between (weak) NP-hardness on the one hand, and
only logarithmic polynomial-time approximation algorithms on the other
hand, we apply the inhomogeneity and monotonicity conditions to the high-
way problem. We illustrate the setting by Example 3.3.2 below.
Example 3.3.2. Figure 3.2 shows an example with three segments, I Æ{1,2,3},
and six customers J Æ{1,...,6}. The left part of this ﬁgure shows the underly-
ing highway with its alternative roads and costs for traveling, and the right











Figure 3.2: An instance of the highway problem.
There is no direct alternative road between the second and third segment,
therefore, the valuation of customer 5 is equal to the sum of the costs for the
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alternative roads of both segments separately. This instance has inhomogene-
ity ®Æ2; comparing the average valuations for {1,2,3} and {2}.
The approximation result derived in Section 3.2.2 holds for the single
item pricing problem with arbitrary bundles. Obviously, it also holds for the
highway problem.
Corollary 3.3.3. Given " È 0, the highway problem admits an approxima-
tion algorithm that yields a revenue at least (1Åln®Å")¡1 times the optimal
revenue, with computation time O(n(lognÅm)).
3.3.1 Complexity
Similarly as for the single item pricing problem with arbitrary bundles, the
highway problem with homogeneous average valuations is trivially solvable.
However, if we allow only arbitrarily small deviations of homogeneous valua-
tions, the highway problem becomes intractable. In Theorem 3.3.6, we show
that the highway problem with inhomogeneous average valuations remains
NP-hard even if it is further restricted to Conditions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
The reduction is from the PARTITION problem, and extends an idea by
Briest and Krysta (2006). We use the PARTITION problem with an additional
restriction, deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.3.4. Given positive integers a1,...,a2L and A, does there exist




`ÝS a` Æ A and jSjÆ L?
This problem is known to be NP-hard; see Garey and Johnson (1979). We
may assume that L È3/", for otherwise the number of integers is bounded by
a constant and therefore PARTITION is solvable in polynomial time. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that 0· a1 ·...· a2L and a` · A for all `Æ
1,...,2L. Let a0





We create an instance H of the highway problem with 7LÅ3 segments.
The segments are partitioned in 2LÅ1 gadgets. Gadget ` Æ 1,...,2L con-
sists of two segments, i Æ 2`¡1 and i Æ 2`. Each of these two segments
are requested by 2L¡1 customers with valuation a0
`. The combination of
two segments, 2`¡1 and 2`, is requested by one customer with valuation
(2¡ 1
L)a0
`. Gadget 2LÅ1 contains 3LÅ3 segments, where the ﬁrst three seg-
ments, 4LÅ1,4LÅ2,4LÅ3, are requested by one customer with valuation
12
4LÅ3A0 and the last 3L segments, 4LÅ4,...,7LÅ3, are requested by three
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customers with valuation 12L
4LÅ3A0. Three customers request all segments in
gadget 2LÅ1 and each has valuation 12L
4LÅ3A0. Finally, there is one big cus-
tomer, who requests the ﬁrst 4LÅ3 items with valuation (4¡ 1
L)A0. Instance
H is displayed in Figure 3.3, where the number of customers interested in

























d =2L−1 d =3
d =3 d =1 d =1
d =1





Figure 3.3: Instance H .
In the following lemma, we show that this instance of the highway prob-
lem satisﬁes the three above mentioned conditions, that is, the inhomogene-
ity of average valuations is bounded from above by 1Å" for some constant
"È0, the valuations are monotone, and the average valuations are monotone
decreasing. Then, using this lemma, we prove that the problem is NP-hard.
Lemma 3.3.5. Instance H of the highway problem satisﬁes Conditions 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3.
Proof. The customers requesting item 4L¡1 or 4L have the largest average
valuation of a0
2L, and the customers requesting bundle {4L Å1,...,7L Å3}
have the lowest average valuation of 12L
















































Condition 3.2 follows straightforwardly by just verifying that the valu-
ation on a bundle is at least as high as the valuation on any of its subsets.
Now, it is easy to see that Condition 3.3 holds for the subpaths containing
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one or two items. Also, for the customers requesting {4LÅ4,...,7LÅ3} and
{4LÅ1,...,7LÅ3} it is obvious as their valuations are equal but the size of
their bundles differ. We perform a case study to verify that Condition 3.3
also holds for all other customers j, j0 2 J for which I j µ I j0. The average val-
uation of the bundles of size 1 is greater than the average valuation of the
bundles of size 2, for all `Æ1,...,2L, thus for the single item bundles the con-















































Consequently, instance H of the highway problem satisﬁes all three condi-
tions.
Theorem 3.3.6. The highway problem is NP-hard even when restricted to
Conditions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
Proof. We claim that there exists a feasible solution to PARTITION (see Def-
inition 3.3.4) if and only if there is a feasible solution to instance H of the











`ÝS a` Æ A and jSj Æ L.
For all ` 2 {1,...,2L}, let p2`¡1 Æ p2` Æ a0
` if ` 2 S and p2`¡1 Æ p2` Æ (1¡
1
2L)a0
` if ` Ý S. Furthermore, we set p4LÅ1 Æ ... Æ p7LÅ2 Æ 0 and p7LÅ3 Æ
12L
4LÅ3A0. Applying this price vector, the revenue without contribution of the
big customer is equal to (4L ¡2)a0
` in each gadget ` Æ 1,...,2L. The big
customer contributes her entire valuation (4¡ 1
L)A0. In gadget 2LÅ1, the
customer requesting segments 4LÅ1, 4LÅ2 and 4LÅ3 gets this path for free.
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The other customers in this gadget contribute their complete valuations.
























For the converse, we are given an optimal solution to instance H with a
total revenue of at least (8LÅ 72L
4LÅ3 ¡ 1
L)A0. First, we observe that in such an
optimal solution, segments 4LÅ1, 4LÅ2 and 4LÅ3 are necessarily priced to
0 and the total price of the remaining segments in gadget 2LÅ1 is 12L
4LÅ3A0,
yielding a revenue of 72L
4LÅ3A0. To see this, we notice that the total demand
on the ﬁrst three segments in this gadget is 5 and on the latter 3L segments
the demand is 6. Therefore, if the total price on the ﬁrst three segments of
gadget 2LÅ1 is 0 Ç x · 12
4LÅ3A0, the total revenue obtained in the gadget is
at most 72L













from the customers in gadget 2LÅ1. The above suggested pricing, where
segments 4LÅ1, 4LÅ2 and 4LÅ3 are priced to 0, does not decrease revenue
generated in gadgets 1,...,2L, and the total revenue in gadget 2LÅ1 is equal
to 72L
4LÅ3A0.
Second, in the optimal solution to the highway problem, there could be
only two alternative pricing strategies in gadgets `Æ1,...,2L:
either p2`¡1 Æ p2` Æ a0





where both prices do not exceed a0
`. In both pricings, the contribution of the
gadget (without big customer) to the total revenue is (4L¡2)a0
`. Therefore,
in the optimal solution to instance H with revenue at least (8LÅ 72L
4LÅ3¡ 1
L)A0,























that is, at least her valuation. As she cannot spend more, she spends her
total valuation. This amount is to be spent on the ﬁrst 4L segments as the
price of segments 4LÅ1, 4LÅ2 and 4LÅ3 is set to 0.
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Deﬁne set S Æ {` 2 {1,...,2L} : p2`¡1 Æ p2` Æ a0










































As this must be equal to the valuation of the big customer, we know that
P
`2S a0
` Æ A0. Also, as
P2L
`Æ1a0
` Æ 2A0, we have
P
`ÝS a0














We claim that jSj Æ L. To prove this, suppose it is not true. First, assume
that jSjÇ L, that is, jSj· L¡1. Then we have
X
`2S
a` Æ AÅ(L¡jSj)(4LÅ2)A ¸ AÅ(4LÅ2)A È2A,
which is not possible as
P2L
`Æ1a` Æ 2A, so jSj ¸ L. Now, assume jSj È L, that
is, jSj¸ LÅ1. Then we have
X
`2S
a` Æ AÅ(L¡jSj)(4LÅ2)A · A¡(4LÅ2)A Ç0.
This is also not possible as all integers a` are nonnegative. Therefore, we




`ÝS a` Æ A.
3.4 Conclusion
As a main contribution of this chapter, we show that the highway problem as
well as the single item pricing problem with arbitrary bundles is NP-hard
(weakly and strongly, respectively) if the inhomogeneity is bounded from
above by 1Å", for any " È 0. As it is easy to show that both problems are
straightforwardly solvable if all average valuations are equal, we delineate
the borderline between triviality and NP-hardness.
Unfortunately, the study of the natural version of the highway pricing
problem in this chapter did not lead to closing the gap between logarithmic
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approximation and weak NP-hardness. However, for instances where the
average valuation between customers does not vary a lot, we present a good
approximation algorithm. Clearly, the existence of a quasi-PTAS for the
highway pricing problem by Elbassioni, Sitters, and Zhang (2007) suggests
that a PTAS might be in reach. Yet, we leave it as an open problem to derive




In this chapter we address the algorithmic complexity of a single item pri-
cing problem in capacitated, undirected graphs. A company wants to deter-
mine the prices of capacitated edges to serve a set of potential customers.
Each customer is interested in purchasing a simple path in the graph and
has a maximum valuation that we assume to be known to the company. The
goal is to decide which customers to serve, and to determine prices for all
edges in order to maximize the company’s total revenue. We address this
single item pricing problem in different graph topologies. More speciﬁcally,
we derive several results on the algorithmic complexity of this single item
pricing problem, given that the graph is either a path, cycle, tree, or grid.1
4.1 Introduction
We consider a single item pricing problem that is deﬁned on a capacitated,
undirected graph, referred to as the tollbooth problem and introduced by Gu-
ruswami et al. (2005). Given is a simple undirected graph G Æ (V,E) with
jEjÆ m edges, and given are integral edge capacities ce, e 2 E. Each edge can
be thought of as a network link, and the edge capacity determines the max-
imum number of customers the link can accommodate. We mainly, but not
exclusively, discuss problems where edge capacities ce are ﬁnite, in contrast
1This chapter is based on Grigoriev, van Loon, Sitters, and Uetz (2006) and Grigoriev, van
Loon, Sitters, and Uetz (2009).Chapter 4. Pricing in Capacitated Graphs
to the original tollbooth problem. Given is a set of n potential customers
J Æ{1,...,n} each of which is interested in purchasing a network connection
between two vertices of the graph. In contrast to many classical network
problems, we assume that each customer wants one speciﬁc simple path,
her bundle, denoted E j µ E, rather than any path that connects the two ver-
tices. Each single-minded customer j 2 J has an integral valuation bj, which
is the largest amount that a customer is willing to pay for her path E j. Let
B Æ maxj2J{bj} be an upper bound on the valuations. The company deter-
mines prices for all edges, and the price of path E j is equal to the sum of
the prices of all edges in this path. A customer is a winner if the total price
of her requested path does not exceed her valuation. The set of winners is
denoted by W µ J.
Deﬁnition 4.1.1. A feasible solution consists of a set of winners W µ J and
a vector of prices p Æ (p1,...,pm) 2 Rm
Å , such that each edge e 2 E accommo-
dates no more than ce winners, and all winners can afford their path, that
is,
P
e2E j pe · bj for all j 2 W. The optimization problem consists of ﬁnd-




e2E j pe is
maximized.
One usually distinguishes between solutions that are envy-free and those
that are not. In the setting with single-minded customers considered here,
envy-freeness requires that if a customer j is not a winner then the total
price of path E j must exceed her valuation. However, we mostly address
problems without requiring envy-freeness in this chapter. In Example 4.1.2,
we present a situation where the underlying graph is a path, customers
request a subpath and an optimal solution is not required to be envy-free.
Example 4.1.2. Consider the rental of a set of similar houses in holiday
parks on the basis of weekends and midweeks, that is, non-overlapping dis-
crete periods. Customers are interested in renting a house in consecutive pe-
riods. Since all houses are identical, in any time period they need to have the
same price. But prices may vary from period to period. We can thus interpret
a time period as an edge in a path, with edge capacity equal to the number of
houses available in that period. Notice that envy-freeness is not necessarily
an issue, since the owner of the houses can freely decide to whom to rent them.
In Section 4.2, we address the problem where the underlying graph G is
a path, known as the highway problem. This problem is introduced by Gu-
ruswami et al. (2005) and motivated by setting tolls on a single highway. If
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the edge capacities are unlimited, we derive an exact dynamic programming
algorithm for the case of uniform valuations, leading to a logarithmic ap-
proximation algorithm for the problem with non-uniform valuations. Then,
we regard the problem on a path with an upper bound C on the capacity of
any edge, that is, ce · C for all e 2 E. We propose a dynamic programming
algorithm that computes an optimal solution in time O(n2CB2Cm). Based
on our dynamic programming algorithm, we moreover derive a fully polyno-
mial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the highway problem, given
that the maximum capacity of any edge, C, is a constant. In contrast to pre-
vious results in this direction (see e.g. Hartline and Koltun (2005), Balcan
and Blum (2006) and Briest and Krysta (2006)), our FPTAS does neither
require a constant number of edges in the subpaths, nor an upper bound on
the valuations or that the bundles are a laminar family. The NP-hardness
proof for the highway problem can easily be adapted to prove NP-hardness
for the same problem on a cycle, as shown in Section 4.3. Moreover, in
this section, we not only regard the problem on a cycle with limited edge
capacities in which each customer j 2 J requests a path E j µ E, but also
the problem where customers only specify two vertices to be connected. For
both problems, we show how to adapt the dynamic programming approach
of Section 4.2.3 in order to solve them to optimality in time O(n3CB3Cm) and
O(n3CB3C4Cm), respectively.
In Section 4.4 we address the problem where the capacity of any edge is
exactly one. For the case that graph G is a path (highway problem), the prob-
lem reduces to ﬁnding a maximum weight independent set in an interval
graph, which is polynomially solvable (Möhring 1985). When we generalize
from a path to a cycle, the problem reduces to ﬁnding a maximum weight in-
dependent set in a circular arc graph, which is also known to be solvable in
polynomial time (Golumbic and Hammer 1988). Furthermore, if the under-
lying graph G is a tree, we can show that the problem remains polynomially
solvable. When the underlying graph G is a grid, however, we show that it
is NP-hard to approximate the maximum revenue within a factor n1¡", for
any "È0. Recall that n is the number of customers.
4.2 Highway problem
In this section, we restrict the underlying graph G Æ (V,E) to be a path,
thus we address the highway problem. We ﬁrst discuss the complexity of
this problem. Thereafter, we present a dynamic programming algorithm for
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the case with unlimited edge capacities and uniform valuations, which leads
to a logarithmic approximation algorithm for the case with non-uniform val-
uations. Finally, we present a dynamic programming algorithm and a fully
polynomial time approximation scheme for the case where edge capacities
are bounded by some constant C.
4.2.1 Complexity
It is not hard to see that the highway problem is polynomially solvable if
either the set of winners W µ J is given, or the vector of prices p is given.
Lemma 4.2.1. The highway problem is polynomially solvable if the vector of
prices p Æ(p1,...,pm) is given.
Proof. Given the vector of prices p Æ (p1,...,pm), we only need to ﬁnd a
feasible set of winners that maximizes the total revenue. Whenever the
edge capacities are unlimited, this is trivial and the set of winners is just
W Æ{j 2 J :
P
e2E j pe · bj}.
For the case of limited capacity, let W0 be the set of customers for whom
the requested path is affordable, given the price vector p. For any edge e,
we can not accommodate more than ce customers. Let aej be equal to 1 if
edge e 2 E j for customer j, and 0 otherwise. We ﬁnd a revenue-maximizing
feasible subset of winners by solving linear program (4.1), where xj Æ1 if and













aejxj · ce 8e 2 E (4.1)
0· xj ·1 8j 2W0
The constraint matrix {aej}e2E,j2J of this linear program has the consec-
utive ones property, which was introduced by Fulkerson and Gross (1965).
A matrix has the consecutive ones property if there is a permutation of its
rows that places the 1’s consecutively in every column. The constraint ma-
trix in linear program (4.1) has this property because the requested path
E j of any customer j consists only of consecutive edges. A consecutive ones
matrix is totally unimodular (Nemhauser and Wolsey 1988), which means
that every square non-singular matrix has determinant -1 or +1. Hence, the
corresponding polyhedron only has integral vertices (Hoffman and Kruskal
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1956; Papadimitriou and Steiglitz 1998). Therefore, linear program (4.1)
yields an integral optimal solution, and W Æ{j 2 J : xj Æ1}.
If a feasible set of winners W µ J is given, we ﬁnd an optimal price vector
p Æ(p1,...,pm) by solving linear program (4.2). In the case with limited edge










pe · bj 8j 2W (4.2)
pe ¸0 8e 2 E
Since this constraint matrix has the consecutive ones property, too, we ob-
tain the following.
Lemma 4.2.2 (Guruswami et al. (2005, Lemma 5.1)). The highway problem
is polynomially solvable if a feasible set of winners W µ J is given. Moreover,
if the valuations bj are integral, there exists an optimal, integral price vector.
Briest and Krysta (2006) show that the highway problem is NP-hard. For
their reduction from PARTITION it sufﬁces, but it is also necessary, that the
capacity of some edge is at least 3. If the capacity of any edge is at most 2,
the complexity status of the problem remains open.
4.2.2 Approximation algorithm
Consider the problem with unlimited edge capacities, referred to as the high-
way problem by Guruswami et al. (2005). First let us assume that every cus-
tomer has the same positive valuation b, that is, all customers have uniform
valuations.
Theorem 4.2.3. The highway problem can be solved in O(m3n) time if it has
unlimited edge capacities and uniform positive valuations.
Proof. Consider the problem with bj Æ 1 for all j 2 J. There exists an opti-
mal solution in which all prices are 0 or 1, because given a set of winners
W in an optimal solution, the optimal prices can be found by solving linear
program (4.2) with an integral vector (b1,...,bn), and the constraint matrix
satisﬁes the consecutive ones property. We obtain this solution using a poly-
nomial time dynamic program.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that the edges on the path (high-
way) are indexed consecutively. In the dynamic programming algorithm for
the problem with bj Æ 1, for every customer j 2 J, let sj denote the edge
in path E j with the smallest index and tj the edge in E j with the largest
index. For all edges k,` 2 E with k Ç `, let R(k,`) be the total optimal rev-
enue obtained by the customers for whom tj · `, given that pk Æ p` Æ 1
and pkÅ1 Æ ¢¢¢ Æ p`¡1 Æ 0. Furthermore, let R(k,m Å1) be the total op-
timal revenue obtained by all customers given that pk Æ 1 and, if k Ç m,
pkÅ1 Æ ¢¢¢ Æ pm Æ 0. We deﬁne R(0,`) Æ j{j 2 J : tj Æ `}j for all ` Æ 1,...,m.
Then, given R(e,k) for all e Æ 0,...,k¡1 and k Ç ` · mÅ1, we compute the
revenue R(k,`) by ﬁnding the maximum sum of R(e,k) and the contribution
of all customers j 2 J whose path E j contains either edge k or ` (not both),














1 if e Ç sj · k and k Ç tj Ç`
1 if k Ç sj and tj Æ`
0 otherwise.
The optimal revenue is equal to maxk2E{R(k,mÅ1)}. The computation
time of this dynamic program is O(m3n). Note that Guruswami et al. (2005)
introduce yet another O(BBÅ2nBÅ3) time dynamic program to solve the same
problem with a constant upper bound B on the valuations. This complexity
is O(n4) in case bj Æ1 for all j 2 J.
After we solve the problem with bj Æ 1 for all j 2 J, we multiply pe by
b for every edge e 2 E, to obtain the optimal solution for the problem with
original valuation b.
If we consider the problem in which every customer’s valuation bj is in
[b,±b] for some ±È1, then we can round down all valuations to b and lose at
most a factor of ± in the optimal revenue. Therefore, the following corollary
follows straightforwardly from Theorem 4.2.3.
Corollary 4.2.4. Consider the highway problem with unlimited edge capac-
ities. If for every customer j 2 J, the valuation bj is such that b · bj · ±b for
b ¸0 and ±¸1, then there exists a polynomial time ±-approximation.
For the same problem with arbitrary valuations, we can derive a poly-
nomial time O(lnB)-approximation algorithm. To achieve this, let us deﬁne
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subproblems such that the `th subproblem contains customers {j 2 J : ±`¡1 ·
bj Ç±`}. Using Corollary 4.2.4, we ﬁnd a ±-approximate solution for each of
these log±B subproblems and we derive a (±log±B)-approximation algorithm
for the highway problem with unlimited edge capacities. The approximation
ratio ±log±B is minimized by letting ± Æ e, and we arrive at the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.2.5. There exists an (elnB)-approximation algorithm for the
highway problem with unlimited edge capacities.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the highway problem with
limited edge capacities. That is, each edge e 2 E can accommodate no more
than ce customers. Let C ¸ maxe2E ce be an upper bound on the capacity of
any edge. We show that we can solve this problem in time O(n2CB2Cm) by
ﬁnding a longest path in an acyclic digraph. Afterwards, we derive a fully
polynomial time approximation scheme for this problem.
4.2.3 Dynamic program
We create an m-layered digraph D with an additional source s and sink t,
layers 0 and mÅ1, respectively. There are arcs only from layer e to eÅ1,
for e Æ 0,...,m. Hence, in any s¡t path, there are exactly mÅ2 nodes. In
every node in layer e, corresponding to edge e, we store all winners j that are
accommodated by edge e. Moreover, we store the respective total amounts
all these winners spend on all edges (network links) in their respective path
E j up to and including edge e. For any node x, the path s¡x in the digraph
represents a feasible partial solution. Arcs from node x of layer e to node y of
layer eÅ1 are only introduced if the path s¡y represents a feasible extension
of the partial solution represented by the path s¡ x. The length of an arc
that connects a node of layer e to a node of layer eÅ1 is equal to the revenue
earned on edge eÅ1, that is, the total amount that the corresponding winners
pay for edge eÅ1. Therefore, the length of the longest s¡t path in digraph
D is equal to the maximum total revenue. Moreover, the set of winners can
be reconstructed from the longest s¡ t path. Algorithm 4.1 shows a more
formal description.
Theorem 4.2.6. The dynamic programming algorithm solves the highway
problem in O(n2CB2Cm) time, where C is an upper bound on the edge capac-
ities.
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Algorithm 4.1: Dynamic Programming Algorithm
Input: The highway problem with maximum capacity of any edge at
most C
Output: Accommodation of customers to edges and edge prices pe
begin (construction of digraph D)
nodes: For each edge e 2 E, we introduce a layer of nodes:
Denote by Je the set of customers with e 2 E j;
By Ke Æ(j1, j2,..., jk) we denote any (sorted) subset of Je of
cardinality k, where k ·min{ce,jJej}·C;
Deﬁne Hj :Æ{0,1,...,bj} as the possible total amount customer
j 2 Ke can spend on edges {1,...,e}\E j;
Let he 2 Hj1 £Hj2£ ¢¢¢£Hjk be a vector denoting how much each
customer j spends on edges {1,...,e}\E j, for each j 2 Ke. If
Ke Æ;, we let he Æ0;
Let all such pairs (Ke,he) be the nodes in layer e of D, for
e Æ1,...,m;
Let s and t denote source and sink. To unify notation, assume
sÆ(;,0) and tÆ(;,0);
arcs: Insert an arc ae from node (Ke¡1,he¡1) to node (Ke,he), for
e Æ2,...,m, if:
(1) For all j 2 Ke¡1 with e 2 E j, j 2 Ke, and for all j 2 Je¡1\Ke¡1
with e 2 E j, j 62 Ke.
(2) There exists a unique integral value d ¸0 such that
d Æ he
j ¡he¡1
j for all j 2 Ke¡1\Ke, and d Æ he
j for all j 2 Ke\Ke¡1.
We furthermore connect source node s to all nodes (K1,h1), and we
connect all nodes (Km,hm) to sink node t.
arc lengths: For an arc ae that connects (Ke¡1,he¡1) and (Ke,he):
If Ke Æ;, we let the length of arc ae be `(ae)Æ0, and if Ke 6Æ;, we
let the length of arc ae be `(ae)Æ djKej, where d is the (unique)
value from condition (2) above.
end
Solution: Compute the longest s¡t path P in digraph D. Whenever
for customer j we have that j 2 Ke with (Ke,he)2P , edge e
accommodates customer j. The price pe for edge e equals `(ae)/jKej,
where ae is the arc from path P that connects nodes (Ke¡1,he¡1) and
(Ke,he).
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary s¡t path P in digraph D. Abusing notation,
let (We,he) be the nodes on P . Set We is thus the set of customers that are
accommodated by edge e, and he is the vector of the total amounts these
customers pay up to and including edge e. By deﬁnition of the nodes and
arcs of the digraph, no customer j will be accommodated by an edge outside
her requested path E j. For any customer j, consider an edge e 2 E j such that
j 2We. That is, edge e accommodates customer j. By condition (1) of the arc
deﬁnition, all other edges of path E j must accommodate customer j as well.
Next, by deﬁnition we have for any node (We,he) that jWej · ce. Hence, the
edge capacities are satisﬁed. Finally, let us consider the valuation constraint



















The third equality holds due to condition (2) of the arc deﬁnition, and the
last inequality holds because hl
j 2 Hj Æ{0,1,...,bj}.
Now we know that any s¡t path P in D deﬁnes a feasible solution to
the highway problem with limited edge capacities, and W Æ
S
e2EWe denotes












In other words, the path length deﬁnes the revenue of the corresponding
solution, thus the longest path yields an optimal solution.
To arrive at the computation time of O(n2CB2Cm), we estimate the size
of digraph D. For every edge e 2 E, there are at most O(nC) different sets
Ke and at most O(BC) different vectors he. Thus, per edge e 2 E, we have
at most O(nCBC) nodes (Ke,he). For any e 2 E, every node (Ke,he) is con-
nected to at most O(nCBC) nodes (KeÅ1,heÅ1). So, per layer e, there are
at most O(n2CB2C) arcs to layer eÅ1, which means that there are at most
O(n2CB2Cm) arcs in D. The computation time to ﬁnd the longest path in
D is linear in the number of arcs, since D is acyclic (Ahuja, Magnanti, and
Orlin 1993).
Notice that the solution constructed by the dynamic programming algo-
rithm is not necessarily envy-free.
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4.2.4 FPTAS
We next show how to turn the dynamic programming algorithm into a fully
polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS); that is, for any " È 0, we
have an algorithm that computes a solution with revenue at least (1¡")
times the optimum revenue, in time polynomial in the input and 1/". To
that end, we just apply the dynamic programming algorithm to a rounded in-
stance in which the customers’ valuations are b0
j Æbbj/¯c where ¯Æ"B/(2n2)
for " È 0. Note that without loss of generality, we may assume that ¯ is
integer.
Lemma 4.2.7. For every solution (W,p) to the original instance, there exists a
solution (W,p00) to the rounded instance with revenue ¦(W,p00)È 1
¯¦(W,p)¡
mn.
Proof. Let (W,p) be a feasible solution to the original instance with revenue
¦(W,p). Let p00
e Æbpe/¯c for all edges e 2 E. Note that (pe/¯)¡1Ç p00
e ·(pe/¯).
For the original instance we have for every winner j 2W,
P














































Lemma 4.2.8. For every solution (W0,p0) to the rounded instance, there exists
a solution (W0, ˜ p) to the original instance with ¦(W0, ˜ p)Æ¯¦(W0,p0).
Proof. Let (W0,p0) be a solution to the rounded instance yielding revenue
¦(W0,p0). Let ˜ pe Æ p0
e¯ be prices in the original instance for all edges e 2 E.
This is integer because p0
e and ¯ are integer. Then the valuation constraint















Hence, the same set of customers W can get their requested path, and solu-




















We now combine Lemma 4.2.7 and Lemma 4.2.8 to obtain an FPTAS.
Theorem 4.2.9. There exists an FPTAS for the highway problem in which
edge capacities are bounded by a constant.
Proof. Let (W,p) and (W0,p0) be the optimal solutions to the original and
rounded instances, respectively. Consider solution (W0, ˜ p) to the original
instance, where ˜ pe Æ ¯p0
e for all edges e 2 E, and solution (W,p00) to the
rounded instance, where p00
e Æ bpe/¯c for all edges e 2 E. An application of
the previous two lemmas now yields










where the ﬁrst inequality holds due to optimality of solution (W0,p0) to the
rounded instance. Note that for n customers there are at most 2n distinct
endpoints of their requested paths. Without loss of generality, we identify a
set of edges between two consecutive endpoints with a single edge. There-
fore, the number of distinct edges m is at most 2n¡1. Since the maxi-
mum revenue ¦(W,p) is at least the maximum valuation B, we have that
¦(W0, ˜ p)È(1¡")¦(W,p).
Concerning the time to compute the optimal solution (W0,p0), observe

















Thus, the number of nodes per layer e 2 E is at most O(n3C/"C) and conse-
quently there are O(n6C/"2C) arcs between any two consecutive layers. Now,
as m·2n¡1, the total number of arcs in the digraph is O(n6CÅ1/"2C). As the
computation time to ﬁnd the longest path in an acyclic digraph D is linear
in the number of arcs (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993), the computation
time is polynomial in terms of n and 1/".
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4.3 Pricing in a capacitated cycle
The complexity result and the dynamic program we obtained for the highway
problem with capacitated edges can be extended to the pricing problem on a
capacitated cycle.
Corollary 4.3.1. The single item pricing problem on a cycle is NP-hard.
In fact, the NP-hardness proof for the highway problem by Briest and
Krysta (2006) immediately results in NP-hardness for the problem on a cy-
cle, as the two ends of the path can be connected. Customers still request
the same subpaths after this transformation.
Theorem 4.3.2. The single item pricing problem on a capacitated cycle can
be solved in time O(n3CB3Cm).
Proof. We adapt the dynamic program of Algorithm 4.1. Choose any edge
e 2 E to start the procedure. Other than in the previous algorithm we now
start in layer 1, and include all possible nodes (Ke,he) in this layer; these
nodes are created similarly as in Algorithm 4.1, where Ke is a subset of
the customers for which e 2 E j, and he represents the total amount spent
on edges up to and including edge e. For example, for a customer j with
E j Æ {e¡2,e¡1,e,eÅ1}, he represents the amount this customer spends on
edges e¡2, e¡1 and e, regardless of the fact that we do not yet know how
much exactly she spends on edges e¡2 and e¡1.
Arcs between layers e and eÅ1 exist if the conditions (1) and (2) of Al-
gorithm 4.1 are satisﬁed. In the ﬁnal layer, mÅ1, there are exactly the
same nodes as in layer 1 to complete the cycle. For every node (Ke,he) in
layer 1, we ﬁnd the longest path to the same node (Ke,he) in layer mÅ1.
Among all longest paths, we select the one with the highest total value. This
value is equal to the maximum total revenue, and the set of winners can be
reconstructed from this longest path as well.
The size of the digraph is similar as before, that is, there are O(nCBC)
nodes per layer, O(n2CB2C) arcs between any two consecutive layers, and
therefore a total of O(n2CB2Cm) arcs. Finding a longest path in the digraph
is linear in the number of arcs since the digraph is acyclic (Ahuja, Magnanti,
and Orlin 1993). As we have to ﬁnd the longest path for each of the O(nCBC)
nodes in the ﬁrst layer, all longest paths can be found in O(n3CB3Cm), which
is the total time needed to ﬁnd the optimal solution to the problem on a cycle
with limited edge capacities.
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An interesting extension is the problem in which each customer requests
a connection between two vertices instead of a speciﬁc path. In this case,
the company has the freedom to decide in which direction of the cycle the
connection is established in order to maximize the revenue.
Theorem 4.3.3. The single item pricing problem on a capacitated cycle is
NP-hard, even if customers are indifferent to the direction used for the con-
nection.
Proof. We reduce from the highway problem. First, we include an additional
edge that connects the two end vertices of the original path to create a cycle.
Then, we introduce one extra customer that requests a connection between
the two original end vertices and has a valuation that is larger than the sum
of all other customers’ valuations. This forces the price on the new edge to
be expensive enough in the optimal solution such that no other customer can
afford using this edge. Therefore, all customers will still request the same
paths as in the instance on a path.
To solve this problem, we further adapt the previous dynamic program-
ming approach to include the direction of the connection between the re-
quested vertices for every customer. Therefore, given set Ke Æ (j1,..., jk) of
customers with e 2 E j, we introduce vector dire 2 {0,1}k to denote for each
customer j 2 Ke the direction of the connection between the requested ver-
tices; 0 for clockwise, 1 for counter-clockwise. Thus, in layer 1, corresponding
to chosen edge e 2 E, we have all possible nodes (Ke,he,dire).
Arcs are again created if conditions (1) and (2) of Algorithm 4.1 are met.
However, yet another condition should be satisﬁed, which assures that the
connection for each customer has only one direction. Thus, for all j 2 Ke \
KeÅ1, there is an arc if also dire
j Æ direÅ1
j . In the ﬁnal layer, mÅ1, there
are again the same nodes as in layer 1. Finally, after the complete digraph
is created, we ﬁnd for every node (Ke,he,dire) in layer 1 the longest path
to the corresponding node (Ke,he,dire) in layer mÅ1. Among all longest
paths, we select the one with the highest total value. This value is equal
to the maximum total revenue, and the set of winners can be reconstructed
from this longest path as well.
Theorem 4.3.4. The single item pricing problem on a capacitated cycle in
which customers are indifferent to the direction used for the connection can
be solved in time O(n3CB3C4Cm).
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Proof. By a similar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.2, and the extra
condition that each customer that gets a connection between the requested
vertices has a connection oriented in only one direction, the longest of all
longest paths between similar nodes deﬁnes the revenue of the optimal so-
lution.
For every edge e 2 E, there are at most O(nC) different sets Ke, at most
O(BC) different vectors he, and at most O(2C) different vectors dire. Thus,
per edge e 2 E, we have at most O(nCBC2C) nodes (Ke,he,dire). For any
e 2 E, every node (Ke,he,dire) is connected to at most O(nCBC) nodes of the
form (KeÅ1,heÅ1,direÅ1), as there only exists an arc when the values dire
j
and direÅ1
j are the same for all customers j 2 Ke \KeÅ1. So, there are at
most O(n2CB2C2C) arcs between layers e and eÅ1, which means that there
are at most O(n2CB2C2Cm) arcs in the digraph. The computation time to
ﬁnd the longest path in the digraph is linear in the number of arcs since the
digraph is acyclic (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993). We have to ﬁnd the
longest path for each node in layer 1, which takes O(n3CB3C4Cm) time.
4.4 Unit supply
In this section we assume that the capacity of any edge is one, that is, ce Æ1
for all e 2 E. We consider four types of graphs, namely paths, cycles, trees
and grids.
4.4.1 Highway problem
The instance on a path can be represented as an interval graph. An interval
graph is the intersection graph of a set of intervals on a path. It has one
vertex for each interval, or subpath, in the instance, that is, one vertex per
customer. There is an edge between every pair of vertices corresponding to
intervals that intersect, that is, customers for which the intersection of their
requested subpaths is not empty. The valuations of the customers are rep-
resented as weights on the corresponding vertices. As the edge capacities
are one in this case, we are searching for a maximum weight independent
set, that is, a subset of the vertices such that no two vertices in this subset
are adjacent in the interval graph. The result of Theorem 4.4.1 is not sur-
prising, since the problem of ﬁnding a maximum weight independent set in
an interval graph is known to be solvable in quadratic time according to a
result by Möhring (1985).
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Theorem 4.4.1 (Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad (1998, Theorem 10)). The
highway problem with unit edge capacities can be solved in O(n2) time.
4.4.2 Cycle
The instance on a cycle can be represented as a circular arc graph, which
is the intersection graph of a set of intervals on a cycle. It has one vertex
for each interval, or subpath, in the instance, and an edge between every
pair of vertices corresponding to intervals that intersect. Again, the weight
of a vertex is equal to the corresponding customer’s valuation. Once more,
we search for a maximum weight independent set in this circular arc graph,
which is known to be solvable in cubic time according to a result by Golumbic
and Hammer (1988).
Theorem 4.4.2 (Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad (1998, Corollary 11)). The
single item pricing problem on a cycle with unit edge capacities can be solved
in O(n3) time.
The problem in which the customers are indifferent to the direction of
their requested connection can be solved by straightforward Algorithm 4.2,
also in O(n3) time.
Algorithm 4.2: Single item pricing problem on a cycle with unit ca-
pacity and customers requesting a connection
Let
¡ !
E j be the edges contained in the clockwise connection for
customer j, and
Ã ¡
E j the edges in the counterclockwise connection.
foreach j Æ1,...,n do
Assign
¡ !
E j to j, and solve the problem on path E\
¡ !
E j with
customers J\ j. Let
¡ !
¦j be the revenue;
Assign
Ã ¡
E j to j, and solve the problem on path E\
Ã ¡
E j with
customers J\ j. Let
Ã ¡
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4.4.3 Tree
Guruswami et al. (2005) show that the problem with unlimited edge capac-
ities is APX-hard even on star graphs. Contrasting this complexity result,
we prove that if the capacity of each edge is exactly one, the problem on a
tree can be solved in polynomial time. Again, recall that we do not require
the solution to be envy-free.
Theorem 4.4.3. The single item pricing problem on a tree can be solved in
O(n4) time.
Proof. Consider the graph H Æ(J,E0) where (j,k)2 E0 if and only if E j\Ek 6Æ
;, for two customers j,k 2 J. Since {E j : j 2 J} is a collection of simple paths
in a tree, graph H is an edge intersection graph of paths in a tree, or EPT
graph, as deﬁned by Golumbic and Jamison (1985); see also Brandstädt, Le,
and Spinrad (1999). The underlying graph G is a tree and the capacity of
each edge is exactly one, thus the maximum weight independent set in H
with vertex weights bj, j 2 J, corresponds to the optimal set of winners W,
and the weight of this independent set is equal to the maximum revenue.
The vector of optimal prices can be obtained straightforwardly by setting
the price of one arbitrary edge of E j to bj, and setting the prices of all other
edges in E j to 0, j 2 W. The remaining edges in the tree can be priced
arbitrarily.
A polynomial time algorithm to compute a maximum weight indepen-
dent set in an EPT graph was described by Tarjan (1985). The algorithm
is a recursive procedure that decomposes the problem on the basis of clique
separators. The polynomial computation time is a consequence of the fact
that the atoms, that is, the non-decomposable subgraphs of EPT graphs, are
line graphs. A line graph of an undirected graph G is a graph that represents
the adjacencies between edges of G. The line graph has a vertex for every
edge in G. Two vertices of the line graph are adjacent if and only if their cor-
responding edges are adjacent in G. For line graphs, the maximum weight
independent set problem is just the maximum weight matching problem,
which can be solved in O(n3) time by Edmonds’ algorithm (Edmonds 1965).




Demaine et al. (2006) show that the single item pricing problem with un-
limited capacities, where the customers request arbitrary subsets of the net-
work links, is hard to approximate within a semi-logarithmic factor. If we re-
strict the requested subsets of links to be a path of edges in a general graph,
then the problem is APX-hard even under strong restrictions as shown by
Guruswami et al. (2005) and Briest and Krysta (2006)
Here we show that if the capacities of the edges are bounded by one, then
we can derive an even stronger inapproximability result for a very restricted
class of graphs and customers’ requests.
Theorem 4.4.4. For all "È0, approximating the single item pricing problem
on a grid with unit supply within a factor n1¡" is NP-hard, even with unit
valuations, and when each edge is an element of at most two requested paths.
The same result holds if the solution is required to be envy-free.
Proof. We construct an approximation preserving reduction from INDEPEN-
DENTSET. In the latter problem, given a graph H Æ (V0,E0), the problem is
to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality subset S µV0 such that no two vertices from
S are adjacent. It is NP-hard to approximate INDEPENDENTSET within a
factor jV0j1¡" as shown by Zuckerman (2006).
Let V0 Æ {v1,...,vn} and E0 Æ {a1,...,am}. We construct the instance of
the single item pricing problem as follows. We create an (nÅ1)£(2mÅ2)
grid, that is, a simple graph with 2nmÅ2nÅ2mÅ2 vertices {(j,e) : 1 · j ·
nÅ1,1 · e · 2mÅ2}, where (j,e) and (j0,e0) are adjacent if jj0¡ jjÅje0¡ej Æ
1. Let horizontal layer j 2 {1,...,n} correspond to vertex vj 2 V0, and let
the edge ((nÅ1,2e),(nÅ1,2e Å1)) in the grid correspond to edge ae 2 E0.
Next, for each vertex vj 2 V0, we introduce a customer in the single item
pricing problem with a requested path deﬁned by the following simple path
in the grid graph. The path starts at point (j,1) and ends at point (j,2mÅ
2) following the layer j everywhere except for the edges ((j,2e),(j,2eÅ1))
such that vj 2 ae. These edges are substituted by vertical detours, passing
through edges ((nÅ1,2e),(nÅ1,2eÅ1)). See Figure 4.1 for an example. We
complete the construction by setting the valuation of each customer to 1.
We claim that there exists an independent set of cardinality K in H if and
only if there exists a solution to the single item pricing problem on the grid
with unit edge capacities with total revenue K. By construction, two paths in
the grid corresponding to adjacent vertices in H must share some edge a2 E0
in layer (nÅ1). Since the capacity of edge a is 1, only one of these paths can











Figure 4.1: Grid graph from the reduction of INDEPENDENTSET.
be present in a feasible solution. Hence, the total revenue in the single item
pricing problem is at most the maximum cardinality independent set in H.
For the converse, consider an independent set S in H and any two ver-
tices in this independent set. By construction, the two corresponding paths
in the single item pricing problem are edge disjoint. Therefore, there is a so-
lution to the single item pricing problem where S deﬁnes the set of winners
and each edge e 2 E accommodates at most one customer. For each vj 2 S
we set the price of the grid edge ((j,1),(j,2)) to 1, for each vj Ý S we set the
price of ((j,1),(j,2)) to 2, and for all other edges of the grid we set the prices
to 0. In the constructed solution to the single item pricing problem the total
revenue equals jSj. Thus, the reduction preserves the objective value.
Since the number of customers n in the single item pricing problem ex-
actly equals jV0j, we derive that the single item pricing problem is hard to
approximate within a factor n1¡". It remains to notice that the constructed
solution is envy-free since the price of the bundle of each non-winning cus-
tomer equals 2, which is greater than her valuation. Therefore, the theorem
holds also if we require the solution to be envy-free.
824.5. Conclusion
4.5 Conclusion
For the highway problem with capacitated edges, we derive an FPTAS based
on a pseudo-polynomial time dynamic program. These results are extended
to the problem where the underlying graph is a cycle. For the problem where
the capacity is equal to one, we show that the problem is polynomially solv-
able if the underlying graph is a path, cycle or tree. However, on a grid, the
problem becomes difﬁcult to approximate within n1¡" for any "È0.
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Algorithms for Afﬁne Pricing
We consider a revenue maximization problem where a company sells a set
of items to a set of customers. Every customer has one request for a contract
based on the different types of items available. We assume that the requests
and the valuations of the customers are known to the company. The company
determines a price for every type of item. Given these prices, the price of
a contract is calculated on the basis of an arbitrary afﬁne function on the
request of the customer. We show that this model generalizes the single item
pricing problem, and we derive a ﬁxed-parameter polynomial time algorithm
for the afﬁne pricing problem.1
5.1 Introduction
A telephone operator offers various types of phone usage to its customers,
for example, calling one minute domestically or abroad, sending a text mes-
sage or multimedia objects, but also establishing a connection. The operator
has to determine a price for each type of phone usage. The question is how
to set the prices so as to maximize the total revenue. Through market re-
search, an operator can acquire the exact details of phone usage for each of
its customers, that is, data is available on the date and time of the usage, the
duration, and the used network. Every customer requests a contract based
on her speciﬁc phone usage. Given the prices for the different types of phone
usage set by the operator, the price of the contract of a particular customer
is an afﬁne function on her request.
1This chapter is based on Grigoriev, van Loon, Sviridenko, Uetz, and Vredeveld (2007).Chapter 5. Algorithms for Afﬁne Pricing
Afﬁne pricing is a pricing strategy where there is a ﬁxed, customer de-
pendent cost for accepting the contract, and a constant per-item price for
every item type. Afﬁne pricing is different from the single item pricing prob-
lem described in Part I, as there customers request subsets of the available
set of items. Single item pricing is semi-logarithmic inapproximable, that
is, hard to approximate within a factor of O(log"n) for some "È0, assuming
that NP * BPTIME(2O(n±)) for all ±È0, as was generally shown by Demaine
et al. (2006). In this chapter, we show that the afﬁne pricing model gener-
alizes the single item pricing problem and give complexity results in case
the dimension of the afﬁne pricing problem, that is, the number of distinct
item types, is not constant. If the dimension of the problem is constant, we
present a polynomial time algorithm to solve the problem. In Section 5.4,
we apply the afﬁne pricing algorithm in a practical study using data from
a telephone company that resemble reality. Moreover, we present a local
search algorithm that yields solutions very close to optimal for the practical
data at hand.
The afﬁne pricing problem is deﬁned as follows. Let J Æ{1,...,n} denote
the set of customers requesting a contract from a company. Every customer
j 2 J has a valuation bj, which is the maximum amount j is willing to pay for
the contract. The customers are single-minded, that means that a customer
requests one contract which she accepts only if its price does not exceed
her valuation. Let set K Æ {1,...,m} be the set of distinct item types, each
inﬂuencing the price of the contract, and we call m the dimension of the
afﬁne pricing problem. Note that an item is not necessarily a physical or
digital product; it can for example also be a service or shipping cost. The
price of item type k 2 K is denoted by pk ¸ 0. The price p(j) of the contract
requested by customer j is deﬁned by afﬁne price function
p(j)Æ dj0Ådj1p1Å¢¢¢Ådjmpm, j 2 J. (5.1)
Positive coefﬁcient djk represents the demand of customer j 2 J for item
type k 2 K. Coefﬁcient dj0 is the cost charged to customer j 2 J for accepting
the contract. Without loss of generality, we assume that dj0 · bj. The coef-
ﬁcients may in general depend on the item types requested in the contract,
but also on customer j or the requested contract itself. For example, if k rep-
resents one minute of calling then the number of minutes customer j wants
to call is equal to djk. Or, if k represents shipping then djk is equal to 1 if
customer j requests shipping and 0 otherwise. Thus every customer gets a
personal offer for the contract she requests.
885.2. Afﬁne pricing algorithm
The problem consists of determining nonnegative prices pk for the item
types k 2 K. A solution to the problem is a price p(j) for the contract re-
quested by customer j 2 J. A customer is called a winner if she accepts and
receives the contract, and a loser otherwise. The set of winners is denoted
by W Æ{j 2 J : p(j)· bj}.
Deﬁnition 5.1.1. A solution is feasible if the contracts of all winners can be
afforded, that is, the price of the contract is at most the customer’s valuation,
and if no item type is oversold in case of limited supply. The objective of the
company is to maximize the total revenue, ¦Æ
P
j2W p(j).
Deﬁnition 5.1.2 (Envy-free). A solution is envy-free if it is feasible and in
addition the losers’ contracts are each priced higher than their valuations.
In this chapter, we only consider envy-free solutions. This is a property
of an optimal solution to the pricing problem with unlimited supply of item
types, but has to be assured if the supply is limited.
5.2 Afﬁne pricing algorithm
We present an algorithm to solve the afﬁne pricing problem. The running
time of this algorithm is polynomial as long as the dimension of the afﬁne
pricing problem m is constant. We describe the algorithm with unlimited
supply of the item types, and extend it to obtain a near-optimal solution for
the case with limited supply in Section 5.2.1. In the ﬁnal part of this sec-
tion, we describe the unlimited supply problem with unit-demand customers
instead of single-minded customers.
Deﬁnition 5.2.1 (Arrangement of linear inequalities). An arrangement of
linear inequalities is a set of linear inequalities in m dimensional space.
Deﬁnition 5.2.2 (Vertex). A vector p Æ (p1,...,pm) 2 Rm
Å is a vertex of the
arrangement of valuation and nonnegativity inequalities if it is characterized
by m out of the following nÅm equalities
dj0Ådj1p1Å¢¢¢Ådjmpm Æ bj, j 2 J
pk Æ 0, k 2 K ,
such that the coefﬁcient matrix of these m equalities has rank m.
89Chapter 5. Algorithms for Afﬁne Pricing
The afﬁne pricing algorithm that we propose in this chapter, enumerates
all vertices of the arrangement of valuation inequalities p(j) · bj, j 2 J,
and nonnegativity inequalities pk ¸ 0, k 2 K. We select the vertex for which
the price vector yields the highest revenue. We show in Lemma 5.2.3 that
there exists a vertex that is an optimal solution to the afﬁne pricing problem,
which proves that enumerating all vertices sufﬁces to solve the problem.
Lemma 5.2.3. There exists a vertex that is an optimal pricing strategy to the
afﬁne pricing problem.
Proof. Given an optimal solution p¤ Æ (p¤
1,...,p¤
m) 2 Rm
Å . Let W¤ Æ {j 2 J :








s.t. dj0Ådj1p1Å...Ådjmpm · bj 8j 2W¤
pk ¸0 8k 2 K .
Let ¯ p Æ( ¯ p1,..., ¯ pm)2Rm
Å be an optimal solution to this linear program. Now,
the generated revenue with vector ¯ p is at least as high as the generated
revenue with vector p¤, as ¯ p is an optimal solution to the linear program
and they both have the same set of winners. By optimality of p¤, the revenue
should be equal for both price vectors. By deﬁnition, vector ¯ p is a vertex.
Details of the afﬁne pricing algorithm are presented in Algorithm 5.1.
The algorithm is applied to a simple instance in Example 5.2.4 to further
clarify the procedure.
Algorithm 5.1: Afﬁne pricing algorithm.
Let ¦¤ Æ0, p¤ Æ(0,...,0) and W¤ Æ J;
foreach vertex p 2Rm
Å do
Let p(j)Æ dj0Ådj1p1Å¢¢¢Ådjmpm be the price of the contract
requested by customer j 2 J;
Let W Æ{j 2 J : p(j)· bj} be the set of winners;
Let ¦Æ
P
j2W p(j) be the total revenue;
if ¦È¦¤ then
Let ¦¤ Æ¦, p¤ Æ p and W¤ ÆW;
end
end
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Example 5.2.4. Assume the company has two different item types for sale,
and three customers request a contract. The ﬁxed cost dj0 Æ 0 for all cus-
tomers j. One customer wants 4 copies of the ﬁrst item, and 1 of the second.
One customer is interested in 6 copies of the ﬁrst and 1 of the second item.
And one customer requests 1 copy of both items. Their valuations are 4, 3
and 2, respectively. The valuation inequalities are 4p1Å p2 · 4, 6p1Å p2 · 3
and p1Åp2 ·2. Figure 5.1 shows a graphical representation of this situation.
The bullets represent the price vectors that are vertices. For each such price
vector we determine the revenue ¦. The optimal revenue of 73
5 is attained
at p Æ (1
5,14
5). Graphically, we can see that W Æ J because this price vector
lies in the feasible region deﬁned by the valuation inequalities p(j)· bj of all
customers j 2 J.
p1
p2



























Figure 5.1: Example of an instance of afﬁne pricing.
Theorem 5.2.5. The afﬁne pricing problem can be solved in polynomial time
if the number of item types m is constant. The computation time is O((nÅ
m)m(m3Ånm)) 2 O(nmÅ1).





2 O((nÅm)m) systems of m equalities each. In each of
these iterations, we solve a linear system in m variables and m constraints
91Chapter 5. Algorithms for Afﬁne Pricing
to determine the price vector, which takes O(m3) time. Checking whether
all prices are positive takes O(m) time. Computation of the contract prices,
winners, and the revenue takes O(nm) time. The claimed time complexity
follows.
In contrast, if the dimension m of the afﬁne pricing problem is not con-
stant, the problem is much harder. In fact, if m is not constant, the single
item pricing problem is just a special case of the afﬁne pricing problem: For
all k 2 K and j 2 J, let djk Æ 1 whenever item type k is contained in j’s
bundle and djk Æ 0 otherwise, and let dj0 Æ 0. Then, each item price corre-
sponds to one variable pk, thus the afﬁne pricing problem generalizes the
single item pricing problem. Combining this with a result by Demaine et al.
(2006), we obtain the following.
Corollary 5.2.6. The afﬁne pricing problem with an unbounded number of
item types is inapproximable within a semi-logarithmic factor.
5.2.1 Limited supply
In this section, we consider the envy-free afﬁne pricing problem with limited
availability of item types. Let ck ¸ 0 be the availability of item type k 2 K.
Now, we consider all solutions p Æ (p1,...,pm) 2 Rm
Å for which the following
three inequalities are satisﬁed.
p(j) · bj, 8 j 2W (5.2)
p(j) È bj, 8 j 2 J\W (5.3)
X
j2W
djk · ck, 8k 2 K (5.4)
Since (5.3) is a strict inequality, we cannot simply ﬁnd the optimal solu-
tion at a vertex of a linear program as we did in the afﬁne pricing problem
with unlimited supply. Furthermore, there might exist no envy-free vertex
at all. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 5.2.7. Consider the situation where J Æ{1,2,3}, K Æ{1,2} and c1 Æ
c2 Æ 1. The valuation constraints are p(1) Æ p1 · 1 Æ b1, p(2) Æ p2 · 1 Æ b2
and p(3) Æ p1Å p2 · 2 Æ b3. Figure 5.2 displays this setting, where all price
vectors p 2Rm
Å in and on the boundary of the gray area are not envy-free. No
vertex, represented by the bullets, yields an envy-free solution. However, for
some " È 0, vectors p Æ (1,1Å") and p Æ (1Å",1) are optimal solutions with
revenue 1.









Figure 5.2: Example of an instance of afﬁne pricing with limited supply where
there is no envy-free vertex.
Using the insight of the above example, we show how to get a near-
optimal envy-free solution by exploring an “"-environment” of the vertices
as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.2.2, in case this environment contains envy-free
solutions.
Deﬁnition 5.2.8 (Near-optimal solution). A vector p 2 Rm
Å is a near-optimal
solution if, for a given ± È 0, the revenue obtained by this price vector is at
least (1¡±) times the revenue obtained by any feasible, envy-free vector ˜ p 2Rm
Å .
Deﬁnition 5.2.9 (Envy-free vertex with limited supply). A vector p 2 Rm
Å
is an envy-free vertex of the arrangement of valuation and nonnegativity in-
equalities if, for some "È0, it is characterized by m out of the following 2nÅm
equalities
dj0Ådj1p1Å¢¢¢Ådjmpm Æ bj, j 2 J
dj0Ådj1p1Å¢¢¢Ådjmpm Æ bj Å", j 2 J
pk Æ 0, k 2 K ,
such that the coefﬁcient matrix of these m equalities has rank m, and satisﬁes
inequalities (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4).
Given ±È0, set "Æ±/(nm). Now, applying Algorithm 5.1 on the envy-free
vertices from Deﬁnition 5.2.9, we derive a near-optimal solution to the envy-





O((nÅ m)m) systems of m equalities each. In each of these iterations, we
solve a linear system in m variables and m constraints to determine the
price vector, which takes O(m3) time. Checking whether all prices are pos-
itive takes O(m) time. Computation of the contract prices, winners and the
93Chapter 5. Algorithms for Afﬁne Pricing
revenue, and checking whether no item type is oversold takes O(nm) time.
We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2.10. For a given ± È 0, we can ﬁnd a near-optimal solution to
the envy-free afﬁne pricing problem with limited availability of item types in
polynomial time if the number of item types m is constant. The computation
time is O((nÅm)m(m3Ånm)) 2 O(nmÅ1).
On the negative side, it turns out that for non-constant m the problem
with limited supply seems even harder to approximate than the same prob-
lem with unlimited supply.
Theorem 5.2.11. Consider the afﬁne pricing problem with limited supply
and non-constant dimension. For any " È 0, it is NP-hard to approximate
the maximum revenue within a factor n1¡". This result holds even if all
customers have a valuation of one, the availability of each item type is one,
and each item type is requested once by at most two customers.
Proof. We use an approximation preserving reduction from INDEPENDENT-
SET. Given a graph G Æ (V,E), we want to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality
subset V0 µ V such that no two vertices in V0 are adjacent. Zuckerman
(2006) shows that it is NP-hard to approximate the maximum independent
set within a factor jVj1¡", for any "È0.
We construct the following instance of the pricing problem. Each vertex
v 2V corresponds to a customer and each edge e 2 E corresponds to an item
type. For every customer v, let dv0 Æ 1 and dve Æ 1 if edge e is incident to
vertex v, and 0 otherwise. The valuation bv is equal to 1. Each item type
e is available once. The company determines the prices of the item types




We claim that an independent set of cardinality s exists in G if and only
if there exists a pricing for the above deﬁned instance with total revenue s.
Suppose V0 µV is an independent set in G with jV0jÆ s. Then let pe Æ0 for
all edges e 2 E incident to a vertex v 2 V0, and pe È 0 otherwise. This way
the set of winners equals the independent set V0, and therefore no item type
is oversold. No customer is envious, as the price of a contract exceeds the
valuation for every loser, and we extract a total revenue of s.
Conversely, assume a solution to the pricing problem with total revenue
s. Since only one copy of any item type is available, the set of winners must
deﬁne an independent set in G. As the maximum revenue received from any
customer is 1, there exists an independent set of size s in G.
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5.2.2 Unit-demand customers
So far, we assumed that customers are single-minded, which means that
they request one contract and either accept or reject it. However, in this
subsection we claim that, for unlimited supply, we can apply the same algo-
rithm for the case with unit-demand customers. That is, each customer can
request several different contracts, each with a separate valuation. Every
customer accepts at most one of the requested contracts. We assume that
the customer selects the contract with the highest utility, which is the valu-
ation minus the price, if this utility is nonnegative. For the example in which
customers request contracts from a telephone company, we can imagine that
customers are interested in different contracts offered by the company, but
in the end, they need only one contract to use their telephone.
Let L j be the set of contracts requested by customer j 2 J, such that
jL jj ¸ 1 and L j \Lk Æ ; for all j 6Æ k 2 J, and let L Æ
S
j2J L j. Notice that if
two customers request the same contract, we store both copies in L, for ease
of notation. Customer j 2 J is interested in at most one contract from subset
L j µ L, and has valuation b` for contract ` 2 L j. Let positive coefﬁcient d`k
be the demand of customer j 2 J for item type k 2 K in contract ` 2 L. The
price for the contract `2 L is
p(`)Æ d`0Åd`1p1Å...Åd`mpm.
In this section, we redeﬁne a vertex as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.2.12 (Vertex with unit-demand customers). A vector p 2 Rm
Å
is a vertex of the arrangement of linear inequalities with unit-demand cus-
tomers if it is characterized by m equalities out of the following jLjÅm equal-
ities
d`0Åd`1p1Å¢¢¢Åd`mpm Æ b`, `2 L
pk Æ 0, k 2 K ,
such that the coefﬁcient matrix of these m equalities has rank m.
As a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of a vertex with unit-demand
customers and Lemma 5.2.3, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2.13. There exists a vertex as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.2.12 that is
an optimal pricing strategy to the afﬁne pricing problem with unit-demand
customers.
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For every vertex with unit-demand customers, we do the following. We
determine the price of every contract `2 L. The demand set Dj for customer
j 2 J is the set of contracts she prefers most, thus Dj Æ {` 2 L j : b`¡ p(`) ¸
b`0 ¡ p(`0), 8`0 2 L j}. We assume that customer j 2 J selects a contract `j 2
Dj with highest price, as otherwise the company could reduce the prices
of this contract with a very small amount, making this the contract with
the highest utility for the customer. Then, W Æ {j 2 J : p(`j) · b`j} and
¦ Æ
P
j2W p(`j). Finally, we select the maximum among all values ¦, with
optimal parameters p1,...,pm, and set of winners W.
Theorem 5.2.14. The afﬁne pricing problem with unit-demand customers
and unlimited supply can be solved in polynomial time if the number of item






2 O((jLjÅm)m) systems of m equalities each. In
each of these iterations, we solve a linear system in m variables and m con-
straints, which takes O(m3) time. It takes O(m) time to verify whether all
prices are positive. Computation of the contract prices takes O(jLjm) time,
selection of the most preferable contract for every customer takes O(jLjn)
time, and computation of the winners and the revenue takes O(n) time.
Thus, the time complexity is O((jLjÅ m)m(m3 ÅjLjm ÅjLjn), which is in
O(njLjmÅ1) for constant m.
Similarly as before, if the number of item types m is not constant, this
problem is a generalization of the single item pricing problem with unit-
demand customers. As the problem with unit-demand customers is in fact
a generalization of the problem with single-minded customers, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.2.15. The afﬁne pricing problem with an unbounded number
of item types and unit-demand customers is inapproximable within a semi-
logarithmic factor.
5.3 Local search
The computation time of the afﬁne pricing algorithm (Algorithm 5.1) is ex-
ponential in the number of item types. Therefore, we suggest a local search
algorithm that ﬁnds a near-optimal pricing strategy in polynomial time even
if the number of item types m is not constant.
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For notational purposes, let I Æ {1,...,n,nÅ1,...,nÅm} be the index set
of inequalities. For all i 2 I, let p(i) Æ p(j) and bi Æ bj if i Æ j 2 J, and
p(i)Æ¡pk and bi Æ0 if i¡n Æ k 2 K. We consider the arrangement of linear
inequalities p(i) · bi for all i 2 I. For this section, we redeﬁne a vertex, and
also give a deﬁnition of an edge in the arrangement of linear inequalities.
Deﬁnition 5.3.1 (Vertex). A vertex v is deﬁned by a price vector p(v) 2 Rm
Å
that is described by a subset Iv ½ I such that jIvj Æ m and the coefﬁcient
matrix of the equalities p(v)(i)Æ bi for all i 2 Iv has rank m.
For every vertex v, we deﬁne the contract price for customer j 2 J as




m . The set of winners is W(v) Æ {j 2 J :
p(v)(j)· bj}. The revenue of vertex v is denoted by ¦(v)Æ
P
j2W(v) p(v)(j).
Deﬁnition 5.3.2 (Edge). An edge e Æ {v,w} between two vertices v and w
exists if jIv \Iwj Æ m¡1. Then, we call vertices v and w adjacent, and both
are incident to edge e.
In the local search algorithm, we travel from one vertex to another along
the edges of the arrangement of linear inequalities. In this sense the algo-
rithm resembles the simplex algorithm for linear programming. The simplex
algorithm was proposed by George Dantzig2 in 1947. This algorithm begins
at a vertex of a polytope that represents a feasible region, deﬁned by a series
of linear inequalities. Then, it moves along the edges of the polytope until
it reaches the vertex of the optimum solution. For further reading, we refer
to Dantzig (1963), Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1998) and Vanderbei (2001).
Although all inequalities are linear, the pricing problem is not a linear
program, and therefore we cannot apply the simplex method. The idea of
the local search algorithm is to travel along edges of the arrangement of
linear inequalities in a steepest ascent fashion. We ﬁrst give an intuitive
description of the algorithm and present the details in Algorithm 5.2. Then,
we clarify the procedure in Example 5.3.3.
We start in an arbitrary vertex, say A, described by some set IA µ I of
cardinality m as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.3.1. We select an arbitrary index
iA 2 IA. Then, we explore all vertices v adjacent to A such that iA 2 Iv. In
other words, we explore all vertices adjacent to A for which equality p(iA)Æ
biA holds. Among these vertices we pick the one that yields the highest
2George Bernard Dantzig (1914-2005) was an American mathematician, and the Professor
Emeritus of Transportation Sciences and Professor of Operations Research and of Computer
Science at Stanford.
97Chapter 5. Algorithms for Afﬁne Pricing
Algorithm 5.2: Local search algorithm
Let I Æ{1,...,n,nÅ1,...,nÅm} and ¤Æ;. Let p(i)Æ p(j) and bi Æ bj
if i Æ j 2 J, and p(i)Æ¡pk and bi Æ0 if i¡nÆ k 2 K;
Select a vertex v described by set Iv µ I with jIvjÆ m, and select
iv 2 Iv;
Let p(i)Æ bi, 8i 2 Iv and calculate the price vector p(v), contract prices
p(v)(j) for all j 2 J, the set of winners W(v), and the revenue ¦(v);
Let p¤ Æ p(v), W¤ ÆW(v) and ¦¤ Æ¦(v);
while jIj¸ m do
Iw Æ Iv;
foreach set I0 ½(Iv\iv) with jI0jÆ m¡2 do
foreach i 2 I \Iv do
Iu Æ iv[I0[i;
Let p(i0)Æ bi0, 8i0 2 Iu and determine p(u), W(u) and ¦(u);
if ¦(u)È¦¤ then




¤Æ¤[{iv} and iw Æ Iw\Iv;
if iw 2 I then
Iv Æ Iw and iv Æ iw;
foreach i 2¤ do
if i Ý Iv then




I Æ I \¤, ¤Æ;;
if jIj¸ m then
Select some set Iv µ I and pick iv 2 Iv;
Determine p(v), W(v) and ¦(v);
if ¦(v)È¦¤ then






revenue, that is, we locally optimize the revenue. If this revenue is higher
than the revenue generated in vertex A, we accept this vertex as the new
solution, say B, and let iB Æ IB \ IA. Now, we ﬁnd the vertex with highest
revenue adjacent to B that satisﬁes p(iB) Æ biB but is not incident to edge
{A,B}. If we arrive at a vertex for which no adjacent vertex yields a higher
revenue, we stop the procedure. However, if there are at least m equalities
left that we did not explore before, characterized by indices in set I0 µ I
with jI0j ¸ m, we restart the algorithm at an arbitrary vertex deﬁned by m
equalities for which the indices are chosen from set I0.
Example 5.3.3. Consider the instance with four customers and three item
types, as displayed in Figure 5.3. The customers’ valuation inequalities are
given by p(1)Æ 3
2 p1Å 3
2 p2Åp3 ·36Æ b1, p(2)Æ4p1Åp2Åp3 ·32Æ b2, p(3)Æ
3
2 p2 Å p3 · 24 Æ b3, and p(4) Æ 1
2 p1 Å 2
5 p2 Å p3 · 16 Æ b4. Moreover, p(5) Æ
¡p1 · 0 Æ b5, p(6) Æ ¡p2 · 0 Æ b6 and p(7) Æ ¡p3 · 0 Æ b7, and therefore
I Æ{1,...,7}.
We start the procedure in vertex A with p(A) Æ(0,0,36) described by IA Æ
{1,5,6} and we select element iA Æ 1 2 IA. The revenue is ¦(A) Æ 36. We
explore all vertices v adjacent to A satisfying constraint p(1) Æ b1. In the
ﬁgure, this is displayed by the arrows on edges leaving vertex A. Vertex B
described by IB Æ {1,4,5} with p(B) Æ (0,18 2
11,8 8
11) has the highest revenue of
¦(B)Æ7810
11 among all adjacent vertices, and is thus the local optimum if we
start in A. We travel from A to B, and update ¤ Æ {1} and iB Æ IB \ IA Æ 4.
As all customers in ¤ are also in IB, we keep set I as it is. Now, we ﬁnd all
vertices v adjacent to B with p(4) Æ b4, thus explore all edges incident to B
except the edge we came from. Again, this is displayed by arrows on edges
leaving vertex B. Vertex C with p(C) Æ(0,7 3
11,13 1
11) has the highest revenue of
¦(C)Æ84 4
11, and as ¦(C)È¦(B), we travel to vertex C with IC Æ{3,4,5}. We
update ¤Æ{1,4} and iC Æ IC\IB Æ3. However, as 1Ý IC we have I Æ{2,...,7}




ID Æ {2,3,4} and iD Æ 2, and update ¤ to {2,3,4} whereas I does not change.
There is no vertex adjacent to D that has a higher revenue than ¦(D)Æ10052
83.
Therefore, we remove ¤ from I which leaves us with I Æ {5,6,7}, and empty
set ¤. As jIj Æ m, we explore vertex E with IE Æ {5,6,7}. This vertex nor its
adjacent vertices have a higher revenue than ¦(D), thus the algorithm stops
and outputs the prices p(D).

















2p2 + p3 = 24
(4) : 1
2p1 + 2
5p2 + p3 = 16
(2) : 4p1 + p2 + p3 = 32
(1) : 3
2p1 + 3





(5) : p1 = 0 (6) : p2 = 0
(7) : p3 = 0
Figure 5.3: Graphical representation of the local search algorithm on an instance
with mÆ3.
Theorem 5.3.4. Algorithm 5.2 runs in O(nm5Ån2m4Ån3m2) time, which is
in O(n3) if the number of item types is constant.
Proof. Every index i 2 I is selected at most once to be iv, as after the selec-
tion it is added to ¤; that is O(nÅm). Then, we select every subset I0 from





ferent subsets I0 possible. Moreover, jI\Ivj· n. In each iteration, we solve a
linear system of m constraints and m variables to ﬁnd price vector p, which
takes O(m3) time. Checking if all prices are positive takes O(m) time. Com-
putation of contract prices, winners and the revenue takes O(nm). Then, we
update iv, ¤ and I. If the new iv is an element of I then we check at most
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j¤j · m times whether the equality with index iv in ¤ partly deﬁnes the
current vertex. Otherwise, we select a new vertex and determine its price
vector in O(m3) time, and revenue and winners in O(nm) time. Thus, the
total running time is O(nm5Ån2m4Ån3m2), which is in O(n3) if the number
of item types m is constant.
5.4 Computational study
We apply the afﬁne pricing algorithm and the local search algorithm to de-
termine a pricing strategy for a telephone operator. The data we use re-
semble reality. The item types are available in unlimited supply, as we are
selling digital goods. We assume customers to be single-minded, that is, each
customer either accepts the offer for the contract or she leaves to a competi-
tor. In this practical application, we determine the start-up tariff, a price
per minute for calling within the country and abroad, and a price per sent
text message.
The data we use contain detailed information about the phone usage of
many customers. For each customer, we can exactly determine the demand
for the different item types and therefore the contract she requests. Let p1
be the start-up price for a call, p2 the price per minute for calling domesti-
cally, p3 the price per text message, and p4 the price per minute for calling
abroad. Then, the price for the contract of customer j 2 J is deﬁned as
p(j)Æ dj1p1Ådj2p2Ådj3p3Ådj4p4,
where dj1 is the number of calls customer j wants to make, dj2 is the num-
ber of minutes she calls within the country, dj3 is the number of text mes-
sages she sends, and dj4 is the number of minutes she calls abroad.
We assume that customers are rational, and therefore select the cheap-
est offer for their contract. Thus, a customer only accepts our offer for her
contract if we offer the cheapest price in the market. Therefore, we calcu-
late the valuation of a customer as follows. First, we consider all existing
pricing strategies of the company we observe, and of some large compet-
ing telephone companies. Then, we calculate for every customer what the
price of her contract would be for each of the current pricing strategies. The
cheapest of these prices will be the valuation. However, any other valuation
determined by market research can be used as well. The goal of this practi-
cal research is: Given that the competing operators keep their prices ﬁxed,
ﬁnd the pricing strategy that maximizes the revenue.
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5.4.1 Results
We conduct several tests on the data we received on a computer with an
Intel Core2Duo CPU running at 2.40GHz and 3.25 GB of Ram. Besides
optimizing all four item type prices as described above (m Æ 4), we also op-
timize prices while having the start tariff of a call for free (m Æ 3), thus
p(j) Æ dj2p2 Å dj3p3 Å dj4p4, and moreover, keeping the price for calling
abroad at the original tariff of the telephone company of 0.75 euro (m Æ 2),
that is p(j)Æ dj2p2Ådj3p3Å0.75dj4. For these three tests with an extensive
data set containing data of 6160 customers, the local search algorithm gives
the optimal solution. The running time of this algorithm is signiﬁcantly
smaller than the running time of the afﬁne pricing algorithm, as shown in
Table 5.1. For the case with m Æ4 the exact running time of the afﬁne pric-
ing algorithm is not presented, as the running time is extremely large which
is not practically useful.
mÆ2 mÆ3 mÆ4
Current revenue 21940.97 25888.40 25888.40
Optimal revenue 33515.80 38648.50 44917.60
Runtime afﬁne pricing 1554 sec. 975453 sec. > 4 months
Runtime local search 2 sec. 2 sec. 13 sec.
Table 5.1: Results in euro for instance with 6160 customers in dimension m.
In the above test on the complete data set, the local search algorithm
performed perfectly as it always resulted in the optimal solution. Unfortu-
nately, there is no guarantee that the local search algorithm will produce
the optimum. However, Algorithm 5.2 is a practically powerful tool as its
running time is signiﬁcantly smaller than the running time of the exact al-
gorithm, and by construction, will produce a fairly good solution. To stress
this, we perform nine tests on several random samples of the data set with
m Æ 4. We use samples of 100, 200, and 300 customers. The results of the
afﬁne pricing algorithm (A), the local search algorithm (L) and the current
revenue (C) are presented in Table 5.2, where the runtime is in seconds.
Figure 5.4 presents the relative deviation from the optimal revenue.
These results indicate that the revenue obtained by the local search al-
gorithm is not always optimal, but it is not far from it either. The running
time of the local search algorithm is a lot shorter than the running time of
the afﬁne pricing algorithm, especially for large samples.
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Test1 - nÆ100 Test2 - nÆ100 Test3 - nÆ100
Method Revenue Sec. Method Revenue Sec. Method Revenue Sec.
A 11945.10 22 A 8365.76 22 A 173.22 21
L 11945.10 0 L 7906.89 0 L 172.91 0
C 4905.02 C 5316.53 C 136.96
Test4 - nÆ200 Test5 - nÆ200 Test6 - nÆ200
Method Revenue Sec. Method Revenue Sec. Method Revenue Sec.
A 3405.37 416 A 8018.33 415 A 3530.61 414
L 3405.37 2 L 7853.29 0 L 3482.65 0
C 2263.08 C 4162.48 C 2337.43
Test7 - nÆ300 Test8 - nÆ300 Test9 - nÆ300
Method Revenue Sec. Method Revenue Sec. Method Revenue Sec.
A 5054.56 2467 A 6448.82 2432 A 5681.08 2450
L 4934.63 1 L 6436.11 0 L 5681.08 0
C 2636.76 C 4015.67 C 3691.81











Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Test 7 Test 8 Test 9
Figure 5.4: Relative deviation from the optimal solution of afﬁne pricing, local
search and current solution from the optimum.
5.5 Conclusion
Afﬁne pricing can be applied in many different types of companies because
of its very general structure. Also, as long as the number of different item
types is constant, we can solve the pricing problem with unlimited supply in
polynomial time, irrespective of the proﬁle of the customers (single-minded
or unit-demand), and we derive a near-optimal solution if the supply is lim-
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ited. However, if the number of item types is not constant, the hardness
results from single item pricing apply to afﬁne pricing as well. Moreover,
the envy-free problem with limited supply is even harder to approximate
than the problem with unlimited supply.
Challenged by the large amount of data received from a telephone op-
erator, we have the opportunity to practically test our algorithms. In the
computational study, the customers are single-minded and the supply is un-
limited. The theoretical computation time for the algorithm is O(nmÅ1) for a
constant number of item types m. Although the afﬁne pricing algorithm al-
ways ﬁnds the optimal pricing strategy for the given instances, the running
time appeared to be too high for practical purposes. Therefore, we introduce
a local search algorithm that runs in O(n3) time for constant number of item
types m. We were not able to prove any bound on the performance of the
algorithm, but on the complete and sampled instances, the results are very




Consider a situation in which a company sells several different item types to
a set of customers. Every customer requests a contract, based on the types of
items for sale and her personal demand. Currently, the company is not sat-
isﬁed with the pricing strategy and wants to implement new prices. Imple-
menting these new prices in one single time step might not be desirable, for
example, because of the change in contract prices for the customers. There-
fore, the company changes the prices gradually, such that the prices charged
to a subset of the customers, the target market, do not differ too much from
one period to the next. We propose a polynomial time algorithm to imple-
ment the new prices in the minimum number of time periods needed, given
that the prices charged to the customers in the target market increase by at
most a factor 1Å±, for some ±È0. Furthermore, we address the problem to
maximize the revenue when a maximum number of time periods is predeter-
mined. For this problem with integer price vectors, we describe a dynamic
program. We extend this result and present an approximation algorithm
for the problem with continuous prices. Moreover, we propose a local search
algorithm. Also, we present the integer program that models this problem
and conduct a practical study.1
1This chapter is based on Berger, Grigoriev, and van Loon (2008).Chapter 6. Price Strategy Implementation
6.1 Introduction
A company owns a set of different item types for sale, K Æ {1,...,m}. We
assume that every item type is available in unlimited supply. The set of
potential customers is denoted by J Æ {1,...,n}. Every customer j 2 J has a
personal demand djk ¸ 0 for every item type k 2 K. The combination of the
demand for all item types is called a customer’s contract. Every customer
j 2 J is single-minded and has a valuation bj for the contract, which is the
maximum amount she is willing to pay. Let B Æ maxj2J{bj} be an upper
bound on the valuations.
In this chapter, we regard the problem that the company faces when im-
plementing a new price vector p¤ 2 Rm
Å . This price vector might be the opti-
mal price vector obtained by solving the afﬁne pricing algorithm as discussed
in Chapter 5, but can also be any other vector that the company wishes to
implement. We assume that the current price vector is p0 6Æ p¤. Imme-
diate introduction of the new prices in the next period (e.g. week, month)
might not be desirable. For example, a sudden huge difference in prices may
change the perception of customers or the position in the market in compar-
ison to the competing companies. Therefore, the company wants to change
prices gradually. Let T Æ {0,...,tmax} be the set of time periods, where t Æ 0
is the current time and t Æ tmax is the end time of the implementation. For
notational purposes, let TÅ Æ T \{0}.




Å . Given these prices, the contract price for customer j 2 J is




We call a customer a winner if she can afford her contract and receives it.
We denote the set of winners by Wt Æ {j 2 J : pt(j) · bj}. The company’s
revenue in time period t is ¦t Æ
P











Given price vector p¤ 2Rm
Å , we can easily determine for which customers
the price of the contract does not exceed valuation, that is, W¤ Æ {j 2 J :
p¤(j) · bj}. We call W¤ the target market. When implementing the optimal
pricing strategy, we have to satisfy the restriction that for these customers
the price of the contract may increase at most a factor of (1Å±) between
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two consecutive periods for some positive ±, which will be predetermined by
the company. That is, given price vectors p0, p¤ and ±, the company has to
satisfy the following two constraints.




k, 8k 2 K.
We address two different problems in this chapter, which are formally
deﬁned below.
Problem 6.1. Given p0, p¤ and ± È 0, ﬁnd price vectors pt for all t 2 TÅ, so
as to minimize tmax subject to Constraints 6.1 and 6.2.
Problem 6.2. Given p0, p¤, ± È 0 and tmax that is large enough to satisfy
Constraints 6.1 and 6.2, ﬁnd price vectors pt for all t 2 TÅ subject to Con-
straints 6.1 and 6.2 so as to maximize
P
t2T ¦t.
For Problem 6.1, we show how to calculate the minimum number of time
periods and we present an algorithm to ﬁnd the price vectors with compu-
tation time O(nmÅmlogB). For Problem 6.2 with integer price vectors, we
describe a dynamic program that runs in pseudo-polynomial time if the num-
ber of item types m is constant. For the problem with continuous price vec-
tors, the dynamic program gives an approximate solution with performance
guarantee (1Å") for any "È0, and a computation time of O(t2
max(B/")2mnm).
Then, we introduce a local search algorithm that, in every time period tÈ0,
selects a pricing strategy that yields the highest total revenue to the com-
pany, but also satisﬁes the above constraints. Although we were not able
to estimate the performance guarantee on the solution of this algorithm,
computational studies show that the obtained revenue is not far from the
optimal total revenue calculated by solving an integer linear program.
6.2 Implementation in minimal time
We assume that the price of any item type in the current solution is at least
equal to some very small "È0, that is, p0
k ¸" for all k 2 K. Let qj denote the
ratio between customer j’s contract price in the optimal and current pricing
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Theorem 6.2.1. Given current price vector p0, the minimum number of steps
to implement price vector p¤ is tmax Æ tq, where tq Æmax{1,dlog1Å± qe}.
Proof. Since p0 6Æ p¤, tmax ¸1, that is, we need at least one step to implement
the new prices. By Constraint 6.1 we know that
p¤(j)·(1Å±)tmaxp0(j), 8 j 2W¤.




·(1Å±)tmax , tmax ¸log1Å± q. (6.1)
Combining inequality (6.1) with the facts that the minimum number of time
periods needed is integer and at least equal to one, we have that tmax ¸ tq Æ
max{1,dlog1Å± qe}.
We construct a sequence of price vectors located on the straight line in
Rm
Å between p0 and p¤. For every such price vector pt, t2 T, we know that
pt Æ¹tp¤Å(1¡¹t)pt¡1, (6.2)















Æ pt¡1(j)Å(p¤(j)¡ pt¡1(j))¹t. (6.3)
Now, for every t2 TÅ, we deﬁne a set W¤













Notice that if W¤
t Æ ; then ¹t Æ 1 and we are able to reach solution p¤ at
time t, as
pt(j)Æ pt¡1(j)Å(p¤(j)¡ pt¡1(j))Æ p¤(j)· pt¡1(j), 8 j 2W¤.
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and for all j 2W¤\W¤
t we have that
pt(j)· pt¡1(j)Ç(1Å±)pt¡1(j),























where the last equality holds by deﬁnition of W¤
t . We claim that, for every















This claim is trivially true for t Æ 1, again by deﬁnition of W¤
t . Assume the





























where the last equality holds due to the induction hypothesis. Thus, the
claim holds for all t2 TÅ.
Consequently, at step tq Æ max{1,dlog1Å± qe} we reach p¤. Thus, tmax ·
tq. As we also showed that tmax ¸ tq, the claim is proven.
Using the steps in the proof above, we deﬁne the straight line algorithm
as follows. Given ± È 0 and price vectors p0 and p¤, let j0 2 W¤ be the cus-












k )¹t Å pt¡1
k be the price of item type k 2 K in time period t Æ 1,...,tq ¡1.
Finally, in time period tq, we implement price vector p¤.
Theorem 6.2.2. The straight line algorithm ﬁnds a price implementation
from p0 to p¤ in O(nmÅmlogB) time.
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Proof. The price implementation generated by the straight line algorithm
satisﬁes Condition 6.1 as shown in the proof of Theorem 6.2.1 and Condi-
tion 6.2 by deﬁnition of the ﬁnal step in the algorithm. Also, it uses tq
steps to implement the new price vector, which is minimal. Thus, the algo-
rithm solves Problem 6.1. Finding customer j0 2W¤ who maximizes q takes
O(nm) time, as we calculate the ratio between the contract prices for the
new and current price vectors, for every customer in the target market. For
all tÆ1,...,tq¡1, where tq Æmax{1,dlog1Å± qe}, we need to ﬁnd ¹t which can
be done in O(m) time, as we need to calculate pt¡1(j0). Then, implementing
the price vector pt takes O(m) time, which results in a total running time
of O(nmÅ tqm). Integer tq is bounded from above by the logarithm of the
largest valuation, as q Æ maxj2W¤{p¤(j)/p0(j)} only depends on the contract
prices of the winners given price vector p¤. Consequently, the computation
time of the straight line algorithm is O(nmÅmlogB).
6.3 Maximize total revenue
Let tmax be the number of time periods the company wants to use to imple-
ment pricing strategy p¤, and let T Æ{0,1,...,tmax}. In Problem 6.2 we want







j2Wt pt(j). Notice that Wt, t 2 T, is a subset of J, not
just of the target market W¤.
In this section, we ﬁrst address Problem 6.2 restricted to integer prices.
We present a dynamic programming algorithm that solves this problem in
pseudo-polynomial time if the number of item types m is constant. Then,
using a straightforward scaling argument, we transform the algorithm to a
(1Å")-approximation algorithm for the same problem with continuous prices,
for any desired precision "È0. Finally, we present a local search algorithm.
6.3.1 Dynamic program
Given ± È 0 and integer price vectors p0 and p¤, we ﬁnd the integer price
vectors to optimize the total revenue by a dynamic program that runs in
pseudo-polynomial time if the number of item types m is constant. This
dynamic program determines the longest path from source u to sink v in an
acyclic digraph D Æ (N,A). We construct digraph D consisting of tmax Å1
layers as follows. A node is of the form (t,pt), where t is the time period, or
layer, and pt is an integer price vector. Arcs are only created between two
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consecutive layers. In layer 0, there is only node u Æ (0,p0), and in layer
tmax there is only node vÆ(tmax,ptmax), where ptmax Æ p¤. There exists an arc
between node (t¡1,pt¡1) and node (t,pt) if
² t2 TÅ,
² pt¡1 and pt are integer price vectors,
² pt(j)·(1Å±)pt¡1(j) for all j 2W¤.
The length of the arc is ¦t. The longest u¡v path corresponds to the pricing
strategy that yields maximum total revenue. Note that the length of this
path, plus ¦0, is equal to the total revenue.
Theorem 6.3.1. The dynamic programming algorithm solves Problem 6.2
with integer price vectors in time O(t2
maxB2mnm).
Proof. Correctness of the dynamic program follows from the fact that we
enumerate over all possible integer price vectors. The number of nodes in
layer t is O(Bm), which means that in total we have O(tmaxBm) nodes in
the digraph. The number of arcs is O(t2
maxB2m). Determining the length of
an arc, ¦t, takes O(nm) time. Finding the longest u¡v path in a digraph
is linear in the number of arcs (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993). So the
claimed complexity follows.
In order to solve the problem with continuous price vectors, we allow
prices that are integer multipliers of ", for some "È0. We derive the follow-
ing corollary.
Corollary 6.3.2. The dynamic programming algorithm is a (1Å")-approxi-
mation algorithm running in O(t2
max(B/")2mnm) time, for any "È0.
6.3.2 Local search
In this section, we assume that price vector p¤ is the optimal price vector for
the given instance of the afﬁne pricing problem. The idea of the local search
algorithm is to implement the optimal price vector in every time period such
that for every customer the contract price is at most equal to the minimum of
the valuation and (1Å±) times the contract price in the previous time period.
To ﬁnd this optimal price vector, we execute the afﬁne pricing algorithm
(Algorithm 5.1) in every time period t2 TÅ. A formal description is presented
in Algorithm 6.1, which is further clariﬁed in Example 6.3.3.
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Algorithm 6.1: Local search algorithm
Given p0, p¤ and ±È0. Let ¦¤ Æ¦0;
foreach t2 TÅ do
Let ¦t Æ0, pt Æ0 and Wt Æ J;
foreach set of m equalities out of the jW¤jÅm equalities
pt(j)Æmin{bj,(1Å±)pt¡1(j)}, j 2W¤, and pt
k Æ0, k 2 K, such that
the coefﬁcient matrix of these m equalities has rank m do
Determine price vector p that is characterized by these m
equalities;
if pk ¸0 for all k 2 K then
Let p(j)Æ dj0Ådj1p1Å¢¢¢Ådjmpm be the price of the
contract requested by customer j 2 J;
Let W Æ{j 2 J : p(j)· bj} be the set of winners;
Let ¦Æ
P
j2W p(j) be the total revenue;
if ¦È¦t then






Note that this algorithm assures that as soon as we are able to reach the
optimal price vector p¤, we will stay at this level as there is obviously no
better price vector in reach.
Example 6.3.3. Consider a setting with three customers and two item types,
and ±Æ1. The valuation constraints p(j)· bj are p(1)Æ16p1Å32p2 ·512Æ
b1, p(2) Æ 20p1 Å20p2 · 400 Æ b2 and p(3) Æ 28p1 Å16p2 · 448 Æ b3, dis-
played by the solid lines in Figure 6.1. Using the afﬁne pricing algorithm,
we know that the optimal pricing is p¤ Æ (8,12). The current price vector is
p0 Æ(2,1). With this current price vector, customer 1 pays 64, customer 2 pays
60 and customer 3 pays 72. We create an arrangement of linear inequalities
16 p1
1 Å 32 p1
2 ·min{512,(1Å±)64}Æ128
20 p1
1 Å 20 p1
2 ·min{400,(1Å±)60}Æ120
28 p1
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The ﬁrst three constraints are represented by the dotted lines in the ﬁgure.
The optimal price vector is p1 Æ(4,2). Repeating this procedure, in which the
constraints are represented by the dashed lines, leads to p2 Æ (8,4). Then,
we get 16p2
1Å32p2
2 · min{512,(1Å±)256} Æ 512, 20p2
1Å20p2
2 · min{400,(1Å
±)240} Æ 400, and 28p2
1Å16p2
2 · min{448,(1Å±)288} Æ 448. Thus, this gives
the arrangement deﬁned by the valuation constraints. The optimal solution
p¤ is reachable, so the algorithm selects this price vector and keeps selecting
it for all periods t¸3, t2 T.





















Figure 6.1: Graphical representation of an instance for mÆ2.
Theorem 6.3.4. Local search algorithm 6.1 runs in O(tmax(nÅ m)m(m3 Å
nm)) time, which is in O(tmaxnmÅ1) if the number of item types m is constant.





2 O((nÅm)m) systems of m equalities each. In each of
these iterations, we solve a linear system in m variables and m constraints
to determine the price vector, which takes O(m3) time. Checking if all prices
are positive takes O(m) time and the computation of the contract prices,
winners, and the revenue takes O(nm) time. We perform these steps for all
t2 TÅ, so the claimed complexity follows.
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6.4 Computational results
We apply the straight line algorithm and the local search algorithm to imple-
ment the optimal pricing strategy for a telephone operator. The item types
are available in unlimited supply, as we are selling digital goods. We as-
sume customers to be single-minded, that is, each customer either accepts
the offer for the contract or she leaves to a competitor. In this practical ap-
plication, we determine the start-up price for a call, p1, the price per minute
for calling domestically, p2, the price per text message, p3, and the price per
minute for calling abroad, p4. The data we use contain detailed information
about the phone usage of many customers, thus we are able to determine
the contract requested by each customer. The price for the contract of cus-
tomer j 2 J is deﬁned as p(j) Æ dj1p1Ådj2p2Ådj3p3Ådj4p4, where dj1 is
the number of calls customer j wants to make, dj2 is the number of minutes
she calls within the country, dj3 is the number of text messages she sends,
and dj4 is the number of minutes she calls abroad. Notice that dj0 Æ 0. We
assume that customers are rational, and therefore select the cheapest offer
for their contract. Thus, a customer only accepts our offer for her contract if
we offer the cheapest price in the market. Therefore, we deﬁne the valuation
of a customer as the cheapest price for her contract at any competitor. We
apply the described algorithms to three different samples of the data set.
Every sample contains ten customers. The current price vector in euro is
p0 Æ(0.01,0.06,0.01,0.75) and ±Æ0.05.
In this section we determine the minimum number of time periods, and
the number of periods used by the local search algorithm to implement the
optimal prices. Then, we set tmax Æ40 and ﬁnd the optimal pricing strategy.











s.t. pt(j) ·(1Å±)pt¡1(j) 8t2 TÅ, 8 j 2W¤
¼t
j · bj 8t2 T, 8 j 2 J
¼t
j · pt(j) 8t2 T, 8 j 2 J
pt(j) ·(1Å±)Bxt




k 8k 2 K
pt
k ¸0 8t2 T, 8k 2 K
¼t
j ¸0 8t2 T, 8 j 2 J
xt
j 2{0,1} 8t2 T, 8 j 2 J
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In an optimal solution at time t 2 T, we know that variable ¼t
j Æ pt(j) if
j 2Wt and ¼t
j Æ bj otherwise. Binary variable xt
j is equal to 0 if j 2Wt and 1
otherwise.
Sample 1 In the ﬁrst sample, the optimal price vector is p¤ = (0.175136,
0.170037, 0.087114, 0.766734). The minimum number of time steps needed
to implement p¤ starting from p0 is 31. The total revenue generated by the
straight line algorithm is 64230.64. The optimal revenue for implementing
p¤ in 31 steps is 70936.90, which means that the revenue of the straight
line algorithm is 90.55% of the optimal revenue. The local search algorithm
needs at least 34 steps to implement p¤. However, running this algorithm
for 31 steps generates a total revenue of 70968.47, which is even larger than
the optimal revenue when we do implement p¤.
For the second problem, we set tmax Æ40. The optimal revenue is equal to
99020.27, and the optimal price vector is implemented from step 33 onwards.
The local search algorithm yields a revenue of 98898.67, which is 99.88%
of the optimal revenue. The straight line algorithm outputs a revenue of
92192.83, which is 93.11% of optimal. Both these algorithms instantly give
the optimal solution. Solving the integer program takes 2 seconds.
Sample 2 Price vector p¤ = (0.109423, 0.173030, 0.216197, 0.666756) is
optimal for the second sample. The minimum number of time steps needed
to implement p¤ starting from p0 is 29. The total revenue generated by the
straight line algorithm is 35339.58. The optimal revenue for implementing
p¤ in 29 steps is 37449.57, which means that the revenue of the straight
line algorithm is 94.37% of the optimal revenue. The local search algorithm
needs at least 32 steps to implement p¤. Running this algorithm for 29
steps generates a total revenue of 37244.64, which is 99.45% of the optimal
revenue when we do implement p¤.
For the second problem, we set tmax Æ40. The optimal revenue is equal to
56229.31, and the optimal price vector is implemented from step 29 onwards.
The local search algorithm yields a revenue of 56004.24, which is 99.60%
of the optimal revenue. The straight line algorithm outputs a revenue of
54121.09, which is 96.25% of optimal. Both these algorithms instantly give
the optimal solution. Solving the integer program takes 338 seconds.
Sample 3 In the last sample, the optimal price vector is p¤ = (0.112089,
0.188362, 0.102176, 1.467432). The minimum number of time steps needed
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to implement p¤ starting from p0 is 33. The total revenue generated by the
straight line algorithm is 24293.19. The optimal revenue for implementing
p¤ in 33 steps is 27825.56, which means that the revenue of the straight line
algorithm is 87.31% of the optimal revenue. In this sample, the local search
algorithm also needs 33 steps to implement p¤, and generates a revenue of
27736.29, which is 99.68% of the optimal revenue.
For the second problem, we set tmax Æ40. The optimal revenue is equal to
36833.93, and the optimal price vector is implemented from step 33 onwards.
The local search algorithm yields a revenue of 36744.66, which is 99.76%
of the optimal revenue. The straight line algorithm outputs a revenue of
33301.56, which is 90.41% of optimal. Both these algorithms instantly give
the optimal solution. Solving the integer program takes 3 seconds.
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
min tmax 31 29 33
MIP 70936.90 37449.57 27825.56
Straight 64230.64 90.55% 35339.58 94.37% 24293.19 87.31%
LS till tmax 70968.47 100.04% 37244.64 99.45% 27736.29 99.68%
tmax 40 40 40
MIP 99020.27 56229.31 36833.93
Straight 92192.83 93.11% 54121.09 96.25% 33301.56 90.41%
LS 98898.67 99.88% 56004.24 99.60% 36744.66 99.76%
Table 6.1: Summary of computational results where p0 Æ(0.01,0.06,0.01,0.75) and
±Æ0.05.
6.5 Conclusion
Regarding Problem 6.1, we can easily calculate the minimum tmax, and ﬁnd
price vectors pt for all t2 TÅ in polynomial time using the straight line algo-
rithm. The local search algorithm might need more steps to implement p¤,
but using this algorithm might be more proﬁtable to the company than us-
ing the integer program, as there we have the requirement that ptmax should
be equal to p¤.
For Problem 6.2 restricted to integer prices, we present a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm that runs in pseudo-polynomial time if the number
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of item types m is constant. We extend this result and derive a (1Å")-
approximation algorithm for the same problem with continuous prices, for
any desired precision " È 0. The local search algorithm seems very useful
in practice, and yields close-to-optimal revenues according to our computa-
tional results.
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Algorithms for Optimal Price
Regulations
Since summer 2007, mobile phone users in the European Union (EU) are
protected by a ceiling on the roaming tariff when calling or receiving a call
abroad. We analyze the effects of this price regulative policy, and compare it
to alternative implementations of price regulations. The problem is a three-
level program: The EU determines the price regulative policy, the telephone
operator sets proﬁt maximizing prices, and customers choose to accept or
decline the operator’s offer. The ﬁrst part of this chapter contains a polyno-
mial time algorithm to solve such a three-level program. The crucial idea
is to partition the polyhedron of feasible price regulative parameters into a
polynomial number of smaller polyhedra such that a certain primitive de-
cision problem can be written as a linear program on each of those. Then
the problem can be solved by a combination of enumeration and linear pro-
gramming. In Section 7.3, we analyze an instance of this problem more
extensively, namely the price regulation problem that the EU encounters.
Using customer data from a large telephone operator that resemble reality,
we compare different price regulative policies with respect to their social
welfare. On the basis of a speciﬁc social welfare function, we observe that
other price regulative policies or different ceilings can improve the total so-
cial welfare on this particular data set.1
1This chapter is based on Grigoriev, van Loon, and Uetz (2008a).Chapter 7. Algorithms for Optimal Price Regulations
7.1 Introduction
It is of major importance to the European Union (EU) that European com-
panies, governments and citizens play an important role at the realization
of a world-economy based on knowledge. The EU tries to stimulate the de-
velopment and use of new information and communication technology, and
to enlarge the level of competition of the EU compared to other markets, e.g.
the United States and Japan. An important element of the European pol-
icy is to assure that ICT-services are available and affordable for everyone.
This contains for example telephony, fax, internet and free emergency num-
bers. However, especially the prices for making and receiving calls abroad,
referred to as roaming, have been extremely high in the EU. A warning did
not lead to a decrease in prices, and therefore the European Commission
uses price regulation to force lower prices and more transparency in the mar-
ket (European Commission, Information Society, Media Directorate General
2007). Currently, the EU considers the same instrument for data roaming,
since the situation mirrors the one for voice roaming back in 2007. We an-
alyze the effects of the current price regulation on the social welfare, both
algorithmically and practically, and compare it to alternative regulations.
We regard a general model in which a government tries to maximize
social welfare through price regulation. This regulation should bound the
company (not necessarily a telephone operator) in setting the prices so as
to protect the customers, without harming the market. The company deter-
mines the price of item types. An item type represents a physical product or a
service, for example, a minute calling, internet connection, shipping, etc. We
use a model in which there is only one company that determines the pricing
strategy, under given and known market competition. Obviously, there ex-
ist markets in which multiple companies operate and need to share a set of
customers. However, for this research we make the simplifying assumption
that, under given market regulations, companies reach an optimal market
price, so we identify them with just one single company.
Similarly as in Chapter 5, we introduce the following notation. Let K Æ
{1,...,m} be the set of distinct item types a given company wants to price.
Let pk ¸ 0 be the price of items of type k 2 K. Let J Æ {1,...,n} be a set of
single-minded customers. Every customer j 2 J has positive demand djk for
item type k 2 K, which is the number of times customer j wants to purchase
item type k. For example, if k represents calling abroad for one minute then
djk is the number of minutes j wants to call abroad. Or, if k is the start-up
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of a process then djk is 1 if j prefers to start the process and 0 otherwise.
Every customer j requests a contract from the company, which is speciﬁed
by the total demand vector (dj1,...,djm). The valuation bj is the maximum
amount customer j 2 J is willing to pay for her contract. Once the prices of
the item types are determined, the price of the contract, p(j), is deﬁned by
the following afﬁne function
p(j)Æ dj0Ådj1p1Å¢¢¢Ådjmpm, j 2 J. (7.1)
Note that the price of a contract is personal, due to a potential ‘entrance
fee’ dj0, and because it depends on the demand (dj1,...,djm) of a single cus-
tomer. We assume that, through market research, we know the customers’
demands djk for all item types k 2 K and the valuation bj, for all customers
j 2 J. Therefore, we are faced with a purely algorithmic problem in contrast
to mechanism design problems where the valuations are private information
to the customers.
The pricing regime as deﬁned in (7.1) is referred to as afﬁne pricing in
the economic literature, which is extensively discussed in Chapter 5. A so-
lution to the problem is a price p(j) for every customer j 2 J, which is de-
termined through a vector of prices p Æ (p1,...,pm) as given in (7.1). Every
customer decides whether to accept this contract or not. Hereto, she sets
binary variable wj to 1 if she accepts, and 0 otherwise, in order to maxi-
mize her personal objective, denoted by f j(p)¢wj. In this chapter, we as-
sume a linear function f j(p), for example, think of f j(p) Æ bj ¡ p(j). Let
w Æ (w1,...,wn) denote the strategies of all customers. Customers that ac-
cept the contract are referred to as winners, and the set of winners is deﬁned
by W Æ{j 2 J : wj Æ1}. We assume that all item types are available in unlim-
ited supply, which is true for digital items for example. Thus any solution
will be trivially envy-free.
7.1.1 Three-level program
The government protects the customers by means of regulative constraints.
Let R Æ {1,..., ˆ r} denote the set of constraints imposed by the government.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the number of regulations ˆ r is
constant. Every constraint r 2 R is deﬁned by gr(p,®r) · 0, where ® Æ
(®1,...,®ˆ r)2Rˆ r
Å is a vector of price regulative parameters determined by the
government. For example, a ceiling on price pk is implemented by letting
gk(p,®k) Æ pk ¡®k. We restrict gr(p,®r) to be a linear function in p and
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®. We introduce a bilevel program in which the company maximizes his
objective f C(p,w), for example revenue minus production costs, such that
price vector p Æ(p1,...,pm) satisﬁes the price regulative constraints. Every
customer maximizes her objective f j(p)¢wj. For further reading on bilevel







f j(p)¢wj 8 j 2 J
s.t. gr(p,®r)·0 8r 2 R
pk ¸0 8k 2 K
wj 2{0,1} 8 j 2 J
In the above mathematical program, the vector of price regulative pa-
rameters ® and constraints gr(p,®r), r 2 R, are assumed to be given. We
propose a three-level program2, where, on top of the two levels given by
company and customers, the government maximizes social welfare. In this
three-level program, the government acts ﬁrst, the company decides given
the government’s action, and the customers make their decision based on
the company’s prices. The government inﬂuences social welfare by mod-
ifying the price regulative parameters ®r, r 2 R. Also, instead of simply
forbidding the violation of price regulative constraints, we introduce taxes
¿ Æ (¿1,...,¿ˆ r) 2 [0,1]ˆ r. That is, if the company’s prices violate regulation
gr(p,®r) · 0 then a penalty must be paid over the additional revenue re-
ceived by this violation. The actual penalty for violating regulation r is de-
noted by
f TAX
r (p,w,®,¿)Æ gr(p,®r)Å¢¿r ¢ ¯ gr(w),
where gr(p,®r)Å Æmax{0,gr(p,®r)} is the amount of violation, ¿r is the tax,
and function ¯ gr(w) needs to be speciﬁed for each type of price regulative
constraint r. For example, if the regulation is a ceiling on p1, that is,
gr(p,®r) Æ p1 ¡®r, it sounds reasonable to ask tax ¿r for each euro earned
by violating the ceiling. Then ¯ gr(w) would have to be deﬁned as the total
demand for item type 1 of all winners,
P
j2J dj1wj.








gr(p,®r)Å¢¿r ¢ ¯ gr(w). (7.2)
2This three-level program is loosely based on Courcoubetis and Weber (2003, Section
5.4.1), but there the model does not include price regulation.
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The mathematical program (3LEVP) below shows the general structure






f C(p,w)¡ f TAX(p,w,®,¿)
max
wj
f j(p)¢wj 8 j 2 J
wj 2{0,1} 8 j 2 J
pk ¸0 8k 2 K
0·¿r ·1 8r 2 R
®r ¸0 8r 2 R.
We impose the following conditions on the functions.
Condition 7.1. The government’s objective function f G(p,w) is a polynomi-
ally computable function.
Condition 7.2. For every customer j 2 J, the function f j(p) is linear in p.
Condition 7.3. Given w, ® and ¿, function f C(p,w)¡ f TAX(p,w,®,¿) is pos-
itive, piecewise linear and monotone in p.
Condition 7.4. Price regulative constraint gr(p,®r) is linear in p and ®r for
all r 2 R.
The objective of the government could be to maximize the social welfare.
This objective is modeled by function f G(p,w) in the above three-level pro-
gram. If the above conditions are satisﬁed then we show that we can solve
this program in polynomial time, given that the number of item types m and
the number of regulative constraints ˆ r are constant.
Note that the lower two levels of 3LEVP can be seen as the Lagrangian
of the bilevel program 2LEVP. Moreover, a strict price regulation as in the
bilevel model, that is, forbidding to violate the regulative constraints, can
still be implemented by letting ¿r be arbitrarily large for all r 2 R. In this
case, ¿ is not strictly a tax, but just an indication that we forbid to violate
the price regulation constraints.
It is known, as shown by Demaine et al. (2006), that problem 2LEVP
with a non-constant number of item types m is hard to approximate within
a semi-logarithmic factor in the number of customers n. This means that
solving the three-level program 3LEVP has the same complexity already if
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the government’s objective is equal to the company’s objective. Similarly
as in Chapter 5, we make the assumption that the number of distinct item
types m is constant. These are reasonable assumptions particularly for the
applications that we aim at, since there the number of item types is very
small, for example, price per minute for a call received, a call placed, and
price per text message. For a small number of item types, the number of
regulations is also naturally assumed to be small.
For a constant number of item types m and regulative constraints ˆ r, we
present a polynomial time algorithm to solve three-level program 3LEVP,
under the four conditions described above.
In Section 7.3, we explicitly deﬁne all functions in three-level program
3LEVP to optimize the social welfare for the speciﬁc problem faced by the
European Union in regulating the roaming charges. We present polynomial
time algorithms to ﬁnd the optimal social welfare for the current EU policy,
optimization of the tax level only, and optimization of the regulative param-
eters only. After the theoretical results and description of the algorithms, we
perform an extensive computational study in Section 7.4 to verify practical
feasibility of the approach and to evaluate the results of different scenar-
ios for implementing price regulations. Here, we use the actual price reg-
ulations set by the European Commission and investigate the EU policy in
terms of social welfare.
7.2 Parameter and tax level optimization
Consider three-level program 3LEVP for which the functions satisfy the con-
ditions stated before. In this section, we propose an algorithm to solve this
program.
Deﬁnition 7.2.1 (Vertex). A vertex v2V is deﬁned by a price vector p(v) 2Rm
Å
that is characterized by m equalities out of the nÅm equalities f j(p(v)) Æ 0,
j 2 J, and p
(v)
k Æ0, k 2 K, such that the coefﬁcient matrix of these m equalities
has rank m.
Lemma 7.2.2. For given vectors w2{0,1}n, ®2Rˆ r
Å and ¿2[0,1]ˆ r, the optimal
price vector p Æ(p1,...,pm) for the company can only be at a vertex as deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 7.2.1.
Proof. The lemma follows from the fact that, for given vectors ® and ¿, the
company’s objective function is locally linear in the prices. Here, locally
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linear means linear on any minimal polyhedral subdivision as deﬁned by
the nÅ mÅ ˆ r equations f j(p) Æ 0, j 2 J, pk Æ 0, k 2 K, and gr(p,®r) Æ 0,
r 2 R. Thus, any price vector p that is not a vertex either has an improving
direction since ¿r ·1 for all r 2 R and therefore is not optimal, or it lies on a
face of the arrangement of the m linear equations that is orthogonal to the
linear objective. Moreover, since ¿r ·1 for all r 2 R, moving in the improving
direction will never decrease the company’s proﬁt, no matter what ® is.
We propose an algorithm that solves problem 3LEVP by optimizing price
regulative parameters ® and the taxes ¿ simultaneously. Thereto, we parti-
tion the polyhedron of the price regulative parameters ® into a polynomial
number of smaller polyhedra, and solve a linear programming problem in
each of those. These linear programs are deﬁned in such a way that we
can verify if a given price vector constitutes the company’s optimum prices.
This decision problem is in general non-linear. The trick here is to deﬁne
the partition such that this decision problem becomes linear inside each of
the small polyhedra. The optimum solution of a three-level mathematical
program is eventually obtained by enumeration over all polyhedra and ver-
tices, and evaluating the social welfare in each of them. We ﬁrst describe
the algorithm formally, and then illustrate our approach in Example 7.2.4.
Consider the following decision problem.
Problem 7.1. Are there price regulative vectors ® and ¿ such that vertex
v2V with price vector p(v) maximizes the objective function f C¡ f TAX for the
company?
The main idea for the solution to Problem 7.1 is as follows. Consider
some arbitrary vertex v 2 V, we would like to write constraints expressing
the fact that vertex v maximizes the objective, namely for all vertices u 2V,
f C(p(v),w(v))¡ f TAX(p(v),w(v),®,¿)¸ f C(p(u),w(u))¡ f TAX(p(u),w(u),®,¿).
By deﬁnition, f TAX(p(v),w(v),®,¿) is nonlinear in the price regulative para-
meters. To linearize f TAX we introduce a subdivision of Rˆ r
Å into polyhedra
A`, ` 2 L. Thus, L is the set of polyhedra. For a given vertex v 2 V and by
linearity of gr(p(v),®r), there is a unique value for ®r, say av
r, where the sign
of gr(p(v),®r) changes from · 0 to È 0. Doing this for all vertices v 2 V and
all regulative constraints r 2 R, we deﬁne a rectangular subdivision in Rˆ r
Å
for possible ®’s by ®r Æ av
r. On each such deﬁned ®-rectangle A`, we may
now compare the company’s objective in vertex v 2 V to the objective in all
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other vertices u 2 V \v. Therefore, we split the tax function f TAX
r , r 2 R,
into two parts for every vertex v 2 V and polyhedron A` such that x
(v,`)
r
incorporates all terms in the regulative constraint not multiplied with ®r
and y
(v,`)





r be the lower and upper bound for ®r in polyhedron A`. For every
vertex v2V, polyhedron A`, `2 L, and regulation r 2 R, we do the following.
If gr(p(v), ˆ ®
(`)




















r are correct because gr(p(v),®) is
linear in ®. Consequently,
f TAX




r ®r¿r, 8r 2 R.
We can derive a solution to Problem 7.1 on A` by solving the following math-
























r ·®r · ˆ ®
(`)
r 8r 2 R
0·¿r ·1 8r 2 R.
This quadratic program can be linearized by simple variable substitution,
where Ár Æ ®r¿r for all r 2 R. Therefore, for every vertex v 2 V and polyhe-
dron A`, Problem 7.1 becomes a linear program (LP1) with variables ¿r and




















· f C(p(v),w(v))¡ f C(p(u),w(u)) 8u 2V
ˇ ®
(`)
r ¿r ·Ár · ˆ ®
(`)
r ¿r 8r 2 R
0·¿r ·1 8r 2 R.
On any polyhedron A` this linear program is either infeasible, suggesting
that there are no price regulative parameters in A` that makes v the so-
lution that maximizes the company’s objective, or we obtain corresponding
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price regulative parameters in A`. Eventually, a straightforward algorithm
enumerating all vertices v 2 V, checking feasible solutions for ®’s in A`,
` 2 L, and picking the one that achieves the maximal social welfare, pro-
vides an optimal solution to the three-level program. Since the number of
item types m is constant, we have a polynomial number of vertices. As the
number of regulative constraints ˆ r is constant, we have only a polynomial
number of polyhedra in Rˆ r
Å. For every polyhedron and every vertex, we solve
linear program LP1, deriving the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2.3. Three-level program 3LEVP, satisfying the imposed condi-
tions, admits a polynomial time algorithm if the number of item types m and
the number of regulative constraints ˆ r are constant.
Example 7.2.4. Consider the problem in which m Æ 2 with f j(p) Æ bj ¡ p(j)
for all j 2 J. Figure 7.1 displays a possible picture for this setting, where















Figure 7.1: Linear arrangement of the valuation and nonnegativity inequalities.
The vertices p(1), ..., p(10) generated by m out of these equalities and
the equalities pk Æ 0, k 2 K, are displayed by the bullets. We deﬁne three
price regulative constraints by g1(p,®1) Æ p1 ¡®1, g2(p,®2) Æ p2 ¡®2 and
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g3(p,®3)Æ p1¡®3p2, and let ¯ gr(w)Æ1 for all r Æ1,2,3. There is no economic
interpretation for ¯ gr(w) Æ 1, so this is purely for simplicity of the example.
These constraints are presented by the dotted lines in Figure 7.1, created by
solving gr(p,®r)Æ gr(p(v),®r)Æ0 for all v2V and r 2 R. That is, the vertical,
horizontal and diagonal lines represent regulative constraint g1, g2 and g3,
respectively, through the different vertices. There are 7 vertical regions, that
is, from p1 Æ 0 to p1 Æ p
(1)
1 , from p1 Æ p
(1)
1 to p1 Æ p
(2)
1 , etcetera, all the way
up to p1 ¸ p
(9)
1 . Similarly, there are 7 horizontal regions, and 4 diagonal
regions. Consequently, we need 7¢7¢4 Æ 196 polyhedra in the subdivision of
the regulative parameter space R3
Å.
Figure 7.2 represents the subdivision of the regulative parameter space
R3
Å into polyhedra A`, `Æ1,...,196. On the axes, there are the values for the













































Figure 7.2: Subdivision in R3
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Now, let us consider vertex p(3). As g1(p(3), ˆ ®
(`)







1 Æ ¡1. For the second regulation we have g2(p(3), ˆ ®
(`)





2 Æ 0. And ﬁnally, since g3(p(3), ˆ ®
(`)









2 . We perform these steps for every polyhedron A`, `2 L, and every
vertex v 2 V. After straightforward computation of f C(p(u),w(u)), u 2 V, we
solve linear program LP1 and select the vertex that yields the highest social
welfare among all vertices v2V for which LP1 is feasible.
In this section, we use price regulative constraints in which there is one
particular ®r and ¿r for every constraint r 2 R. However, the above described
algorithm can easily be adapted for other cases, that is, there might be mul-
tiple ® parameters or tax levels ¿ in one constraint, or multiple constraints
can be subjected to the same tax level ¿ or contain the same ®.
7.3 Optimization of European regulation
In this section, we explicitly deﬁne functions f G, f C, f TAX and f j, j 2 J, to
address the problem faced by the European Union regarding the regulation
on roaming. First of all, the customers accept a contract if its price does
not exceed the valuation, that is, the objective of customer j 2 J is deﬁned
as (bj ¡ p(j))wj. If p(j) · bj this function is maximized by setting wj Æ 1
and thus accepting the contract, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, the EU sets
ceilings on the prices. That is, R Æ K, and gk(p,®k) Æ pk ¡®k with ®k ¸ 0
for all item types k 2 K. The objective of the company is to maximize the
proﬁt, deﬁned as revenue minus costs. The revenue is the total payment by
all winning customers. As for the costs, let ck be the cost of providing one
unit of k to a customer. The company’s cost to serve customer j is denoted
by c(j)Æ dj1c1Å¢¢¢Ådjmcm.
In the simplest setting, the government regulates the prices by forbid-
ding to violate the constraint pk · ®k for every item type k 2 K. We model









s.t. 0· pk ·®k 8k 2 K
wj 2{0,1} 8 j 2 J.
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To ﬁnd the prices that will lead to the optimal proﬁt for the company,
we use the afﬁne pricing algorithm introduced in Chapter 5, in which we
incorporate the price regulative constraints, and the costs of the company.
Theorem 7.3.1 (Theorem 5.2.5). For given price regulative constraints pk ·
®k which must not be violated, proﬁt maximizing prices can be computed in
polynomial time, given that the number of distinct item types m is constant.
As already discussed in the introduction, we study whether there are
other price regulative strategies that might lead to an increase in social wel-
fare. Thus, let us ﬁrst proceed with a deﬁnition of the social welfare func-
tion we believe is appropriate for modeling the roaming regulation problem.
According to utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham3 and John Stuart Mill4,
society should aim to maximize the total utility of individuals, aiming for
“the greatest happiness for the greatest number”. Thus, the government
strives to set the price regulative parameters so as to maximize the social
welfare, deﬁned as the sum of utilities. The utility of the company is the
total revenue minus costs. We assume that the company is risk-neutral, and
thus the marginal utility is equal for every extra euro earned. On the con-
trary, consumers have a concave utility function in general, which means
that they are assumed to be risk-averse. A concave utility function induces
that a gain in wealth conveys a smaller increase to utility than the reduction
in utility imparted by a loss in wealth of equal magnitude, that is, dimin-
ishing marginal utility. Another property of a concave utility function is
that a customer with a low valuation values one unit of money more than
a customer with a high valuation. In other words, the marginal utility of a
euro to a ‘poor’ customer is likely to exceed the marginal utility of a euro to a
‘rich’ customer (Shavel 2004, Chapter VII). Bernoulli (1738)5 ﬁrst proposed a
utility function that is equal to the natural logarithm of wealth. A logarith-
mic function is monotonically increasing and the marginal utility function
is monotonically decreasing, which are the two basic mathematical proper-
ties that consumer utility functions have to satisfy, as described by Baz and
Chacko (2004). In the words of Savage (1972), “no other function has been
3Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was an English jurist, philosopher, and legal and social
reformer.
4John Stuart Mill (1806-1876) was a British philosopher, political economist, civil servant
and Member of Parliament.
5Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782) was a Swiss mathematician. He is particularly remem-
bered for his applications of mathematics to mechanics, especially ﬂuid mechanics, and for
his pioneering work in probability and statistics.
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suggested as a better prototype for Everyman’s utility function”. Based on
this discussion, we model the utility of customer j 2 J as ln((bj¡p(j))wjÅ1),
where the addition of 1 is solely to have a positive function. Conclusively,







(bj ¡ p(j))wj Å1
¢
Å(p(j)¡c(j))wj.
In Section 7.3.1, we furthermore include a tax payment for violating the
price regulative constraints, similar as in Section 7.2. However, this does
not change the social welfare function, as the tax is paid by the company
to the government. Thus, the company’s utility is decreased by the same
amount as the government’s utility is increased, also known as transferable
utility. This assumption is justiﬁed when the company and the government
have a common currency that is valued equally by both.
7.3.1 Price regulation by tax
In this section, the price regulative constraints pk · ®k are not enforced by
law, but their violation is penalized via tax ¿1. We deﬁne ¯ gk(w)Æ
P
j2J djkwj
for all item types k 2 K. The tax function is deﬁned as
f TAX
k (p,w,®,¿1)Æ gk(p,®k)Å¢¿1¢ ¯ gk(w)Æ
X
j2J
djk(pk¡®k)Å¿1wj, 8k 2 K.


























f jwj Æ(bj ¡ p(j))wj
s.t. pk ¸0 8k 2 K
wj 2{0,1} 8 j 2 J
0·¿1 ·1.
Notice that all functions in this three-level program satisfy the conditions
stated in the introduction of this chapter.
For any given ®k, k 2 K, consider the arrangement of linear inequalities
deﬁned in Rm
Å by the valuation inequalities p(j) · bj for every customer j 2
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J, that is, f j(p) ¸ 0, nonnegativity inequalities pk ¸ 0 and price regulative
constraints pk ·®k for every item type k 2 K.





m ) 2 Rm
Å that satisﬁes m equalities out of the n Å2m equalities
p(v)(j) Æ bj, j 2 J, p
(v)
k Æ ®k, and p
(v)
k Æ 0, k 2 K, such that the coefﬁcient
matrix of these m equalities has rank m.
To optimize the social welfare function we use nonlinear programming.
For further reading on nonlinear programming, we refer to Bazaraa, Sherali,
and Shetty (1993). For notational purposes, let I Æ{1,...,nÅ2m} be the index
set of inequalities. For all i 2 I, we do the following:
• If i Æ j 2 J then dik Æ djk for all k 2 K [0 such that p(i) Æ p(j) and
bi Æ bj.
• If i¡nÆ k 2 K then dik Æ1 and dik0 Æ0 for all k0 2(K [0)\k such that
p(i)Æ pk, and bi Æ0.
• If i¡n¡m Æ k 2 K then dik Æ1 and dik0 Æ0 for all k0 2(K [0)\k such





ln(bj ¡ p(j)Å1)Å p(j)¡c(j),
for some given price vector p 2Rm
Å , where W Æ{j 2 J : p(j)· bj}.
Consider the arrangement of linear inequalities p(i)· bi. This arrange-
ment consists of multiple polyhedra. A polyhedron P is deﬁned by a sub-
set of inequalities Ui(p) ¸ 0, where Ui(p) Æ p(i)¡ bi for some i 2 I and
Ui(p)Æ bi ¡ p(i) for others.
Example 7.3.3. Consider an instance with n Æ 3 customers and m Æ 2 item
types, thus I Æ {1,...,7}. The arrangement of linear inequalities p(i) · bi
displayed in Figure 7.3. The gray polyhedron is deﬁned by U2(p)Æ b2¡p(2)¸
0, U3(p)Æ p(3)¡b3 ¸0 and U6(p)Æ p(6)¡b6 Æ p1¡®1 ¸0.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient
for a solution to be optimal. The necessary conditions for inequality con-
strained problems were ﬁrst published by Karush (1939), although they
became renowned after a seminal conference paper by Kuhn and Tucker
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p(4)= p1 =0= b4




p(6)= p1 =α1 = b6
p(7)= p2 =α2 = b7
Figure 7.3: A polyhedron in the arrangement of linear inequalities.
(1951). Let ¯ p Æ( ¯ p1,..., ¯ pm) be a feasible solution and let IÆ Æ{i 2 I : Ui( ¯ p)Æ





¹iUi( ¯ p)Æ0 8i 2 IÆ
¹i ¸0 8i 2 IÆ.
Using the above discussion, we now explicitly show that the optimal pric-
ing strategy is attained at a vertex.
Theorem 7.3.4. For any given ®k ¸0, k 2 K, there exists a revenue maximiz-
ing price vector p 2Rm
Å corresponding to a vertex as in Deﬁnition 7.3.2.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary chosen polyhedron P of the arrangement of
linear inequalities. We show that for any such polyhedron, the optimal solu-
tion can only be attained at a vertex. First, we assume there exists a feasible
price vector ¯ p Æ ( ¯ p1,..., ¯ pm) in the interior of polyhedron P . As ¯ p is in the
interior, we know that IÆ Æ ;. The set of winners is denoted by W µ J. For
any price vector in the interior of polyhedron P , the set of winners W is the
same. The KKT conditions therefore hold if




bj ¡ ¯ p(j)Å1
Ådjk Æ0, 8k 2 K,
where ¯ p(j)Æ dj0Ådj1 ¯ p1Å...Ådjm ¯ pm. As ¯ p is in the interior, we know that
bj È ¯ p(j) for all j 2W. Thus rS( ¯ p)È0, and ¯ p is not a local optimum.
Now we check whether a price vector on the boundary of the polyhedron
can be a local optimum, where we exclude the vertices. We consider two
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cases as the inequality Ui(p) ¸ 0 describing the polyhedron can be either
Ui(p)Æ p(i)¡bi or Ui(p)Æ bi ¡ p(i), for some i 2 I.
Case 1: For some i 2 I, we assume that ¯ p(i) Æ bi and ˜ p(i) È bi for any
˜ p in the interior of polyhedron P . That is, inequality Ui(p) Æ p(i)¡bi ¸ 0
partially describes the polyhedron. Obviously, IÆ Æ {i}. Then, vector ¯ p is a




bj ¡ ¯ p(j)Å1
ÅdjkÅ¹idik Æ0. (7.3)
If i Æ j 2 W then for this particular customer we have bj Æ p(j). Note that
we may assume that jW \ IÆj ¸ 1 as if the only winner is i Æ j then we can
choose any point on p(j)Æ bj and get revenue bj, so we will obtain the same
revenue at a vertex of the polyhedron that is partly deﬁned by p(j)Æ bj. For
all j 2 W \ IÆ, it holds that bj È ¯ p(j). Coefﬁcient dik is equal to djk ¸ 0 if
i Æ j 2 J, or 1 if i¡n Æ k 2 K or i¡n¡m Æ k 2 K. Also, we know that ¹i is
positive for all i 2 I and k 2 K. Thus, the left hand side of Equality (7.3) is
strictly positive, and therefore the equality cannot hold, which means that
vector ¯ p is not a local optimum.
Case 2: For some i 2 I, we assume that ¯ p(i) Æ bi and ˜ p(i) Ç bi for any
˜ p in the interior of polyhedron P . That is, inequality Ui(p) Æ bi ¡ p(i) ¸
0 partially describes the polyhedron. Again, IÆ Æ {i}. By deﬁnition, there










Now, we rewrite social welfare function S( ¯ p) by replacing ¯ pk0 such that the
function only contains prices ¯ pk, k 2 K\k0. Consequently, the partial deriva-













Æ0, 8k 2 K \k0. (7.5)
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Equation (7.4) can only hold if ¹i Æ0 as dik0 È0 by deﬁnition. Equation (7.5)














for all k 2 K \k0. Similarly as before, we may assume that jW \ IÆj ¸ 1. As
bj È ¯ p(j) for all j 2 W \ IÆ, the left hand side of the this latter equality is
strictly negative. Thus vector ¯ p cannot be a local optimum. Concluding, a
local optimum can only exists at a vertex of the linear arrangement.
Notice that a vertex v2V is most preferable to the company if the proﬁt
after tax at this vertex, f C(p(v),w(v))¡f TAX(p(v),w(v),®,¿1), is at least as high
as at any other vertex. Let W(v) Æ{j 2 J : w
(v)
j Æ1}. More precisely, for every

















Note that all terms except ¿1 in the above inequality are known, as ®k is
given and p
(v)









We rewrite inequality (7.6) and solve the following feasibility linear program
(LP2) for each vertex v2V.














Let V¤ µ V be the set of vertices for which the above linear program has
a feasible solution. Then, among all vertices in V¤ we select the vertex v¤
with the highest social welfare
X
j2W(v¤)
ln(bj ¡ p(v¤)(j)Å1)Å p(v¤)(j)¡c(j).
The tax level ¿1 is obtained as a solution to the linear program for this par-
ticular vertex v¤. So we have proved the following theorem.
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Theorem 7.3.5. For given price regulative constraints pk ·®k, the tax level
¿1 2 [0,1] that maximizes the total social welfare, and the corresponding
proﬁt maximizing prices can be computed in polynomial time, given that the
number of distinct item types m is constant.
7.3.2 Parameter optimization
So far we assumed given values of the price regulative parameters ®1,...,®m.
In this section we optimize these parameters under the regulation that the

















(bj ¡ p(j))wj 8 j 2 J
s.t. 0· pk ·®k 8k 2 K
wj 2{0,1} 8 j 2 J
®k ¸0 8k 2 K.
Since parameters ®k, k 2 K, are not given, let V denote the set of vertices
as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7.2.1. For every vertex v 2V, let ®k Æ p
(v)
k for all k 2
K. Let U Æ {u 2 V : pk · ®k, 8k 2 K}. Then, vertex u 2U is most preferable






p(u0)(j)¡c(j) 8u0 2U \u.
Among all vertices that are most preferable given set U, we select the one
with the highest social welfare and set the ®-parameters accordingly.
Theorem 7.3.6. For the regulation that forbids the company to violate the
constraints, the parameter vector ® that maximizes the total social welfare,
and the corresponding proﬁt maximizing prices can be computed in polyno-
mial time, given that the number of distinct item types m is constant.
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7.4 Computational results
In the summer of 2007, the European Commission decided to implement
an EU-wide ceiling on the international roaming tariffs. In Table 7.1 we
present the prices as they were, are and will be implemented (European
Commission, Information Society, Media Directorate General 2007), where
the inter-operator tariff is the maximum amount an operator may charge
another operator for using the network. These are the costs for the operator
for providing roaming service to the customers to call abroad.
Summer Summer Summer
2007 2008 2009
Calls made abroad 0.5831 0.5474 0.5117
Calls received abroad 0.2856 0.2618 0.2261
Inter-operator tariff 0.3570 0.3332 0.3094
Table 7.1: Ceiling on prices in euro by the European Commission, including value
added tax.
The goal of this practical study is to analyze the effect of properly cho-
sen parameters on social welfare, and the advantage of using taxes instead
of forbidding to violate the price regulation. We use data from a telephone
operator that resemble reality. These data contain the phone usage of cus-
tomers with a prepaid subscription during one month, March 2007, thus this
data set was generated in a period before the introduction of the price regu-
lation. For each customer, the data contain the number of minutes and times
the mobile phone is used for different actions, for example, calling within the
home country or abroad, sending a text message, etc. We determine for every
customer which operator in the telephone market offers the cheapest possi-
ble total price for her complete contract. This price determines her valuation
bj. For this study, even though the data contains more information, we focus
on optimizing the prices for roaming only, namely calling and receiving a call
abroad. This is to say, we consider a problem in dimension 2, with prices p1
for calling abroad, and p2 for receiving a call abroad. We also impose the
constraint that the price for receiving a call should not exceed the price for
placing a call, that is, p1 ¸ p2. If customer j 2 J requests to call dj1 minutes
from abroad and receives calls abroad for dj2 minutes, within a month, the
price customer j has to pay is p(j)Æ d1jp1Åd2jp2.
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7.4.1 Experiments
We apply the model and techniques from Section 7.3 to a data set contain-
ing 1366 customers. Also, we create one random sample out of this data
set containing 500 customers. In the application of the ﬁrst algorithm, we
use the current price regulations imposed by the European Commission as
described in Table 7.1. The costs for calling from abroad (the inter-operator
tariff), c1, is also retrieved from the table, and the cost for the operator for
a customer to receive a call is half of this. First, we forbid the operator to
violate this price regulation by law (LAW), that is, a penalty ¿1 Æ1. Second,
we keep the price regulative parameters ®k as they are, but now we ﬁnd a
tax level ¿1 2 [0,1] which maximizes social welfare (TAX). Note that there
can be a range of feasible tax levels achieving the maximal social welfare by
deﬁnition of LP2. This effect was also observed in our results. Third, we
compute the optimal social welfare by optimizing over the price regulative
parameters ®k (OPT). The computational study is conducted on a computer
with an Intel Core2Duo CPU running at 1.86GHz and 2.0 GB of Ram.
Here, p1 denotes the price per minute in euro for calling from abroad,
and p2 denotes the price per minute in euro for receiving a call abroad. The
tables below give the complete results for all algorithms, that is,
• pricing strategy p1 and p2,
• regulative parameters ®1, ®2 and ¿1,
• revenue R Æ
P
j2W p(j),
• paid cost C Æ
P
j2W c(j),





• proﬁt ¦Æ R¡C,
• total valuation B Æ
P
j2W bj,
• total customer utility U Æ
P
j2W ln(bj ¡ p(j)Å1), and
• social welfare S ÆU Å¦,
where for the tax level we present the computed lower and upper bound that
lead to this result. Finally, we present the runtime in seconds. Tables 7.2, 7.3
and 7.4 display the results for the regulation as implemented in 2007, 2008
and 2009, respectively.
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Complete data set Sample
LAW TAX OPT LAW TAX OPT
p1 0.5830 0.7448 0.7448 p1 0.5830 1.2545 1.2309
p2 0.2856 0.5459 0.5459 p2 0.2856 0.4049 0.1946
®1 0.5831 0.5831 0.7448 ®1 0.5831 0.5831 1.2324
®2 0.2856 0.2856 0.5492 ®2 0.2856 0.2856 0.3020
¿1 1 12.42% 1 ¿1 1 4.35% 1
1 61.79% 1 1 71.69% 1
R 3866.09 4101.72 4101.72 R 758.02 969.83 981.00
C 2370.82 1917.16 1917.16 C 464.95 283.91 308.25
T 0.00 973.87 0.00 T 0.00 506.86 0.00
¦ 1495.27 2184.56 2184.56 ¦ 293.07 685.92 672.74
B 8248.06 7422.67 7422.67 B 2096.46 1668.07 1726.61
U 1338.93 1131.21 1131.21 U 585.62 344.71 365.92
S 2834.20 3315.77 3315.77 S 878.69 1030.63 1038.66
sec 133 125 125 sec 1 1 1
Table 7.2: Results for regulation in 2007.
Complete data set Sample
LAW TAX OPT LAW TAX OPT
p1 0.5474 0.7448 0.7448 p1 0.5474 1.2545 1.2309
p2 0.2618 0.5459 0.5459 p2 0.2317 0.2397 0.1946
®1 0.5474 0.5474 0.7448 ®1 0.5474 0.5474 1.2324
®2 0.2618 0.2618 0.5492 ®2 0.2618 0.2618 0.3020
¿1 1 3.78% 1 ¿1 1 52.40% 1
1 61.48% 1 1 72.51% 1
R 3650.63 4101.72 4101.72 R 742.33 978.15 981.00
C 2228.86 1789.35 1789.35 C 458.79 277.30 287.70
T 0.00 1169.08 0.00 T 0.00 528.36 0.00
¦ 1421.77 2312.37 2312.37 ¦ 283.54 700.85 693.29
B 8275.30 7422.67 7422.67 B 2136.18 1698.15 1726.61
U 1375.74 1131.21 1131.21 U 603.60 354.08 365.92
S 2797.51 3443.59 3443.59 S 887.15 1054.92 1059.21
sec 136 136 134 sec 2 1 1
Table 7.3: Results for regulation in 2008.
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Complete data set Sample
LAW TAX OPT LAW TAX OPT
p1 0.5117 0.7448 0.7448 p1 0.5117 1.2545 1.2309
p2 0.2261 0.5459 0.5459 p2 0.2213 0.2397 0.1946
®1 0.5117 0.5117 1.5004 ®1 0.5117 0.5117 1.2324
®2 0.2261 0.2261 1.4854 ®2 0.2261 0.2261 0.3020
¿1 1 0.00% 1 ¿1 1 33.67% 1
1 61.13% 1 1 73.83% 1
R 3567.25 4101.72 4101.72 R 714.42 978.15 981.00
C 2176.63 1661.54 1661.54 C 437.80 257.50 267.15
T 0.00 1371.31 0.00 T 0.00 557.35 0.00
¦ 1390.62 2440.19 2440.19 ¦ 276.62 720.65 713.84
B 8456.72 7422.67 7422.67 B 2155.85 1698.15 1726.61
U 1418.53 1131.21 1131.21 U 618.39 354.08 365.92
S 2809.15 3571.40 3571.40 S 895.02 1074.73 1079.76
sec 133 133 306 sec 1 1 1
Table 7.4: Results for regulation in 2009.
We summarize our conclusions regarding the computational study from
these results as follows. Introducing a tax (TAX) instead of enforcing the
price regulation by law (LAW) leads to an increase in the social welfare. This
suggests that a more liberal price regulative policy might have the potential
to improve social welfare. The tax levels that are obtained using the algo-
rithm are not trivial. In extreme cases, not observed here though, a company
might be able to participate in the market where it would not be proﬁtable
to do so if violation of price regulations was forbidden. Not surprisingly, the
social welfare is maximal when the ®-parameters are optimized (OPT). In
the sample, the social welfare is strictly larger in the latter case. For the
complete data set, both algorithms yield the same social welfare. Conclud-
ing, it seems that the current EU practice does not yield the optimum, at
least not with the data set and experimental setup that we use here.
7.5 Conclusion
First, we think it is an interesting result in its own that the given three-level
program can indeed be solved in polynomial time by making use of linear
programming techniques. Even though techniques are comparably simple
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and crucially use the fact that the dimension m is constant, we believe it is
not straightforward to come up with a polynomial time algorithm.
Second, on the more economic side, our computational results suggest
that a more liberal price regulative policy, namely taxation instead of regu-
lation by law, might lead to an increase in social welfare. But of course, this
conclusion cannot be made hard as it depends very much on the choice of the
social welfare function.
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Voor ieder bedrijf is het bepalen van prijzen een zeer belangrijke, maar ook
gecompliceerde taak. Het doel is immers om zoveel mogelijk opbrengst te
genereren. Wanneer beslissingen over prijzen worden genomen zonder on-
derzoek en analyse kan een bedrijf een groot deel van de opbrengst mislopen.
Een te lage prijs kan voor verlies zorgen als geïnteresseerde consumenten
meer hadden willen betalen voor het product. Maar, het zorgt er wel voor
dat er meer consumenten worden aangetrokken die met een hogere prijs het
product misschien niet zouden aanschaffen. Een te hoge prijs levert meer op
per verkocht product, maar wellicht kopen sommige consumenten het pro-
duct niet omdat het simpelweg te duur is. Kortom, een goede marktkennis
en algoritmische analyse zijn van wezenlijk belang bij het bepalen van de
juiste prijzen om de opbrengst te maximaliseren.
Het prijsprobleem is een spel tussen het bedrijf en de consumenten.
Eerst bepaalt het bedrijf de prijzen voor de producten. Vervolgens, deze prij-
zen beschouwend, kiezen de consumenten welke producten ze willen kopen
en of ze bereid zijn om de gezette prijzen te betalen. Dit spel op twee niveaus,
waar het bedrijf de leider is en de consumenten de volgers zijn, is een in-
stantie van een Stackelberg spel.
Als leider van dit spel moet het bedrijf de eerste stap zetten. Als het
bedrijf al toegang heeft tot informatie over de voorkeuren van de consumen-
ten op het moment dat de prijzen bepaald moeten worden, is dat vanzelf-
sprekend een groot voordeel. Het verkrijgen van fundamentele kennis over
de doelgroep is tegenwoordig makkelijker dan ooit tevoren, voornamelijk
vanwege het gebruik van internet. Een bedrijf kan gegevens kopen over
bijna elk product, iedere industrie, trend en interesse, op een manier dieNederlandse Samenvatting
het beste past bij de speciﬁeke behoeften van het bedrijf. Vanwege dit grote
aanbod en het gemak om informatie te verspreiden, weten bedrijven wat
consumenten kopen, hoeveel ze uitgeven en hoe vaak een product wordt
gekocht. Die informatie kan veel geld waard zijn als ze ten volste wordt
gebruikt. Algoritmische prijsbepaling is de studie waarin het wiskundige
probleem wordt bekeken dat een bedrijf ondervindt tijdens het bepalen van
de prijzen met als doel de opbrengst te maximaliseren, gebruik makend van
alle informatie over de voorkeuren van de consumenten. Bovendien is het al-
goritmische prijsprobleem niet alleen van belang in een situatie waarin veel
informatie beschikbaar is. Ook wanneer de voorkeur van een consument
persoonlijke informatie is, en dus niet vooraf bepaald kan worden door het
bedrijf, is het zeer belangrijk om een goed algoritmisch begrip te hebben over
hoe de prijzen de opbrengst beïnvloeden.
In dit proefschrift worden twee algoritmische prijsproblemen bekeken,
namelijk het productsgewijze prijsprobleem en het afﬁene prijsprobleem.
In het productsgewijze prijsprobleem beschikt het bedrijf over een verza-
meling producten en voor elk individueel product moet de prijs worden be-
paald. Elke consument vraagt een of meerdere deelverzamelingen van pro-
ducten, die bundels worden genoemd. Elke bundel bevat hoogstens één
kopie van elk product. Voor iedere bundel die een consument vraagt, heeft
ze een waardebepaling. Dit is het maximale bedrag dat ze voor die speci-
ﬁeke bundel wil betalen. De totale prijs van een bundel is gelijk aan de som
van de prijzen van alle producten in de bundel. Een consument koopt de
producten in een gekozen bundel alleen als de prijs niet hoger is dan haar
waardebepaling. Het doel van het bedrijf is om de opbrengst te maximali-
seren, waarbij de opbrengst gelijk is aan de totale som van prijzen van alle
verkochte producten.
Een speciﬁeke instantie van het productsgewijze prijsprobleem is het
zogenaamde tolhuisjes probleem. Dit probleem vindt zijn oorsprong in het
bepalen van tolprijzen op delen van een snelwegennetwerk. Consumenten
reizen over verscheidene, opeenvolgende delen van het netwerk. De waarde-
bepaling wordt berekend als zijnde de kosten van het reizen over alter-
natieve wegen. Het doel van de eigenaar van het wegennetwerk is om de
opbrengst te maximaliseren. Meer speciﬁek is het snelweg probleem, waar
de tolprijzen worden bepaald op delen van één enkele snelweg.
Het algemene productsgewijze prijsprobleem en het snelweg probleem
worden beschreven in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift. In Hoofdstukken 2
en 3 worden deze problemen bekeken onder verschillende natuurlijke mono-
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toniciteitsrestricties. In Hoofdstuk 4 is het aanbod van producten beperkt.
Hierdoor wordt het bepalen van een allocatie van producten aan consumen-
ten een uitdaging.
In het afﬁene prijsprobleem bepaalt het bedrijf de prijs van verschei-
dene producttypes. Een producttype kan tastbaar of digitaal zijn, maar ook
een dienst, transport, het starten van een proces of het aangaan van een
abonnement. Elke consument vraagt een contract dat is gebaseerd op haar
persoonlijke wensen betreffende de beschikbare producttypes. Dit contract
mag meerdere kopieën van een type bevatten. Een consument accepteert het
contract als de prijs niet hoger is dan haar waardebepaling. Deze waarde-
bepaling kan worden gezien als het bedrag dat een consument voor het-
zelfde contract moet betalen bij een concurrerend bedrijf. Hierdoor koopt
de consument het contract als het het goedkoopste is in de markt. Mocht het
bedrijf in staat zijn om een andere waardebepaling te verkrijgen, kan deze
natuurlijk worden gebruikt. De prijs van een contract is gelijk aan een con-
stante prijs per producttype voor elke eenheid die een consument vraagt, en
mogelijk een vast bedrag voor het accepteren van het contract. Dit bedrag
is afhankelijk van de consument zelf. Anders gezegd, gegeven de prijzen
bepaald door het bedrijf, de prijs die een consument moet betalen voor haar
contract is een afﬁene functie van haar persoonlijke vraag.
Dit probleem wordt beschreven in Hoofdstuk 5. Vervolgens, in Hoofd-
stuk 6, wordt het probleem bekeken dat een bedrijf tegenkomt bij het im-
plementeren van nieuwe prijzen. Het is namelijk niet altijd mogelijk om dit
in maar één tijdstap te doen vanwege de bemoeienis van autoriteiten, de
strategie ten opzichte van concurrenten of de perceptie van consumenten.
Dit alles kan het bedrijf dwingen om de nieuwe prijzen geleidelijk te intro-
duceren. In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt de huidige prijsregulatie op roamingtarieven
bekeken. Roaming is het gebruik maken van een mobiele telefoon buiten de
geograﬁsche dekking van het thuisnetwerk. Deze regulatie is in de zomer
van 2007 ingesteld door de Europese Commissie. Het doel van de regula-
tie is om eerlijkere prijzen te verkrijgen en om de markt transparanter te
maken. Naast het bekijken van de huidige situatie, worden ook alternatieve
regulaties aangedragen en oplossingsmethoden beschreven.
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